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Executive Summary
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As developing countries weigh how best to revitalize 
their economies and craft a sustainable development 
path to boost living standards, they will have to factor 
in the reality that the global annual average tempera-
ture is expected to be 2º C above pre-industrial levels 
by 2050. A 2º warmer world will experience more 
intense rainfall and more frequent and more intense 
droughts, ﬂ oods, heat waves, and other extreme 
weather events. As a result, it will have dramatic 
implications for how countries manage their econo-
mies, care for their people and design their develop-
ment paths. Countries will need to adopt measures to 
adapt to climate change. Th ese measures oﬀ er a way 
to make the eﬀ ects of climate change less disruptive 
and spare the poor and the vulnerable from shoulder-
ing an unduly high burden.
 
Against this backdrop, the global community adopted 
the Bali Action Plan at the 2007 United Nations Cli-
mate Change Conference. Th e plan calls for devel-
oped countries to allocate “adequate, predictable, and 
sustainable ﬁ nancial resources and new and additional 
resources, including oﬃ  cial and concessional funding 
for developing country parties”1 to help them adapt 
to climate change. It also underscores that interna-
tional cooperation is essential for building capacity 
to integrate adaptation measures into sectoral and 
national development plans.
How high will the price tag be? Studies to date have 
provided only a wide range of estimates, from $4 bil-
lion to $109 billion a year. Th at is why the Economics 
of Adaptation to Climate Change (EACC) study was 
initiated in early 2008 by the World Bank in partner-
ship with the governments of Bangladesh, Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, 
Samoa, and Vietnam, and funded by the governments 
of Th e Netherlands, Switzerland, and Th e United 
Kingdom. Its objectives are twofold: to develop a global 
estimate of adaptation costs for informing the interna-
tional community’s eﬀ orts in the climate negotiations, 
and to help decision-makers in developing countries 
assess the risks posed by climate change and design 
national strategies for adaptation.
To address these objectives, the study was conducted 
on two parallel tracks: (1) a global track—a top-down 
approach, in which national databases were used to 
generate aggregate estimates at a global scale, draw-
ing on a wide variety of sector studies; and (2) a 
country level track—a bottom-up approach, in which 
sub-national data were aggregated to generate esti-
mates at economywide, sectoral, and local levels. Th is 
Synthesis Report integrates and summarizes the key 
ﬁ ndings of a global study report and seven country 
case study reports—covering Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Samoa, and Vietnam 
(Figure ES-1). By providing information on lessons 
learned and insights gained on adaptation to climate 
change from global, country, and sector-level analyses, 
the hope is to help policymakers worldwide prioritize 
actions, along with developing a robust, integrated 
approach for greater resilience to climate risks. Th e 
Report begins with the concepts and methodology 
used for analyses in both the global and the country 
case studies, including a discussion of study limita-
tions. Th is is followed by a synthesis of key results 
from the global and country tracks and a conclusion 
with lessons learned. 
A Call to Change Course
What are the key ﬁ ndings of the Report? To begin 
with, economic development is perhaps the best hope for 
adaptation to climate change. Development enables an 
economy to diversify and become less reliant on sec-
tors such as agriculture that are more vulnerable to 
climate change eﬀ ects. It also makes more resources 
available for minimizing risk, and similar measures 
often promote development and adaptation. 
Th at said, it cannot be development as usual. Adaptation 
will require a diﬀ erent kind of development—such as 
breeding crops that are drought and ﬂ ood tolerant, 
climate-prooﬁ ng infrastructure to make it resilient to 
climate risks and accounting for the inherent uncer-
tainty in future climate projections in development 
planning. And it will cost to adapt. Our global study 
estimates that the price tag between 2010 and 2050 for 
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adapting to an approximately 2oC warmer world by 
2050 will be in the range of $70 billion2 to $100 bil-
lion a year (World Bank 2010a).Our country studies 
suggest that costs could be even higher, once cross-
sectoral impacts are taken into account. 
However, there are numerous “low-regret” actions—
typically policies that would be priorities for devel-
opment even without climate change—especially 
in water supply and ﬂ ood protection. Economists 
regularly urge policymakers to adopt mechanisms for 
managing water resources that recognize the scarcity 
value of raw water, advice that is almost invariably 
ignored because of deeply embedded political inter-
ests. Th e reality is that the costs of misallocation of 
water resources will escalate even without climate 
change and could be overwhelming with it. At the 
same time, steps must be taken to identify and help 
the poor and most vulnerable—including soliciting 
their views on adaptation priorities and ensuring 
an enabling environment (for example, providing 
farmers with the tools and resources to respond to 
climate change) (World Bank 2010a).
Finally, given the uncertainty surrounding both cli-
mate outcomes and longer-term projections of social 
and economic development, countries should try 
to delay adaptation decisions as much as possible and 
focus on low-regret actions. Th ey should also build 
the resilience of vulnerable sectors. In agriculture, 
for example, this would mean better management 
of water resources and access to extension services 
to give policymakers greater ﬂ exibility in handling 
either droughts or waterlogging caused by ﬂ oods. 
How the Studies were Done
Th e intuitive approach to costing adaptation involves 
comparing a future world without climate change 
with a future world with climate change. Th e diﬀ er-
ence between the two worlds entails a series of actions 
to adapt to the new world conditions. And the costs 
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of these additional actions are the costs of adapting to 
climate. Figure ES-2 summarizes the methodological 
approaches of the two tracks. 
For the global study, the following four steps were 
taken:
Picking a baseline.   For the timeframe, the world in 
2050 was chosen, not beyond (forecasting climate 
change and its economic impacts becomes even 
more uncertain beyond this period). Development 
baselines were crafted for each sector, essentially 
establishing a growth path in the absence of 
climate change that determines sector-level per-
formance (such as stock of infrastructure assets, 
level of nutrition, and water supply availability). 
Th e baselines used a consistent set of GDP and 
population forecasts for 2010–2050.
Choosing climate projections.   While there is con-
siderable consensus among climate scientists that 
climate change is unequivocal, accelerating and 
human-induced (IPCC 2007), there is much 
less agreement on how climate change will aﬀ ect 
natural and social systems. For that reason, two 
climate scenarios were chosen to capture as large 
as possible a range of model predictions—from 
extreme wet to extreme dry. 
Predicting impacts.   An analysis was done to 
predict what the world would look like under 
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the new climate conditions. Th is meant trans-
lating the impacts of changes in climate on the 
various economic activities (agriculture, ﬁ sheries), 
on people’s behavior (consumptions, health), on 
environmental conditions (water availability, for-
ests), and on physical capital (infrastructure).
Identifying and costing adaptation alternatives.   
Adaptation actions were selected to oﬀ set the 
predicted impacts and to restore welfare in each 
of the major economic sectors analyzed—infra-
structure, coastal zones, water supply and ﬂ ood 
protection, agriculture, ﬁ sheries, human health, 
and forestry and ecosystem services. Th e costs of 
these actions together with the cost implications 
of changes in the frequency of extreme weather 
events were also estimated. But a cross-sectoral 
analysis of costs was not feasible.
For the country studies, two additional steps were 
taken:
Evaluating economywide impacts.   A macroeco-
nomic modeling framework—known as a Com-
putable General Equilibrium (CGE) model—was 
used to facilitate the analysis of macroeconomic 
and cross-sectoral eﬀ ects of the impacts and 
adaptation to climate change. 
Evaluating social impacts.   A social component 
was used to gather information on preferred 
adaptation strategies and sequence strategies 
from a bottom-up, local–level perspective. It also 
provided new evidence on how vulnerability is 
socially diﬀ erentiated, and on the importance 
of social accountability and good governance 
for achieving pro-poor, climate-resilient devel-
opment. It went beyond planned adaptation, 
weighing the potential of adaptation taken by 
households, collective action, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the private sector. 
For all of the studies, a number of concepts had to be 
agreed upon:
How much to adapt.   Th e studies assumed that 
countries would fully adapt—that is, adapt up 
to the level at which they enjoy the same level 
of welfare in the (future) world as they would 
have without climate change. Th is in principle 
overstates the costs of adaptation. Of course, 
governments can choose to not adapt at all, 
incurring all damage from climate change, or 
adapt to the point where beneﬁ ts from adapta-
tion equal their costs, at the margin (“optimal” 
adaptation).
What exactly is “adaptation”?   Countries face not 
only a deﬁ cit in adapting to current climate varia-
tion, let alone future climate change, but also def-
icits in providing education, housing, health, and 
other services. Th us, many countries face a more 
general “development deﬁ cit,” of which the part 
related to climate events is termed the “adapta-
tion deﬁ cit.” Th is study makes the adaptation 
deﬁ cit a part of the development baseline, so that 
adaptation costs cover only the additional costs to 
cope with future climate change.
Soft versus hard measures.   “Hard” options (capital 
intensive) were favored over “soft” options (insti-
tutions and policies)—because they are easier to 
quantify.
Public versus private adaptation.   Th e focus was 
on planned adaptation (deliberate public deci-
sion) rather than autonomous or spontaneous 
adaptation (households or communities acting 
on their own without public interventions but 
within an existing public policy framework).
How to include beneﬁ ts.   Some countries and some 
sectors may beneﬁ t from changes in climate. 
Th e question is how to account for these gains. 
A number of diﬀ erent approaches were used to 
account for these gains. 
How to handle uncertainty.   Total adaptation 
costs for a speciﬁ c climate projection assume 
that policymakers know with certainty that a 
particular climate projection will materialize. 
Th us, the use of two extreme scenarios, wettest 
and driest, provides a range of estimates for a 
world in which decision-makers have perfect 
foresight. If decision-makers end up having to 
hedge their bets and consider both scenarios at 
the same time, costs will be higher. 
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The Global Picture
Overall, the global study estimates that the cost 
between 2010 and 2050 of adapting to an approxi-
mately 2oC warmer world by 2050 is in the range of 
$70 billion3 to $100 billion a year. Th is sum is the 
same order of magnitude as the foreign aid that devel-
oped countries now give developing countries each 
year. But it is still a very low percentage (0.17 percent) 
of the income of countries (measured by their GDP, 
which was roughly $60 trillion in 2009). Th e costs 
vary by climate scenario and whether beneﬁ ts from 
climate change are used to oﬀ set adaptation costs (see 
Table ES-1).
Th e driest scenario (Commonwealth Scientiﬁ c and 
Industrial Research Organization, CSIRO) requires 
lower total adaptation costs than does the wettest 
scenario (National Centre for Atmospheric Research, 
NCAR), largely because of the sharply lower costs 
for infrastructure, which outweigh the higher costs 
for water and ﬂ ood management. In both scenarios, 
infrastructure, coastal zones, and water supply and 
ﬂ ood protection account for the bulk of the costs. 
On a regional basis, for both climate scenarios, 
the East Asia and Paciﬁ c Region bears the highest 
adaptation cost, and the Middle East and North 
Africa the lowest. Latin America and the Carib-
bean and Sub-Saharan Africa follow East Asia and 
Paciﬁ c in both scenarios. On a sector breakdown, 
the highest costs for East Asia and the Paciﬁ c are 
in infrastructure and coastal zones; for Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, water supply and ﬂ ood protection and 
agriculture; for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
water supply and ﬂ ood protection and coastal zones; 
and for South Asia, infrastructure and agriculture. 
Not surprisingly, both climate scenarios show costs 
increasing over time, although falling as a percent-
age of GDP—suggesting that countries become 
less vulnerable to climate change as their economies 
grow. Th ere are considerable regional variations, 
however. Adaptation costs as a percentage of GDP 
are considerably higher in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than in any other region, in large part because of 
the lower GDPs but also owing to higher costs of 
adaptation for water resources, driven by changes 
in precipitation patterns.
On the sectoral level, the EACC ﬁ ndings 
oﬀ er insights for policymakers who must make 
tough choices in the face of great uncertainty 
(see Table ES-2).
TABLE ES-1
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC WILL SHOULDER THE BIGGEST BURDEN
(Global costs of adaptation by region)
Aggregation type/
Scenario
East Asia & 
Paciﬁ c
Europe & 
Centr.Asia 
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean
Middle 
East/ North 
Africa
South Asia Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
Total
Gross-sum/
Wet Scenario
25.7 12.6 21.3 3.6 17.1 17.1 97.5
X-sum/
Dry Scenario
17.9 6.9 14.8 2.5 15 14.1 71.2
Note: Gross-sum is the sum of the positive costs of adaptation in all sectors and all countries, excluding gains (negative costs) from climate 
change. X-sum deducts these eventual gains in countries with overall positive costs of adaptation.
Source: Revised estimates (World Bank 2010a).
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Infrastructure.4 Th is sector has accounted for the 
largest share of adaptation costs in past studies and 
takes up a major share in the EACC study—in fact, 
the biggest share for the NCAR (wettest) scenario 
because the adaptation costs for infrastructure are 
especially sensitive to levels of annual and maximum 
monthly precipitation. Urban infrastructure—drain-
age, public buildings, and similar assets—accounts 
for about 54 percent of the infrastructure adapta-
tion costs, followed by railways at 18 percent, and 
roads (mainly paved) at 16 percent. East Asia and 
the Paciﬁ c and South Asia face the highest costs, 
reﬂ ecting their larger populations. Sub-Saharan 
Africa experiences the greatest increase over time.
Coastal zones.5 Th ese zones are home to an ever-
growing concentration of people and economic 
activity, yet they are also subject to a number of 
climate risks, including sea-level rise and storm 
surges, and possible increased intensity of tropi-
cal storms and cyclones. Th e study shows that 
adaptation costs are signiﬁ cant and vary with the 
magnitude of sea-level rise, making it essential 
for policymakers to plan while accounting for the 
uncertainty. One of the most striking results is that 
Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia 
and the Paciﬁ c account for about two-thirds of the 
total adaptation costs.
Water supply.6 In some parts of the world, water avail-
ability has risen and will continue to do so, but in 
others, it has fallen and will continue to do so—and 
the frequency and magnitude of ﬂ oods are expected 
to rise. Th e EACC study shows that water supply 
and ﬂ ood management ranks as one of the top three 
adaptation costs in both the wetter and drier sce-
narios, with Sub-Saharan Africa footing by far the 
highest costs. Latin America and the Caribbean also 
sustain high costs under both models, and South Asia 
sustains high costs under CSIRO.
Agriculture.7 Climate change aﬀ ects production by 
altering yields and areas where crops can be grown. 
Th e EACC study shows that temperature and pre-
cipitation changes in both climate scenarios will 
signiﬁ cantly lower crop yields and production—
with irrigated and rainfed wheat and irrigated rice 
aﬀ ected the most. Developing countries fare worse 
for almost all crops compared to developed countries, 
with South Asia shouldering the biggest production 
declines. Moreover, the changes in trade ﬂ ow patterns 
are dramatic—with exports for developed countries 
rising and South Asia becoming a much larger food 
importer under both scenarios. Th at said, the total 
costs for the agricultural sector relative to other sec-
tors is lower than would have been expected, in part 
because welfare is restored through trade rather than 
TABLE ES-2
INFRASTRUCTURE, COASTAL ZONES, AND WATER CAPTURE THE BULK OF ADAPTATION COSTS
(Global costs of adaptation by sector, X-Sum)
Sector Wet Dry
Infrastructure 27.5 13.0
Coastal zones 28.5 27.6
Water supply and ﬂ ood protection 14.4 19.7
Agriculture, forestry, ﬁ sheries   2.5   3.0
Human health   2.0   1.5
Extreme weather events   6.7   6.4
Total 81.5 71.2
Source: Revised estimates (World Bank 2010a).
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by restoring yields within countries. Yet, it is impor-
tant to note that larger population shares, and among 
them, the poorer of the poor, are highly vulnerable 
because of their dependence on agriculture. 
Human health.8 Climate change can trigger increases 
in the incidence of vector-born diseases, water-borne 
diseases, heat- and cold-related deaths, injuries and 
deaths from ﬂ ooding, and the prevalence of malnu-
trition. Th e EACC study, which focuses on malaria 
and diarrhea, ﬁ nds adaptation costs falling in absolute 
terms over time to less than half the 2010 estimates 
of adaptation costs—thanks to improvements in basic 
health conditions that accompany higher incomes 
and development. While the declines are consistent 
across regions, the rates of decline in South Asia and 
East Asia and Paciﬁ c are faster than in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—a continent that will shoulder more than 80 
percent of the health sector adaptation costs by 2050.
Extreme weather events.23 Without reliable data 
on emergency management costs, the EACC study 
tries to shed light on the role of socioeconomic 
development in increasing climate resilience. It 
asks: As climate change increases potential vulner-
ability to extreme weather events, how many addi-
tional young women would have to be educated to 
neutralize this increased vulnerability? And how 
much would it cost? Th e ﬁ ndings show that by 
2050, neutralizing the impact of extreme weather 
events requires educating an additional 18 million 
to 23 million young women at a cost of $12 billion 
to $15 billion a year. For 2000–50, the tab reaches 
about $300 billion in new outlays. Th is means that 
in the developing world, neutralizing the impact 
of worsening weather over the coming decades 
will require educating a large new cohort of young 
women at a cost that will steadily escalate to sev-
eral billion dollars a year. But it will be enormously 
worthwhile on other margins to invest in education 
for millions of young women who might otherwise 
be denied its many beneﬁ ts.
Putting Global Findings in Context
How does this study compare with earlier studies? Th e 
EACC estimates are in the upper end of estimates by 
the UNFCCC (2007), the study closest in approach 
to this study, though not as high as suggested by a 
recent critique of the UNFCCC study by Parry and 
others (2009). A comparison of the studies is limited 
by methodological diﬀ erences—in particular, the use 
of a consistent set of climate models to link impacts to 
adaptation costs and an explicit separation of costs of 
development from those of adaptation in the EACC 
study. But the major diﬀ erence between them is the 
nearly six-fold increase in the cost of coastal zone 
management and defense under the EACC study. 
Th is diﬀ erence reﬂ ects several improvements to the 
earlier UNFCCC estimates under the EACC study: 
better unit cost estimates, including maintenance 
costs, and the inclusion of costs of port upgrading and 
risks from both sea-level rise and storm surges.9
Th e bottom line: calculating the global cost of adap-
tation remains a complex problem, requiring projec-
tions of economic growth, structural change, climate 
change, human behavior, and government invest-
ments 40 years in the future. Th e EACC study tried to 
establish a new benchmark for research of this nature, 
as it adopted a consistent approach across countries 
and sectors and over time. But in the process, it had 
to make important assumptions and simpliﬁ cations, to 
some degree biasing the estimates. 
Important shortcomings of this study relate to three 
broad categories: uncertainty, institutions, and mod-
eling limitations (Table ES-3). Th ey are natural entry 
points for thinking about future work and knowledge 
needs. Th e highest priority in the immediate future 
must be to reduce the range of uncertainty about 
future climate impacts and to identify forms of adap-
tation that are robust across the range of uncertainty 
that will remain.
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The Country Picture
As for the EACC country studies, seven countries 
were selected based on overall vulnerability to major 
climate change impacts; diﬀ ering environmental, 
social, and economic conditions and adequate data at 
the national level. Government interest at the highest 
level was also important. Mozambique, Ghana, and 
Ethiopia represent nearly the full range of agricultural 
systems in Africa. Vietnam and Bangladesh—Asian 
countries with most of their economic activity and 
population concentrated along the coast and in low-
lying deltas—are among the world’s most vulnerable 
to climate change, especially from extreme weather 
events and ﬂ ooding. Bolivia is a poor Latin American 
country traditionally dependent on the Andean gla-
ciers to supply good portions of water demand, and it 
consists of a wide range of agro-ecosystems. Samoa 
represents a low-lying Paciﬁ c island at increased risk 
to sea level rise and storm surge. 
Mozambique is subject to frequent droughts, ﬂ oods, 
and tropical cyclones—events that threaten the coun-
try’s economic performance, which is already highly 
aﬀ ected by high rainfall variability. Th e most vulnera-
ble sectors from climate change are agriculture, which 
employs over 70 percent of the Mozambique popu-
lation; energy, particularly hydropower generation, 
which is dependent on water runoﬀ ; transport infra-
structure, notably roads; and coastal areas. Findings 
from the social component suggest that livelihood 
activities most sensitive to climate change continue to 
take place in areas most exposed to climate change.
On adaptation, the EACC Mozambique country 
study shows that with small additional costs, sealing 
unpaved roads—a low-regret option—would restore 
about one-ﬁ fth of the welfare loss owing to climate 
change (see Figure ES-3). Remaining welfare losses 
could be regained with better agricultural produc-
tivity or human capital accumulation (education). 
Irrigation investments appear to be a poor alterna-
tive. Investment costs are likely to be about US$400 
million per year over 40 years. As part of the social 
component, participants in scenario development 
workshops were asked to draft preferred adaption 
options for the government (planned) and non-gov-
ernment entities (autonomous) (see Table ES-4). For 
TABLE ES-3 
GETTING A BETTER PICTURE
STUDY LIMITATION RECOMMENDATION
Use of mathematical models 
and no efﬁ ciency criterion
Include institutional, social, cultural and political perspectives to identify 
good policies. Find simpler rules for policymaking
Climate uncertainty Consider more scenarios, Monte Carlo simulations and other probabilistic 
approaches
Growth uncertainty Hard to improve other than through sensitivity analyses
Technological uncertainty Incorporate better information from sector specialists and simulate the 
impact of potential advances.
Non-consideration to institu-
tional issues
Context speciﬁ c institutional capacity has to be assessed and considered to 
make recommendations realistic and feasible
Limited focus on migration and 
urbanization
Work with outside projections; limited current knowledge on cities and 
climate change
Limited range of adaptation Include a broader range of strategies, including more local level
No environmental services Pull better information and introduce more consistent estimates
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Note:  In the worst scenario:  NPV of damages without adaptation is 
$7.6 billion discounted at 5%) 
Source: World Bank 2010g.
ADAPTATION IN MOZAMBIQUE ENTAILS 
GREATER CLIMATE RESILIENCE 
(Reduction in climate change damages, 2003-2050; 
5 percent discount rate, constant 2003 US$)
FIGURE ES-3
TABLE ES-4
KEY ADAPTATION OPTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Planned Adaptation Autonomous Adaptation
Hard ■ Flood control dikes and levies
■ Coastal ﬂ ood control gates
■ Dams and irrigation channels
■ Improved roadways
■ Improved communication infrastructure
■ Improved hospitals and schools
■ More robust buildings
■ Farm-scale water storage facilities
■ Deep wells to provide drinking water for 
people and animals
■ Grain storage facilities
■ Improved food processing equipment
Soft ■ Improved early warning of climatic hazards, 
and of dam releases
■ Better planning and management of forest, 
ﬁ sh, and other natural resources
■ Resettlement of populations to lower risk 
zones
■ More credit and ﬁ nancial services for small busi-
nesses and rural development
■ Better education and information for the rural 
areas
■ Improved health care, social services, and 
social support for all people
■ Better utilization of short season, drought 
resistant crops to prepare for drought, ﬂ oods, and 
cyclones
■ Diversiﬁ cation of ﬂ ood and drought risk by 
maintaining ﬁ elds in both highland and lowland areas
■ Better household and community management 
and use of natural resources, including wild fruits
■ Practice of soil conservation agriculture
■ Migration to lower risk areas
■ Diversiﬁ cation of livelihoods away from 
agriculture
■ Better planning of how much grain to save for 
personal consumption, and how much to sell for 
income generation
Note: The options in plain text respond directly to climate hazards, while those in italics represent measures to increase the population’s 
adaptive capacity, or make them more resilient to shocks to their livelihoods. 
Source: World Bank 2010g.
the hard options, more resources will be needed, and 
for the soft options, an enabling economic and politi-
cal environment. 
Ethiopia is heavily dependent on rain-fed agricul-
ture, and its geographical location and topography 
in combination with low adaptive capacity entail a 
high vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. 
Historically the country has been prone to extreme 
weather variability, resulting in seven major droughts 
since the early 1980s—ﬁ ve of which led to famines. 
Th e primary losses owing to climate change in Ethio-
pia arise from the eﬀ ect of extreme weather events, 
both droughts and ﬂ ooding, on agricultural produc-
tion and infrastructure. 
Adaptation strategies considered in Ethiopia build 
on current government programs—such as increas-
ing the irrigated cropland area and investing in 
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agricultural research and development; boosting the 
share of paved and hardened roads; and altering the 
scale and timing of planned hydropower projects. 
Th e EACC Ethiopia country study shows that with-
out adaptation Ethiopia’s GDP would be lower by 2 
to 8 percent for the four diﬀ erent climate scenarios 
analyzed. Adaptation reduces welfare losses by about 
50 percent (see Figure ES-4) and also lowers income 
variability. It also highlights the potential beneﬁ ts of 
accelerating the diversiﬁ cation of the economy away 
TABLE ES-5 
BETTER ROAD DESIGN STANDARDS ARE A HIGH PRIORITY FOR GHANA
(NPV of deviations of real welfare from baseline under alternative adaptation strategies, US$ billions)
No Adaptation scenario Road Design
Adaptation Investment in
Agriculture Hydro /Agric. Education
Global Dry -13.118 -10.308 -0.121 -0.941 -2.090
Global Wet -10.095 -5.854 -2.973 2.116 0.584
Ghana Dry -2.709 -3.009 -1.193 -1.782 -1.308
Ghana Wet -4.050 -0.766 1.936 1.358 1.795
Note: The options in plain text respond directly to climate hazards, while those in italics represent measures to increase the population’s 
adaptive capacity, or make them more resilient to shocks to their livelihoods. 
Source: World Bank 2010f.
Note:  NPV of absorption, difference from base (percent of NPV of 
GDP). Absorption is deﬁ ned as GDP, plus imports minus exports. 
Wet 1 and Dry 1 are the two secnarios used in the global analysis, and 
Wet 2 and Dry 2 are the wettest and driest scenarios in Ethiopia.
Source: World Bank 2010e.
 ADAPTATION SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERS 
WELFARE LOSSES IN ETHIOPIA 
(Net present value (NPV) of absorption diff erences)
FIGURE ES-4
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from climate sensitive sectors, such as agriculture; 
upgrading road design; strengthening hydropower 
development; and accelerating absorption of the rural 
labor force into non-agriculture activities—including 
through skills-upgrading programs and encourage-
ment of growth poles around medium-size munici-
palities. Total adaptation costs range from US$1.22 
billion (wet) to $5.84 billion (dry) per year over 40 
years, though it may be possible to reduce these costs 
through a labor-upgrading program.
Ghana is highly vulnerable to climate change and 
variability because it is heavily dependent on climate-
sensitive sectors such as agriculture—largely rain-fed 
with a low-level of irrigation development—forestry, 
and hydropower. Th e country has a 565 kilometer long 
coastline that is inhabited by about a quarter of the 
population and is the location of signiﬁ cant physical 
infrastructure. Th e EACC Ghana country study esti-
mates that climate change causes a reduction in real 
household consumption of 5-10 percent in 2050, with 
rural households suﬀ ering greater reductions, primar-
ily through its impact on agricultural production. 
Th e study evaluated adaptation options focused on 
roads, agriculture, hydropower, and coastal protection. 
It found that changes in road design standards alone 
provide signiﬁ cant reductions in welfare losses in most 
scenarios. Th e combination of better road design and 
investments in agriculture or agriculture and hydro-
power or education would minimize or even reverse 
the losses caused by climate change under the four 
climate scenarios analyzed (see Table ES-5). 
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Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries 
to climate risks. About two-thirds of the nation is less 
than 5 meters above sea level and is susceptible to 
river and rainwater ﬂ ooding. Once every three to ﬁ ve 
years, up to two-thirds of Bangladesh is inundated 
by ﬂ oods. Cyclone-induced storm surges owing to 
climate change are expected to inundate an addi-
tional 15 percent of the coastal area and increase the 
inundation depth in these areas. Th e damages from 
a single typical severe cyclone with a return period 
of 10 years is expected to rise nearly ﬁ vefold to over 
$9 billion by 2050, accounting for 0.6 percent of 
GDP. Th e burden is likely to fall disproportionately 
on the rural poor in low-lying coastal areas who are 
also aﬀ ected by other climate-related hazards such as 
saline water intrusion into aquifers and groundwater 
and land submergence.
For storm surges induced by tropical cyclones, the 
EACC Bangladesh country study evaluated adapta-
tion measures such as embankments, aﬀ orestation, 
cyclone shelters, and early warning systems. It found 
that the total estimated cost would be $2.4 billion in 
initial investment and $50 million in annual recur-
rent costs (see Table ES-6). As for inland ﬂ ooding, 
the focus was on infrastructure measures to avoid 
further damage from additional inundation—road 
network and railways, river embankments and 
embankments to protect highly productive agricul-
tural lands, drainage systems, and erosion control 
measures. Th e study found that the total estimated 
cost would be $2.7 billion in initial investment 
and $54 million in annual recurrent cost—with 80 
percent of these costs stemming from road height 
enhancement. Given the large existing variability, 
a prudent near–term strategy for Bangladesh is to 
address the large adaptation deﬁ cit while investing 
to reduce uncertainties about future climate change 
which will deﬁ ne where additional investments are 
required. By 2050, the number of people living in 
cities will triple while the rural population will fall 
by 30 percent. Th e long-term challenge is to move 
people and economic activity into less climate-
sensitive areas.
Bolivia is exposed to hydro-meteorological extremes 
and climate variability, particularly because of the 
inﬂ uence of the El Niño oscillation (ENSO), which, 
regardless of climate change, occurs periodically in 
diﬀ erent parts of the country. Floods, landslides, 
and droughts—which seriously aﬀ ect food security 
and the water supply—are also common. Given that 
Bolivia’s economic mainstays are minerals and gas, it 
is relatively insensitive to climate change. Yet most 
people are engaged in small-scale agriculture, a sec-
tor that is quite vulnerable to climate changes. 
TABLE ES-6
POLDERS AND CYCLONE SHELTERS ARE KEY FOR BANGLADESH’S CYCLONE-INDUCED STORM SURGES
(Total adaption cost for inland ﬂ ooding by 2050, US$ Million)
Adaptation Option
Baseline Scenario
(existing risks) (1)
 (additional risk 
due to CC) (2)
CC Scenario 
(total risk = (1) + (2))
IC AMC IC AMC IC AMC
Polders 2,462 49    893  18    3,355 67
Afforestation      75      75
Cyclone shelters    628 13 1,219  24 1,847 37
Resistant housing    200    200
Early warning system      39    8     39    8
Total 3,090 62 2,426 50 5,516 112
CC = climate change; IC = investment cost; AMC = annual maintenance cost
Source: World Bank 2010c.
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Th e EACC Bolivia country study focused on agricul-
ture and water resources. Even in the more optimistic 
scenario of wetter conditions, agricultural productiv-
ity can only increase if the capacity to store and use 
the needed additional water is available for farmers 
and poor peasants. Th us, “no-regrets” measures would 
include better water resources management and build-
ing water storage and irrigation infrastructure. Th ese 
types of measure are already envisaged by Bolivia in 
its development agenda, but the study shows that the 
development agenda must now be accelerated. 
Vietnam’s exposure to weather-related events and 
disasters ranks among the highest among all developing 
countries. Storms and ﬂ oods occasionally resulting from 
tropical cyclones have caused extensive and repeated 
damages to buildings and infrastructure, agriculture and 
ﬁ sheries sectors, and resulted in a large number of fatali-
ties. Climate change may well bring an increase in the 
frequency, intensity, and duration of ﬂ oods, and greater 
drought problems in the dry season. 
Th e EACC Vietnam country study focused on 
agriculture, aquaculture, forestry, and coastal ports. 
In agriculture, adaptation measures ranged from 
autonomous actions by farmers (such as sowing dates, 
switching to drought-tolerant crops, and adoption of 
salinity-tolerant varieties of rice) to planned public 
actions (such as greater spending on research, devel-
opment, and extension; and extending the areas of 
irrigated land).Th e study shows that the impacts of 
climate change on agriculture and related sectors, even 
with no adaptation, appear to be relatively modest—
given that farmers are expected to change, without 
government interventions, the crops and crop vari-
eties that they grow and their methods of farming. 
Th e CGE macroeconomic analysis suggests that the 
drop in real GDP and real consumption is much less 
severe with adaptation—and adaptation oﬀ sets most 
of the disproportionate impact of climate change on 
the poor (see Table ES-7). In fact, GDP would not 
only fall less but possibly also even increase. Th at said, 
a major concern is how much poorer households will 
suﬀ er from lower agricultural incomes and higher 
food prices relative to the general cost of living. 
Samoa is a country at extreme risk from a variety 
of natural disasters including tropical cyclones and 
TABLE ES-7
AGRICULTURAL ADAPTATION IN VIETNAM REDUCES INEQUALITIES AND HELPS GDP 
 (Percentage deviations in 2050 from baseline with no climate change)
No adaptation With adaptation Adaptation beneﬁ ts
Dry Wet MoNRE Dry Wet MoNRE Dry Wet MoNRE
GDP -2.4% -2.3% -0.7% -1.1% -0.7% 0.7% 1.3% 1.6% 1.3%
Aggregate consumption -2.5% -2.5% -0.7% -1.4% -0.8% 0.6% 1.1% 1.7% 1.3%
Agricultural value-added -13.9% -13.5% -5.8% -3.8% -3.4% 5.4% 10.0% 10.1% 11.2%
Regional GDP
North Central Coast -6.6% -6.1% -2.6% 0.5% -0.3% 4.8% 7.1% 5.8% 7.4%
South East 1.1% 0.8% 1.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.2% -1.1% 0.3% -0.9%
Rural household consumption
Bottom quintile -6.5% -6.3% -2.6% -1.9% -1.4% 2.4% 4.7% 4.9% 5.0%
Top quintile -1.6% -1.7% -0.4% -1.5% -1.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.4%
Note: MoNRE is Vietnam’s Ministry of Environment, which has established an “ofﬁ cial” climate change scenario that is roughly similar to the 
Hadley Center (UK) projections. 
Source: World Bank 2010i.
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tsunamis caused by earthquakes. It is also subject to 
inter-annual climate ﬂ uctuations associated with El 
Nino (ENSO), which aﬀ ect precipitations as well as 
air and sea temperatures. Many scientists believe that 
climate change will lead to some increase in the inten-
sity of tropical cyclones accompanied by greater vari-
ability of rainfall with more frequent episodes of heavy 
rainfall and drought. A major concern is that about 70 
percent of the population lives in low-lying areas that 
would be vulnerable to inundation as a result of the 
combined eﬀ ects of sea level rise, more severe storm 
surges, and ﬂ ooding caused by heavier rainfall.
Th e EACC Samoa country study focuses on the 
implementation of design standards to ensure that 
buildings and other assets can cope with higher 
winds and more intense precipitation without dam-
age. It found that the adoption of more stringent 
design standards today would reduce the impact of 
the climate change in future and the residual dam-
age after adaptation (see Table ES-8). It also found 
that extreme weather variability in the coastal zone 
will involve signiﬁ cant costs for either investments in 
coastal protection or the relocation of assets. In the 
longer term, the relocation of assets—or even whole 
villages—may be the best option as it would shift 
economy activity such as tourism, crops, and other 
businesses away from the coast. 
Lessons and Recommendations 
Lesson 1: Th e cost of developing countries to adapt to 
climate change between 2010 and 2050 is estimated at 
US$70 billion to US$100 billion a year at 2005 prices. 
Th is amounts to about “only” 0.2 percent of the projected 
GDP of all developing countries in the current decade 
and at the same time to as much as 80 percent of total 
disbursement of ODA.
Th e averages across all developing countries hide a very 
uneven distribution of the burden of adaptation across 
regions as well as decades. Our estimates of the overall 
TABLE ES-8
BETTER DESIGN STANDARDS WOULD ENHANCE SAMOA’S RESILIENCE
(Impact of climate change with and without adaptation)
No adaptation With adaptation Beneﬁ t of adaptation
NCAR CSIRO NCAR CSIRO NCAR CSIRO
Design standards for 10-year return period
    Present value @ 5%, $ million 103.9 212.4 34.8 24.5 69.1 187.9 
    Annualized equivalent, $ million per year 5.9 12.1 2.0 1.4 3.9 10.7 
    Loss/beneﬁ t as % of baseline GDP 0.6 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.2
    Loss/beneﬁ t as % of baseline consumption 0.9 1.9 0.3 0.2 0.6 1.7
Design standards for 50-year return period
    Present value @ 5 %, $ million 19.9 37.0 4.5 5.4 15.4 31.6 
    Annualized equivalent, $ million per year 1.1 2.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.8 
    Loss/beneﬁ t as % of baseline GDP 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
    Loss/beneﬁ t as % of baseline consumption 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3
Note: NCAR is wettest scenario; CSIRO is driest scenario.
Source: World Bank 2010h.
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cost of adaptation are 0.6-0.7 percent of GDP for 
the Sub-Saharan Africa region in 2010-19 falling to 
about 0.5 percent of GDP in 2040-49. In contrast, the 
equivalent ﬁ gures for the East Asia and Paciﬁ c region 
are 0.13-0.19 percent in 2010-19 and about 0.07 per-
cent in 2040-49. Apart from Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
regions facing high relative costs of adaptation are the 
Latin America and Caribbean region and (under the 
dry climate scenario) the South Asia region. In addi-
tion, the absolute costs of adaptation increase over 
time and will certainly continue to increase after 2050. 
Our projections suggest that real GDP will increase 
more rapidly than the costs of adaptation over the next 
four decades, even on quite conservative assumptions 
about growth in GDP per person. However, it would 
be unsafe to assume that this trend will continue into 
the second half of the current century. 
Lesson 2: Economic development is a central element of adap-
tation to climate change, but it should not be business as usual. 
Economic development is the most basic and cost 
eﬀ ective method of adaptation, provided that it is 
properly managed. It generates the resources and 
opportunities to adapt to climate change at a relatively 
low cost by ensuring that the design and location of new 
infrastructure, buildings, and other assets take account 
of the eﬀ ects of climate change on their performance. 
Our country studies show that a failure to adapt to 
climate change may lead to very large weather-related 
losses—both in terms of the destruction of infrastruc-
ture and foregone opportunities for future growth. 
In Ethiopia, robust growth based on infrastructure 
investment is the ﬁ rst line of defense against climate 
change impacts. In Bolivia, development measures 
are not only robust to changes in climate impacts but 
also help reduce them by increasing local resilience. 
Lesson 3: Invest in human capital, develop competent 
and ﬂ exible institutions, focus on weather resilience and 
adaptive capacity, and tackle the root causes of poverty. 
Eliminating poverty is central to both development and 
adaptation, since poverty exacerbates vulnerability to 
weather variability as well as climate change. 
Countries that reach the middle of the 21st century 
with large shares of their populations engaged in sub-
sistence agriculture—with substantial illiteracy and 
lethargic or inept institutions—will be particularly 
vulnerable to the eﬀ ects of climate change. Rapid 
development leads to a more ﬂ exible and resilient 
society, so that building human and social capital—
including education, social protection and health, and 
skills training—are crucial to adaptation.
In all of our country studies, the burden of existing 
climate variability is especially heavy in areas that have 
high concentrations of poor and socially vulnerable 
populations. Climate change exacerbates this pattern. 
In the Southern region of Bangladesh, for example, 
the rural poor are expected to face the largest declines 
in per capita consumption, declining productivity of 
the subsistence crops, and land losses owing to greater 
salinity brought forth by sea level rise.
Lesson 4: Do not rush into making long-lived investments 
in adaptation unless these are robust to a wide range of 
climate outcomes or until the range of uncertainty about 
future weather variability and climate has narrowed. 
Start with low-regret options. 
For public policymakers, the fundamental prob-
lem is one of uncertainty regarding both climate 
outcomes and longer–term projections of social 
and economic development (such as anticipated 
migration of people from rural areas to the cities). 
Th is uncertainty is particularly large for patterns of 
precipitation. Some country studies highlight cru-
cial diﬀ erences between alternative wet and dry sce-
narios and their eﬀ ects on agricultural production, 
water resources, and transport infrastructure. Other 
countries show large variation in the magnitude of 
increased precipitation. As a result, countries should 
try to delay adaptation decisions as much as possible 
and focus on low-regret actions—those actions that 
are robust under most climate scenarios. Th ese are 
typically policies or investments that can be iden-
tiﬁ ed as priorities for development even without 
climate change. For Africa, our studies show that 
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expanding the road system and increasing the share 
of paved roads would yield high returns by lowering 
transport costs and expanding markets. Th ey would 
also lessen ﬂ ood impacts and enhance farmers’ abil-
ity to respond to changes in agricultural compara-
tive advantage.
Lesson 5: Adaptation to climate change should start with 
the adoption of measures that tackle the weather risks 
that countries already face, for example, more investment 
in water storage in drought-prone basins or protection 
against storms and ﬂ ooding in coastal zones and/or urban 
areas. Climate change will exacerbate these risks. 
Climate change will always hide beneath climate 
variability. Systems that eﬀ ectively cope with existing 
climate variability will be more successful in adapt-
ing to future climate change than those that cannot. 
Th e short–term priority is to better prepare for the 
weather risks that countries are already facing. One 
clear example concerns the impact of storms, espe-
cially in coastal areas. Despite the uncertainty over 
future rainfall, there is relative certainty that warmer 
climate will lead to rising sea levels and increased 
intensity of storms. With the inevitable increase 
in urban populations, the costs of failing to protect 
coastal cities against major storms will rise rapidly. 
At the same time, the deﬁ ciencies of storm water 
drainage in coastal or inland cities already lead to 
avoidable—and sometimes large—losses caused by 
urban ﬂ ooding that have disproportionate eﬀ ects on 
the health and welfare of the poor. Th e Vietnam study 
suggests that it is important to enhance the capacities 
of agricultural and water systems to cope with cur-
rent climate variability and build resilience into such 
systems from now on. Samoa similarly shows that 
improving building codes to cope with current vari-
ability makes infrastructure more climate-resilient.
Lesson 6: Beware of creating incentives that encourage 
development in locations exposed to severe weather risks. 
Where possible build future cities out of harm’s way—
ﬂ ood plains or coastal zones that are exposed to sea level 
rise and storm surges. 
Economic development has been accompanied by 
a tendency for more rapid urban growth in coastal 
areas than in inland cities. Th is may reﬂ ect relative 
diﬀ erences in transport costs as well as government 
policies or individual preferences. Th ere will be many 
opportunities to reduce weather risks and associated 
costs by intelligent urban and land-use planning. 
Whether in rural or urban areas, the rule of thumb 
is simple: whenever possible, ensure that growth and 
infrastructure take place in locations that are less 
exposed to weather risks. Th e right incentives must 
also be adopted to discourage accumulating physical 
capital in the shadow of dykes considered to be “safe.” 
As the New Orleans tragedy illustrated, a suﬃ  ciently 
extreme event will breach a dyke.
Lesson 7: Hard and soft approaches to adaptation are two 
sides of the same coin. Good policies, planning, and insti-
tutions are essential to ensure that more capital-intensive 
measures are used in the right circumstances and yield the 
expected beneﬁ ts. 
Th e distinction between “hard” (capital-intensive) 
and “soft” (institutions and policies) adaptation is 
easily exaggerated. Th ere is no point in building the 
best type of road in the wrong place, while the best 
institutions will provide no protection against a storm 
that destroys buildings or power lines. Th e challenge 
is to get the balance between hard and soft adaptation 
right. In some ﬁ eld sites in Vietnam, aﬀ orestation of 
mangroves ranks above the infrastructure options 
such as sea dike repair, given the lower costs of man-
grove planting and the potential for this activity to be 
more pro-poor. In Ghana, a number of soft measures 
are given priority over hard measures—including an 
upgrade of peri-urban slums and controlled develop-
ment of new ones, and the protection, management, 
and sustainable use of coastal wetlands.
One
1ECONOMICS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE:  SYNTHESIS REPORT
Context 
Under the Bali Action Plan adopted at the 2007 
United Nations Climate Change Conference, 
developed countries agreed to allocate “adequate, 
predictable, and sustainable financial resources 
and new and additional resources, including offi-
cial and concessional funding for developing coun-
try parties” to help them adapt to climate change 
(UNFCCC 2007) . The plan views international 
cooperation as essential for building capacity to 
integrate adaptation measures into sectoral and 
national development plans. Yet studies on the 
costs of adaptation offer a wide range of estimates, 
from $4 billion to $109 billion a year. A recent 
critique of estimates suggests that these may be 
substantial underestimates (Parry et al. 2009). 
Similarly, National Adaptation Programmes of 
Action, developed by the least-developed coun-
tries under Article 4.9 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), identify and estimate costs for only 
urgent and immediate adaptation measures. They 
do not incorporate the measures into long-term 
development plans. 
Th e Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change 
(EACC) study is intended to ﬁ ll this knowledge 
gap. Soon after the Bali Conference of Parties, a 
partnership—comprising the World Bank and the 
governments of Bangladesh, Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Samoa, 
and Vietnam—initiated the EACC study to esti-
mate the cost of adapting to climate change. Th e 
study, funded by the governments of the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, also 
aims to help countries develop plans that incorpo-
rate measures to adapt to climate change. 
Objectives
Th e EACC study has two broad objectives: to 
develop a global estimate of adaptation costs for 
informing the international community’s eﬀ orts in 
the climate negotiations, and to help decision mak-
ers in developing countries assess the risks posed 
by climate change and design national strategies 
for adapting to climate change. 
Th ese two objectives complement each other. To 
some extent, however, they are also at odds with 
each other, and cannot be fully consistent: support-
ing developing country eﬀ orts to design adaptation 
strategies requires incorporating country-speciﬁ c 
characteristics and sociocultural and economic 
conditions into the analyses. Identifying the global 
costs of adaptation to climate change to support 
international negotiations requires analysis at a 
more aggregate level. Reconciling the two involves 
a tradeoﬀ  between the speciﬁ cs of individual coun-
tries and a global picture. 
Introduction
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Approaches: the two parallel tracks
To address the two objectives, the EACC was con-
ducted on two parallel tracks: a global track, where 
national databases were used to generate aggregate 
estimates at a global scale; and a series of country-
level studies, where national data were disaggregated 
to more local and sector levels, helping to understand 
adaptation from the bottom-up perspective. Th e top-
down and bottom-up approaches were compared 
and to the extent possible integrated. Some elements 
had to be analyzed separately, or solely, under each 
perspective.
The Synthesis Report
Th is report is a synthesis of the global study report 
and seven country case study reports. Th e global study 
consists of a number of sector studies, which were 
commissioned by the EACC project. Country case 
study reports present ﬁ ndings from sector analyses 
conducted at the national level, and include analysis of 
three to ﬁ ve sectors, depending on the country. Figure 
1 below depicts the various EACC study components 
and their links. 
Given that climate change is a relatively new subject, 
the numerous reports produced as part of the EACC 
global and country tracks, including this report, cover 
many technical areas—from climate science to social 
and economic areas, as well as a number of sectors, 
including agriculture, energy, water resources, infra-
structure, and coastal zone management. Given the 
political importance of climate change, the ﬁ ndings of 
this and similar studies are highly relevant for policy 
making in both developed and developing countries. 
While aimed at a very broad audience, it is primar-
ily written for policy makers in developing coun-
tries. Given their diﬀ erent objectives, related EACC 
reports may be of interest to a diverse audience. Th ese 
reports and background papers are available at www.
worldbank.org/eacc.
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Th is report presents a synthesis of the methodology 
and results derived from research conducted for the 
EACC global and country study tracks in Bolivia, 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Viet-
nam, and Samoa. It provides information on lessons 
learned and insights gained on adaptation to climate 
change from global, country, and sector-level analyses. 
It develops a robust, integrated approach for increas-
ing resilience to climate risks, and presents recom-
mendations to help policy makers set priorities.
Th e remainder of the report comprises of four chap-
ters. Th e next chapter presents the concepts and meth-
odology used for analyses in both the global and the 
country case studies. Th is chapter also describes some 
of the study’s limitations. Chapter III introduces the 
results from the global analysis, while chapter IV 
focuses on results from the country analyses. Chapter 
V presents lessons learned and recommendations for 
policy makers.
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Concepts
Th is multiyear study is based on a number of crucial 
concepts, including the deﬁ nition of adaptation costs; 
understanding the links between adaptation and 
development; and dealing with the inherent uncer-
tainty in climate projections and climate impacts.
Adaptation costs
One of the biggest challenges of the study has been 
to develop a usable deﬁ nition of adaptation costs. Th e 
concept is intuitively understood as the costs societ-
ies incur to adapt to changes in climate. Th e IPCC 
deﬁ nes adaptation costs as the costs of planning, pre-
paring for, facilitating, and implementing adaptation 
measures, including transaction costs. 
Th is deﬁ nition is diﬃ  cult to implement in practice, 
however. For one, “development as usual” needs to 
be conceptually separated from adaptation. Th at 
requires deciding whether the costs of development 
initiatives that enhance climate resilience ought to be 
counted as part of adaptation costs. It also requires 
deciding how to incorporate in those costs the adap-
tation deﬁ cit, deﬁ ned as countries’ inability to deal 
with current and future climate variability. It requires 
deﬁ ning how to deal with uncertainty about climate 
projections and impacts. And it requires specifying 
how potential beneﬁ ts from climate change in some 
sectors and countries oﬀ set, if at all, adaptation costs 
in another sector or country.
How much to adapt 
Adaptation is clearly not a rigid set of actions, and 
governments can choose the amount of, or level of, 
adaptation. One possibility is to adapt completely, so 
that society is at least as well oﬀ  as it was before cli-
mate change. At the other extreme, countries could 
choose to do nothing, experiencing the full impact 
of climate change. In the intermediate cases, coun-
tries invest in adaptation using the same criteria as 
for other development projects—until the marginal 
beneﬁ ts of the adaptation measure just exceed the 
costs. Th is leads to a portfolio of adaptation actions 
that either restores social welfare relative to a baseline 
without climate change, or leaves some amount of 
residual damage from climate change.
How much to adapt is consequently an economic 
problem—how to allocate resources to adapt to cli-
mate change while also meeting other needs. And 
therein lies the challenge. Poor urban workers who 
live in a fragile slum dwelling might ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult 
to decide whether to spend money to make their liv-
ing quarters less vulnerable to more intense rainfall, 
or to buy school books or ﬁ rst-aid equipment for 
their family—or how to allocate between the two. 
Poor rural peasants might ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to choose 
between meeting these basic education and health 
CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGY, AND 
LIMITATIONS
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needs and some simple form of irrigation to compen-
sate for increased temperatures and their impact on 
agricultural productivity. Th ese examples suggest that 
desirable and feasible levels of adaptation depend on 
both available income and other resources. 
The deﬁ nition in practice
Corresponding to a chosen level of adaptation is 
an operational deﬁ nition of adaptation costs. If the 
policy objective is to adapt fully, the cost of adapta-
tion can be deﬁ ned as the minimum cost of adapta-
tion initiatives to restore welfare to levels prevailing 
before climate change. Restoring welfare may be pro-
hibitively costly, however, and policy makers may opt 
for an eﬃ  cient level of adaptation instead. Adapta-
tion costs would then be deﬁ ned as the cost of actions 
that satisfy the criterion that their marginal beneﬁ ts 
exceed their marginal costs. Because welfare would 
not be fully restored, there would be residual damage 
from climate change after allowing for adaptation. 
Th is study mostly uses the deﬁ nition of adaptation 
costs where the objective is to restore welfare.
Links between adaptation and development
Economic development is perhaps the best hope for 
adaptation to climate change: development enables 
an economy to diversify and become less reliant on 
sectors such as agriculture that are more vulnerable 
to the eﬀ ects of climate change. Development also 
makes more resources available for abating risk. And 
often the same measures promote development and 
adaptation. For example, progress in eradicating 
malaria helps countries develop and also helps societ-
ies adapt to the rising incidence of malaria that may 
accompany climate change. 
At the same time, adaptation to climate change is 
essential for development: unless agricultural societ-
ies adapt to changes in temperature and precipitation 
(through changes in cropping patterns, for example), 
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development will be delayed. Finally, adaptation 
requires a new type of climate-smart development 
that makes countries more resilient to the eﬀ ects of 
climate change. Urban development without atten-
tion to drainage, for example, will exacerbate the 
ﬂ ooding caused by heavy rains. 
Th ese links suggest that adaptation measures range 
from discrete adaptations, or interventions for which 
adaptation to climate change is the primary objec-
tive (WRI 2007); to climate-smart development, or 
interventions to achieve development objectives that 
also enhance climate resilience; to development that 
is not business-as-usual, as compared to interventions 
that can exacerbate the impacts of climate change 
and that therefore should not be undertaken. Th e Bali 
Action Plan calls for “new and additional” resources 
to meet adaptation costs. Th is study therefore deﬁ nes 
adaptation costs as additional to the costs of develop-
ment. So, the costs of measures that would have been 
undertaken even in the absence of climate change are 
not included in adaptation costs, while the costs of 
doing more, doing diﬀ erent things, and doing things 
diﬀ erently are included. 
The adaptation deﬁ cit
Th e separation of adaptation from development costs 
is linked to the concept of the adaptation deﬁ cit, 
which captures the notion that countries are under-
prepared for current climate conditions, much less 
for future climate change. Presumably, these short-
falls occur because people are under-informed about 
climate uncertainty and therefore do not rationally 
allocate resources to adapt to current climate events. 
Th e shortfall is not the result of low levels of develop-
ment but of less than optimal allocations of limited 
resources resulting in, say, insuﬃ  cient urban drainage 
infrastructure. Th e cost of closing this shortfall and 
bringing countries up to an “acceptable” standard for 
dealing with current climate conditions given their 
level of development is one deﬁ nition of the adapta-
tion deﬁ cit. Th e second use of the term, perhaps more 
common, captures the notion that poor countries have 
less capacity to adapt to change, whether induced by 
climate change or other factors, because of their lower 
stage of development. A country’s adaptive capacity 
is thus expected to increase with development. Th is 
meaning is perhaps better captured by the term devel-
opment deﬁ cit.
Th e adaptation deﬁ cit is important in this study for 
establishing the development baseline from which to 
measure the independent additional eﬀ ects of climate 
change. Because the adaptation deﬁ cit deals with cur-
rent climate variability, the cost of closing the deﬁ -
cit is part of the baseline and not of the adaptation 
costs. In practice, the distinction is diﬃ  cult to apply 
because the costs of addressing current climate vari-
ability and future climate change are often intermin-
gled. Hence, most parts of this study do not attempt 
to estimate the costs of adaptation by reference to a 
baseline under which the adaptation deﬁ cit has been 
closed. Two exceptions are adaptation to sea level rise 
in Bangladesh and to changes in extreme weather 
events in Samoa.
It is not simple to assess how the use of alternative 
baselines in which the adaptation deﬁ cit has or has 
not been closed will aﬀ ect estimates of the costs of 
adaptation. For infrastructure, for example, clos-
ing the adaptation deﬁ cit will usually mean that a 
larger stock of infrastructure assets has to be climate-
proofed, thus implying an increase in adaptation 
costs. In contrast, closing the adaptation deﬁ cit in 
agriculture might imply a higher reliance on irrigated 
agriculture, which may reduce the extent of adapta-
tion required as a consequence of changes in rainfall 
patterns due to climate change. Adaptation costs are 
likely to be reduced in the agricultural sector as a 
result. Th e practical diﬃ  culty of separating the costs 
of closing the adaptation deﬁ cit from the costs of 
adaptation for carefully deﬁ ned baseline means that 
the estimates reported in this study tend to over-state 
the “true” costs of adaptation costs, though by diﬀ er-
ent degrees for diﬀ erent sectors and countries. As an 
illustration, adaptation measures in some of the coun-
try studies actually generate beneﬁ ts for some climate 
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scenarios that increase total welfare rather than just 
restoring it. Th is is because they combine adaptation 
with development measures that would be justiﬁ ed 
even without climate change.  
A typology of adaptation measures
Proactive and reactive measures:   Reactive mea-
sures will be the dominant response until threats 
become better understood. But countries can 
become more proactive in disaster preparedness. 
Th e frequent cyclones and extreme coastal events 
in Bangladesh, for example, have led the country 
to greatly improve its early warning systems, and 
the number of deaths from such events has sig-
niﬁ cantly decreased.
Soft and hard measures:   Many soft measures—
such as water and energy pricing, strengthening 
property rights, and ﬂ ood plain and landslide area 
zoning—have robust adaptation and development 
results. But they take time and require strong 
institutions to put in place. Th e timing may be 
consistent with the time frame of global warm-
ing, however, if concerted action begins now.
Public and private adaptation:   Adaptation mea-
sures can be classiﬁ ed by the types of economic 
agent initiating the measure—public or private. 
Th e literature distinguishes between autonomous 
or spontaneous adaptation (by households and 
communities acting on their own without public 
interventions but within an existing public policy 
framework) and planned adaptation (from a 
deliberate public policy decision). 
Dealing with uncertainty
Uncertainty complicates the analysis of adaptation 
to climate change in three diﬀ erent ways. First, for 
most countries there is no consensus whether future 
climate will be wetter or drier, or how the frequency 
and severity of major storms will change. Changes 
in regional climate phenomena such as the Asian 
monsoon or the El Niño Southern Oscillation are 
even more uncertain. Consequently, decisions about 
investments in assets having a useful life of 20, 30, or 
even 40 years—such as dams, dikes, urban drainage, 
bridges, and other infrastructure—have to be based 
on incomplete information with a large variance in 
projections of future climate conditions. Th e second 
major uncertainty concerns economic growth. Faster 
economic growth puts more assets at risk in absolute 
terms, but higher levels of investment and technical 
change mean that countries have greater ﬂ exibility 
to absorb and respond to climate-induced changes 
in productivity and other climate shocks. Recent 
experience shows that predicting economic growth is 
a fragile science, while projecting how technological 
change may aﬀ ect adaptation over the next 40 years is 
nearly impossible.
Uncertainty about climate outcomes 
Th e EACC study—both the country and the global 
tracks—calculates adaptation costs as if decision 
makers know with certainty what the future climate 
will be. Th is must be complemented by considering 
how to maximize the ﬂ exibility of investment pro-
grams to take advantage of new climate knowledge as 
it becomes available. For most countries and sectors, 
the study was able to identify policies and investments 
that generate good outcomes over the range of the 
wettest and driest climate scenarios considered. But 
these scenarios could not encompass the full range 
of possible outcomes. Of the 26 climate projections 
available for the A2 SRES, an assessment of adapta-
tion costs was feasible only for two projections for the 
global track and for two-to-four projections for the 
country studies. Further, climate models are evolving 
all the time, so it is inevitable that projections made 
in 2012 will diﬀ er from those made in 2008. 
A good faith eﬀ ort has been made to examine the 
wettest and driest scenarios available for each situ-
ation. Th is range is simply a snapshot of the state 
of climate science when this study was undertaken 
and does not reﬂ ect any view of the distribution of 
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climate outcomes in future as scientiﬁ c models and 
other information change. Because the range of both 
climate and economic uncertainty tends to grow 
exponentially over time, the study examines expen-
ditures up to 2050 and limits the scope to adaptation 
to what may be broadly interpreted as the public sec-
tor. Th e major impacts of climate change, such as the 
melting of ice sheets, are likely to occur after 2050, 
but the degree of uncertainty after this date requires 
a quite diﬀ erent approach to quantifying the costs of 
adaptation.10
Hierarchy of uncertainty and timing
Rational resource allocation must take into account 
the degrees of uncertainty about the nature and tim-
ing of climate outcomes. When will it be optimal to 
start building sea walls in coastal areas and how high 
should they be? Th e uncertainties concern the rate 
of future sea level rise, the potential height of storm 
surges, the damage that may be caused to agricultural 
or urban assets in the coastal zone, and the future 
cost of upgrading sea walls. Th ese must be balanced 
against the need to allocate resources that could be 
used to meet other social or economic goals instead. 
Further, there may be alternative measures which 
are less expensive than sea walls but which provide 
temporary or less eﬀ ective protection. Developing a 
strategy involves choices about the selection, scale 
and timing of adaptation actions when both climate 
change and economic development are uncertain. A 
model is needed that allows governments to prioritize 
and sequence adaptation strategies in a ﬁ nancially 
constrained environment and which takes account of 
social, institutional, and cultural factors (Kellerer et 
al. 2004).11 A pilot exercise was carried out at a sub-
basin water level in Bolivia.
Economic forecasts
A key contribution of this study is to separate the 
costs of adaptation from those of development by 
deﬁ ning an explicit development baseline. Th e study 
assumes just one future development path, based on 
growth in population, GDP per capita, and urbaniza-
tion, which drive the demand for food, investment in 
infrastructure, the beneﬁ ts of protecting coastal zones, 
and so on. How would the costs of adaptation change 
with a diﬀ erent trajectory? Alternative assumptions 
about population and economic growth have only a 
slight impact on estimates of the cost of adaptation in 
2010–19, so the margins of error associated with the 
development baseline are not very important in the 
immediate future, although they will grow over time. 
Th e United Nations publishes alternative population 
projections that rely on diﬀ erent assumptions about 
fertility decline in developing countries. Th e varia-
tion in population forecasts for developing countries 
in 2050 is approximately +/–14 percent for alterna-
tive fertility assumptions. Th e United Nation’s central 
projection has consistently been revised downward 
over the last two decades as fertility rates have fallen 
faster than anticipated. Th us, the plausible range of 
uncertainty might be +/–10 percent. Th e range of 
uncertainty for growth in GDP per capita is larger, 
ranging from –26 percent to +40 percent in 2050. Th e 
variation for developing countries is even larger—
from –40 percent to +50 percent – so the range of 
variation in total GDP might be –45 percent to +75 
percent, a huge margin of uncertainty. Th ese errors are 
compounded by the conﬁ dence intervals of projec-
tions of demand as functions of population and GDP 
per capita. On this basis, it is very diﬃ  cult to calculate 
potential margins of error in the estimates of the costs 
of adaptation. Yet, there is nothing unique in the pro-
cedures adopted here. Th ey are assumptions widely 
adopted in similar exercises. Th e very same uncertain-
ties apply in the analyses of all economic sectors that 
have such extended time horizons.
Future technologies
With the exception of agriculture this study does 
not allow for the unknowable eﬀ ects of innovation 
and technical change on adaptation costs. Hence, the 
reported costs are based on what is known today rather 
than what might be possible in 20–40 years. Sustained 
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growth in per capita GDP for the world economy 
rests on technical change, which is likely to reduce 
the real costs of adaptation over time. Th e exclusion 
of technical change is one factor that imparts an 
upward bias to the reported estimates of the costs of 
adaptation. In the case of agriculture, growth in agri-
cultural productivity, based on historical trends and 
expert opinion, is built into the IMPACT model, and 
explicit account is taken of investment in agricultural 
research as an element of the cost of adaptation.
Methodology
Critical methodological issues include establishing 
a baseline, choosing climate projections, predicting 
impacts, simplifying assumptions, ﬁ ne-tuning the 
methodological approaches of the global and country 
tracks, and introducing a social component into the 
country track.
The baseline
To estimate the impacts of climate change and then 
the costs of adaptation, it is necessary to compare, for 
each time period, the diﬀ erence between the world 
with climate change and the world without climate 
change. To do this, we ﬁ rst have to project what the 
world will look like between now and 2050, our plan-
ning horizon. Th is projected world without climate 
change is the baseline. It is a reasonable trajectory 
for the growth and structural change of the economy 
over 40 years that can be used as a basis of compari-
son with the climate change scenario. 
Using a time frame of 2050, development baselines 
are ﬁ rst developed for each sector using a common 
set of GDP and population forecasts for 2010–50.12 
Th e population trajectory is aligned with the United 
Nations Population Division’s middle-fertility pro-
jections for 2006. To ensure consistency with emis-
sions projections, the GDP trajectory is based on the 
average of the GDP growth projections of the three 
major integrated assessment models of global emis-
sions growth—Climate Framework for Uncertainty, 
Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND; Anthoﬀ  and 
Tol 2008); PAGE2002 (Hope 2006); and Regional 
Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the 
Economy (RICE99; Nordhaus 2002)—and growth 
projections used by the International Energy Agency 
and the U.S. Energy Information Administration to 
forecast energy demand. All these sources provide 
growth estimates at a regionally disaggregated level. 
Th e global average annual real GDP per capita 
growth rate constructed in this way is 2.1 percent, 
similar to global growth rates assumed in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) A2 emissions scenario. From the base-
lines, sector-level performance indicators (such as 
stock of infrastructure assets, level of nutrition, and 
water supply availability) are determined.
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Choosing climate projections
Climate scenarios were chosen to capture the larg-
est possible range of model predictions. Although 
model predictions do not diverge much in projected 
temperature increases by 2050, precipitation changes 
vary substantially across models. For this reason, 
model extremes were captured by using the model 
scenarios that yielded extremes of dry and wet cli-
mate projections, although catastrophic events were 
not captured. Among the models reporting minimum 
and maximum temperature changes, NCAR was the 
wettest and CSIRO the driest scenario (globally, not 
necessarily the wettest and driest in every location) 
based on the climate moisture index.
Predicting impacts
Th e changes in climate are used to predict what the 
world would look like under the new climate con-
ditions without and with adaptation. Th is meant 
translating the impacts of changes in climate on the 
various economic activities (agriculture, ﬁ sheries), on 
people’s behavior (consumption, health), on environ-
mental conditions (water availability, oceans, forests), 
and on physical capital (infrastructure).
Sectors
Agriculture
Forestry
Fisheries
Infrastructure
Water Resources
Health
Ecosystem Services
Projections
Climate
Water Run-off
Baseline GDP/Population
Decision Rule
Economic, Social and 
Environmental Impacts
Identiﬁcation of Adaptation
Measures
Cost of Adaptation
Cross-Sectors
Coastal Zones
Extreme Weather Events
Global Track Country Track
Decision Rule
Global Data Sets
Sectors
Agriculture
Forestry
Fisheries
Infrastructure
Water Resources
Projections
Climate
Water Run-off
Baseline GDP/Population
Participatory 
Scenarios
w/vunerable 
groups
Economic, Social and 
Environmental Impacts
Identiﬁcation of Adaptation
Measures
Cost of Adaptation
Cross-Sectors
Coastal Zones
Extreme Weather Events
National Macroeconomic 
Analysis
Sub-national
Data Sets
STUDY METHODOLOGY: GLOBAL AND COUNTRY TRACKS
FIGURE 2
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Simplifying assumptions 
Analyses of complex decisions under uncertainty 
easily become intractable. The various dimensions 
of climate change combined with many countries, 
sectors and agents reinforce this danger. Hence, 
it is necessary to adopt a variety of assumptions 
whose purpose is to ensure that useful results can 
be generated from the models. First, it is assumed 
that policy makers know what the future climate 
will be and act to prevent its damages. Second, in 
costing the adaptation options, the study focuses 
on hard options (building dams, dykes) and not 
soft options (early warning systems, community 
preparedness programs, watershed management, 
urban and rural zoning). This approach was delib-
erately chosen because the former options can be 
assessed and their costs estimated, not because 
soft options are less important. In reality, soft 
options should be adopted whenever they are less 
expensive than hard options. Third, the adaptation 
costs are based on current knowledge. This implic-
itly assumes that there will be no future innova-
tion and technical change beyond current trends, 
except in the agricultural sector. But we know that 
economic growth and thus development depend 
on technical change, which is likely to reduce the 
real costs of adaptation over time. All of these 
assumptions give an upward bias to the estimates 
of the adaptation costs. We return to these points 
in the limitations discussion. 
Differences between the global and 
country tracks 
The steps identified apply to both the global and 
country tracks. But given their different objectives, 
two steps of the methodologies differ. First, for 
most country studies a macroeconomic modeling 
framework was used allowing for the analysis of 
macroeconomic and cross-sectoral effects of the 
impacts and adaptation to climate change. This 
integrated approach has been less successful in 
generating lessons at the sector level, but provides 
important information for national level deci-
sion making. Second, the country track featured a 
social component in six of the seven country case 
studies. As a companion piece to the EACC Syn-
thesis Report, an EACC-Social Synthesis Report 
has been produced that presents the findings of 
the social component, which was conducted in all 
case study countries except Samoa.
Social analysis
The social component in the country track 
focuses on preferred adaptation strategies from a 
bottom-up, local-level perspective. The method-
ology involved a combination of analytical meth-
ods, including participatory scenario development 
(PSD) workshops to reveal local stakeholders’ 
assessments of adaptation pathways in the context 
of uncertainty. In the workshops, participants rep-
resenting the interests of vulnerable groups iden-
tified preferred adaptation options and sequences 
of interventions based on local and national cli-
mate and economic projections. The findings on 
what forms of adaptation various groups consider 
to be most effective—including soft adapta-
tion options such as land use planning, greater 
public access to information, and institutional 
capacity building—have implications for the 
costs of adaptation.
In addition, the social component generated new 
evidence on how vulnerability is socially differen-
tiated; identified the risks and benefits of adapta-
tion options for a range of actors in an integrated 
and cross-sectoral manner; and highlighted the 
importance of social accountability and good gov-
ernance for achieving pro-poor, climate-resilient 
development. The focus of the EACC-social 
analysis went beyond planned adaptation and 
considered the potential of autonomous forms 
of adaptation undertaken by households, NGOs, 
and the private sector to inform future adapta-
tion planning. This approach was not viable in the 
global track. 
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Limitations
Th e EACC study makes use of mathematical tools, 
which impose intellectual discipline. Examples of this 
discipline are the use of a well-deﬁ ned baseline and 
the requirement under CGE models that the national 
income accounting identities balance at the end of 
each year. Th is approach is required to provide a quan-
titative evaluation of costs and beneﬁ ts. Th e models 
can be used to assess the relative importance of dif-
ferent factors and the marginal impacts of changes 
in speciﬁ c policy variables on outcomes. Such analy-
sis provides an essential foundation for formulating 
policies and making decisions. Nonetheless, the usual 
limitations of relying upon econometric and other 
mathematical models apply. 
Path dependency. Formal models can encourage a 
focus on questions that are amenable to analysis by 
the model at the expense of less tractable but perhaps 
more important issues. Adaptation to climate change 
involves responses that depend upon institutional or 
cultural factors or, more likely, a combination of these 
plus political factors: for example, how to inﬂ uence 
the location of people away from high-risk or increas-
ingly unproductive areas, how to improve the alloca-
tion of water and land, or how to improve the quality 
of education. Th e goal of this study was to focus on 
the economics of adaptation, but this approach pres-
ents only part of a much larger story.
Similarly, previous work in each country inﬂ uenced 
both the direction of EACC research and what it has 
been possible to accomplish.13 Where researchers, 
data, and models already existed, the EACC project 
naturally built upon prior work. Th e consequence is 
that the level and detail of the study’s modeling and 
analysis varies across sectors and countries. In most 
cases, this reﬂ ects the relative importance that coun-
tries and analysts have attached to diﬀ erent kinds of 
adaptation. 
Important limitations of this study fall under 
categories: (1) institutions, and (2) modeling 
limitations. Th e crucial issue of uncertainty and the 
limitations it poses has already been discussed above.
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Institutions
Diﬃ  culty in addressing. From the outset the EACC 
study did not attempt to incorporate institutional, 
political, and cultural factors in the analysis of adapta-
tion costs. Without question, these factors are crucial 
in understanding the process of adaptation and deter-
mining what is feasible as opposed to what might be 
desirable from an economic perspective. But there 
was a clear tradeoﬀ  between extending the scope of 
the study and ensuring that the economics of adapta-
tion could be examined in suﬃ  cient detail.14 
Some types of adaptation are best implemented 
through eﬀ ective collective action at the community 
level. “Soft” adaptation measures—early warning sys-
tems, community preparedness programs, promoting 
education, and capacity building—require strong gov-
ernance to be eﬀ ective. If this can be achieved, they 
may go a long way in reducing vulnerability to climate 
change. However, estimating the costs of implement-
ing such options is diﬃ  cult for individual countries and 
impractical at a global level. Th e global study focused 
“hard” adaptation measures, while the country studies 
attempted to identify opportunities for soft adaptation 
without trying to cost them. Th ere is an additional 
consideration: the country studies suggest that draw-
ing a distinction between (a) what are good develop-
ment policies, and (b) additional measures to adapt to 
climate changes is diﬃ  cult under the best of circum-
stances. Hard adaptation measures can be identiﬁ ed 
and their costs estimated, whereas soft adaptation is 
generally a matter of doing things that would be desir-
able even in the absence of climate change. Sometimes, 
the focus has to be shifted or policies redesigned to 
take account of climate change, but it is rarely feasible 
to separate adaptation from development. 
Migration. One concern that is often expressed is 
that climate change will lead to substantial amounts 
of intra- or inter-country migration, which will 
imply substantial public expenditures to meet the 
needs of migrants in their new places of residence. 
Recent work suggests that social processes linked to 
poverty and marginality as well as the treatment of 
migrants may be more important determinants of the 
amount and consequences of migration than envi-
ronmental change (Barnett and Webber 2010). Good 
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development policies to reduce poverty and enhance 
social inclusion are essential without any consideration 
of climate changes, so the additional element of adap-
tation is a small part of a larger picture. If such policies 
are not implemented, environmental change may be 
an important proximate factor in migration decisions 
leading to substantial costs of adaptation as a conse-
quence of wider policy failures.
Modeling 
Th e study has estimated the additional public sector 
(budgetary) costs that will be required for countries 
to adapt to climate change.15 Governments achieve 
climate adaptation at lowest cost when (a) they use 
cost-beneﬁ t criteria to choose the most eﬃ  cient proj-
ects to meet the overall goal, and (b) they sequence 
projects to maximize the net present value of their 
expected future investment streams. Th e models used 
for this study cannot meet these eﬃ  ciency conditions 
and therefore do not ensure adaptation at least cost. 
None of the sector models used in the global study is 
capable of choosing the best proﬁ le of government’s 
investment through time (inter-temporal optimiza-
tion). Some of the models in the country studies 
have such capability, but most do not. In any case, 
inter-temporal optimization is diﬃ  cult assuming 
certainty and is nearly unmanageable in a stochastic 
framework. In addition, sectoral adaptation plans 
were identiﬁ ed independently in most cases for 
both the global and the country studies. Identifying 
whether the resources invested in one sector would 
have yielded higher adaptation beneﬁ ts in another 
sector, or whether cash transfers would maintain 
welfare at lower cost, was beyond the capacity of 
this exercise.16 Several of the country studies CGE 
models calculated the economywide eﬀ ect of spe-
ciﬁ c sectoral adaptation measures, but the adapta-
tion strategies themselves were not optimized, either 
cross-sectorally or inter-temporally.
One method to overcome the temporal and cross-
sectoral limitations of models is to construct a 
suﬃ  ciently large number of measures/strategies and 
compare their results. Th is has been the strategy of 
this study. However, collaboration with govern-
ment has meant that for each country case study the 
ﬁ rst priority has been to simulate the government’s 
preferred adaptation strategy. Because of time and 
resources constraints, and at times the reluctance on 
the part of government authorities to explore strate-
gies outside the approved plan, few alternative strate-
gies have been explored to date. 
Th ese qualiﬁ cations do not mean that the study ignored 
eﬃ  cient adaptation. For each of the sectoral and coun-
try studies, a serious attempt was made to apply rules of 
thumb or other criteria that identify low cost, though 
probably not least cost, strategies for adaptation. In any 
case, an optimal investment program for adaptation in 
a country or for a sector is diﬃ  cult to deﬁ ne, let alone 
calculate, when there is so much uncertainty about 
future climate and economic development.
Th ere is an important choice that has to be made 
when thinking about future work on adaptation. 
One approach would be to focus on eﬃ  cient adapta-
tion either by the use of optimization models across 
sectors and over time, or by comparing the results 
of a wide range of alternative investment programs, 
including those that implement projects at diﬀ ering 
points in the future. An alternative approach would 
be to look for robust rules of thumb that yield reason-
able or good adaptation strategies across a wide range 
of climate outcomes and economic conditions. In 
view of the uncertainties about climate and economic 
development as well as the limited information avail-
able to models, the second approach seems likely to 
be the better way forward in the immediate future. 
Th ere are two issues on which the economic frame-
work used to examine adaptation requires additional 
work. Th e ﬁ rst issue concerns the treatment of ecosys-
tem services. Some of the services of ecosystems that 
are used as indirect inputs to the production of market 
goods and services were included implicitly or explic-
itly in the sector. However, the role of ecosystems 
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such as coastal and inland wetlands in providing 
both nonmarket services—including protection from 
droughts, ﬂ oods, or storms—and cultural or recre-
ational beneﬁ ts was not addressed. Additional work 
is needed on ﬂ ood protection services of wetlands 
other than mangroves and on the potential for using 
mangroves as an adaptation measure. With respect 
to biodiversity, it is diﬃ  cult to separate the eﬀ ects of 
climate change from those of more general economic 
development. Even if that can be done, little is known 
about what adaptation measures are eﬀ ective for pre-
serving biodiversity. 
Th e second issue is how to combine social analyses 
with the economic models. Th e original intent of the 
EACC was to translate the very rich, mostly qualita-
tive information from ﬁ eld work into economic terms, 
so that the adaptation measures indicated by the local 
populations could be included in the economic analy-
sis as explicit adaptation alternatives. Th is approach 
proved to be unworkable. Among the diﬃ  culties were 
(a) the level of eﬀ ort required to obtain the necessary 
economic information, (b) problems in scaling up 
very speciﬁ c local and soft measures for incorporation 
in national models, and (c) the high degree of overlap 
between what local communities saw as immediate 
development priorities and adaptation measures. 
Nonetheless, the social component was invaluable as 
a complement to the quantitative analysis in assessing 
the consistency of adaptation measures viewed from 
national and local perspectives. 
Future Work
As this section has emphasized, the EACC study has 
been a preliminary attempt to understand the eco-
nomic issues that arise in identifying and implement-
ing measures to adapt to climate change. Th e study 
has highlighted the wide range of uncertainty that 
hamper any attempt to draw immediate and speciﬁ c 
conclusions about the best policies and investments 
for adaptation.
It is sometimes self-serving to emphasize the need 
for more detailed studies and further research. Th is 
is not the case when dealing with climate change. 
Th e highest priority in the immediate future must 
be to reduce the range of uncertainty about future 
climate impacts and to identify forms of adaptation 
that are robust across the range of uncertainty that 
will remain. Table 1 identiﬁ es areas in which future 
work can contribute to this process of reducing 
uncertainty. It is fundamentally based on the study’s 
limitations.
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TABLE 1 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
STUDY LIMITATION RECOMMENDATION
Use of mathematical models Include institutional, social, cultural, and political perspectives to identify 
good policies
Climate uncertainty Consider more scenarios, Monte Carlo simulations, and other probabilistic 
approaches
Growth uncertainty Hard to improve other than through sensitivity analyses
Technological uncertainty Incorporate better information from sector specialists and simulate the 
impact of potential advances
Non-consideration to institu-
tional issues
Context-speciﬁ c institutional capacity has to be assessed and considered to 
make recommendations realistic and feasible
Limited focus on migration and 
urbanization
Work with outside projections; limited current knowledge on cities and 
climate change 
Models not worked on 
efﬁ ciency
Improve models to include inter-temporal, cross-sectoral, and cross-regional 
efﬁ ciency
Limited range of adaptation Include a broader range of strategies
No environmental services Pull better information and introduce more consistent estimates
Integration with local, bot-
tom-up perspectives
Better understand economics of local actions
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Putting a price tag on adaptation
Overall, the study estimates that the cost between 
2010 and 2050 of adapting to an approximately 2oC 
warmer world by 2050 is in the range of $70 billion17 
to $100 billion a year (Table 2). Th is sum is the same 
order of magnitude as the foreign aid that developed 
countries now give developing countries each year. 
But it is still a very low percentage (0.17 percent) 
of the wealth of countries (measured by their GDP, 
which was roughly $60 trillion in 2009).
Total adaptation costs calculated by the gross sum 
method average roughly $10–$15 billion a year more 
than the other two methods (the insigniﬁ cant dif-
ference between the X-sum and net sum ﬁ gures is 
largely a coincidence). Th e diﬀ erence is driven by 
Results From the Global Analyses
TABLE 2
TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS OF ADAPTATION FOR ALL SECTORS, BY REGION, 2010–50 
(2005 $ billions, no discounting)
Cost aggregation 
type
East Asia & 
Paciﬁ c
Europe & 
Central 
Asia
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean
Middle East 
& North 
Africa
South 
Asia
Sub-
Saharan Africa Total
National Centre for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), wettest scenario
Gross sum 25.7 12.6 21.3 3.6 17.1 17.1 97.5
X-sum 21.7 11.2 18.7 2.4 12.4 15.1 81.5
Net sum 21.7 11.1 18.7 2.3 12.3 14.9 81.1
Commonwealth Scientiﬁ c and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), driest scenario
Gross sum 20.1 8.1 17.9 3.5 18.7 16.4 84.8
X-sum 17.9 6.9 14.8 2.5 15.0 14.1 71.2
Net sum 17.7 6.5 14.5 2.4 14.6 13.8 69.6
Notes: (a) The gross aggregation method sets negative costs in any sector in a country to zero before costs are aggregated for the country 
and for all developing countries. The X-sums method nets positive and negative items within countries but not across countries and includes 
costs for a country in the aggregate, as long as the net cost across sectors is positive for the country. The net aggregate measure nets 
negative costs within and across countries. (b) NCAR is The National Center for Atmospheric Research, and CSIRO is the Commonwealth 
Scientiﬁ c and Industrial Research Organisation.
Source: World Bank 2010a.
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countries that appear to beneﬁ t from climate change 
in the water supply and ﬂ ood protection sector, espe-
cially in East Asia and Paciﬁ c and in South Asia.
Th e drier scenario (CSIRO) requires lower total adap-
tation costs than does the wetter scenario (NCAR), 
largely because of the sharply lower costs for infra-
structure, which outweigh the higher costs for water 
and ﬂ ood management. In both scenarios, infrastruc-
ture, coastal zones, and water supply and ﬂ ood protec-
tion account for the bulk of the costs. Infrastructure 
adaptation costs are highest for the wetter scenario.
On a regional basis, for both climate scenarios, the 
East Asia and Paciﬁ c Region bears the highest adap-
tation cost, and the Middle East and North Africa 
the lowest. Latin America and the Caribbean and 
Sub-Saharan Africa follow East Asia and Paciﬁ c in 
both scenarios (Figure 3). On a sector breakdown, 
the highest costs for East Asia and the Paciﬁ c are 
in infrastructure and coastal zones; for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, water supply and ﬂ ood protection and agri-
culture; for Latin America and the Caribbean, water 
supply and ﬂ ood protection and coastal zones; and 
for South Asia, infrastructure and agriculture. 
Not surprisingly, both climate scenarios show costs 
increasing over time, although falling as a percent-
age of GDP—suggesting that countries become less 
vulnerable to climate change as their economies grow 
(Figures 4 and 5). Th ere are considerable regional 
variations, however. Adaptation costs as a percent-
age of GDP are considerably higher in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in any other region, in large part because 
of the region’s lower GDP, but also due to higher 
costs of adaptation for water resources (not shown) 
driven by changes in patterns of precipitation.
Turning to the EACC analyses of sectors and extreme 
events, the ﬁ ndings oﬀ er some insights for policy 
Note: EAP is East Asia and Paciﬁ c, ECA is Europe and Central Asia, LAC is Latin America and Caribbean, MNA is Middle East and North 
Africa, SAS is South Asia, and SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: World Bank 2010a.
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Note: EAP is East Asia and Paciﬁ c, ECA is Europe and Central Asia, LAC is Latin America and Caribbean, MNA is Middle East and North 
Africa, SAS is South Asia, and SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: World Bank 2010a.
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makers who must make tough choices in the face of 
great uncertainty. 
Infrastructure.18 Th is sector has accounted for the larg-
est share of adaptation costs in past studies and takes 
up a major share in the EACC study—in fact, the big-
gest share for the NCAR (wettest) scenario because the 
adaptation costs for infrastructure are especially sensitive 
to levels of annual and maximum monthly precipita-
tion. Urban infrastructure—drainage, public buildings, 
and similar assets—accounts for about 54 percent of the 
infrastructure adaptation costs, followed by railways at 
18 percent, and roads (mainly paved) at 16 percent. East 
Asia and the Paciﬁ c and South Asia face the highest 
costs, reﬂ ecting their relative populations. Sub-Saharan 
Africa experiences the greatest increase over time, with 
its adaptation costs rising from $0.9 billion a year for 
2010–19 to $5 billion a year for 2040–49. 
Coastal zones.19 Coastal zones are home to an ever-
growing concentration of people and economic 
activity, yet they are also subject to a number of 
climate risks, including sea level rise and possible 
increased intensity of tropical storms and cyclones. 
Th ese factors make adaptation to climate change 
critical. Th e EACC study shows that coastal adapta-
tion costs are signiﬁ cant and vary with the magnitude 
of sea-level rise, making it essential for policymakers 
to plan while accounting for the uncertainty. One of 
the most striking results is that Latin America and the 
Caribbean and East Asia and the Paciﬁ c account for 
about two-thirds of the total adaptation costs. 
Water supply.20 Climate change has already aﬀ ected 
the hydrological cycle, a process that is expected to 
intensify over the 21st century. In some parts of the 
world, water availability has increased and will con-
tinue to increase, but in other parts, it has decreased 
and will continue to do so. Moreover, the frequency 
and magnitude of ﬂ oods are expected to rise, because 
of projected increases in the intensity of rainfall. 
Accounting for the climate impacts, the study shows 
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that water supply and ﬂ ood management ranks as one 
of the top three adaptation costs in both the wetter 
and drier scenarios, with Sub-Saharan Africa foot-
ing by far the highest costs. Latin America and the 
Caribbean also sustain high costs under both models, 
and South Asia sustains high costs under CSIRO.
Agriculture.21 Climate change aﬀ ects agriculture by 
altering yields and changing areas where crops can 
be grown. Th e EACC study shows that changes in 
temperature and precipitation from both climate sce-
narios will signiﬁ cantly hurt crop yields and produc-
tion—with irrigated and rainfed wheat and irrigated 
rice the hardest hit. South Asia shoulders the biggest 
declines in production, but developing countries fare 
worse for almost all crops compared to developed 
countries. Moreover, the changes in trade ﬂ ow patterns 
are dramatic. Under the NCAR scenario, developed 
country exports increase by 28 percent, while under 
the CSIRO scenario they increase by 75 percent rela-
tive to 2000 levels. South Asia becomes a much larger 
importer of food under both scenarios, and East Asia 
and the Paciﬁ c becomes a net food exporter under the 
NCAR. In addition, the decline in calorie availability 
brought about by climate change raises the number of 
malnourished children. 
Human health.22 Th e key human health impacts of 
climate change include increases in the incidence of 
vectorborne diseases (malaria), waterborne diseases 
(diarrhea), heat- and cold-related deaths, injuries 
and deaths from ﬂ ooding, and the prevalence of 
malnutrition. Th e EACC study, which focuses on 
malaria and diarrhea, ﬁ nds adaptation costs fall-
ing in absolute terms over time to less than half the 
2010 estimates of adaptation costs by 2050. Why do 
costs decline in the face of higher risks? Th e answer 
lies in the beneﬁ ts expected from economic growth 
and development. While the declines are consistent 
across regions, the rate of decline in South Asia and 
East Asia and Paciﬁ c is faster than in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As a result, by 2050 more than 80 percent of 
health sector adaptation costs will be shouldered by 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Extreme weather events.23 Without reliable data 
on emergency management costs, the EACC study 
tries to shed light on the role of socioeconomic 
development in increasing climate resilience. It 
asks: As climate change increases potential vulner-
ability to extreme weather events, how many addi-
tional young women would have to be educated to 
neutralize this increased vulnerability? And how 
much would it cost? Th e ﬁ ndings show that by 
2050, neutralizing the impact of extreme weather 
events requires educating an additional 18 million 
to 23 million young women at a cost of $12 billion 
to $15 billion a year. For 2000–50, the tab reaches 
about $300 billion in new outlays. Th is means that 
in the developing world, neutralizing the impact 
of worsening weather over the coming decades 
will require educating a large new cohort of young 
women at a cost that will steadily escalate to sev-
eral billion dollars a year. But it will be enormously 
worthwhile on other margins to invest in education 
for millions of young women who might otherwise 
be denied its many beneﬁ ts.
Putting the ﬁ ndings in context
How does this study compare with earlier studies? 
Th e EACC estimates are near the upper end of 
estimates by the UNFCCC (2007), the study clos-
est in approach to this study, though not as high 
as suggested by a recent critique of the UNFCCC 
study by Parry and others (2009). A comparison 
of the studies is limited by methodological diﬀ er-
ences—in particular, the use of a consistent set of 
climate models to link impacts to adaptation costs 
and an explicit separation of costs of development 
from those of adaptation in the EACC study. 24 But 
the major diﬀ erence between them is the nearly 
six-fold increase in the cost of coastal zone manage-
ment and defense under the EACC study. Th is dif-
ference reﬂ ects several improvements to the earlier 
UNFCCC estimates under the EACC study: better 
unit cost estimates, including maintenance costs, 
and the inclusion of costs of port upgrading and 
risks from both sea level rise and storm surges. 
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF ADAPTATION COST ESTIMATES BY THE UNFCCC AND THE EACC, $ BILLIONS
Sector UNFCCC (2007)
EACC Study Scenario
NCAR (wettest) CSIRO (driest)
Infrastructure 2–41 27.5 13.0
Coastal zones 5 28.5 27.6
Water supply and ﬂ ood protection 9 14.4 19.7
Agriculture, forestry, ﬁ sheries 7 2.5* 3.0*
Human health 5 2.0 1.5
Extreme weather events — 6.7 6.4
Total 28–67 81.5 71.2
Note: *In the agriculture, forestry, and ﬁ sheries sector, the cost of adaptation has changed as compared to the estimates presented in the 
EACC global report (World Bank 2010a), in which these costs stood at $7.6 billion for the NCAR and $7.3 billion for the CSIRO scenarios. 
The current costs are estimated as the difference in public spending in the scenario with climate change and adaptation as compared to the 
no-climate-change scenario, and use the same methodology as has been applied to the other sectors. In World Bank (2010), the costs were 
incorrectly reported as reﬂ ecting the difference in public spending in the scenario with climate change and adaptation as compared to the 
scenario with climate change but no adaptation. The difference lowers the EACC lower bound estimate of the global cost of adaptation from 
$75 billion reported in WB (2010) to $71.2 billion per year, rounded to $70 billion per year. 
Source: UNFCCC (2007) and revised estimates World Bank 2010a.
Another reason for the higher estimates is the higher 
cost of adaptation for water supply and ﬂ ood pro-
tection under the EACC study, particularly for the 
CSIRO drier climate scenario. Th is diﬀ erence is 
explained in part by the inclusion of riverine ﬂ ood 
protection costs under the EACC study. Also push-
ing up the EACC study estimate is the study’s com-
prehensive sector coverage, especially inclusion of the 
cost of adaptation to extreme weather events. 
Th e infrastructure costs of adaptation in the EACC 
study fall in the middle of the UNFCCC range 
because of two contrary forces. Pushing up the 
EACC estimate is the more detailed coverage of 
infrastructure. Previous studies estimated adaptation 
costs as the cost of climate-prooﬁ ng new invest-
ment ﬂ ows and did not diﬀ erentiate risks or costs 
by type of infrastructure. Th e EACC study extended 
this work to estimate costs by types of infrastructure 
services—energy, transport, communications, water 
and sanitation, and urban and social infrastructure. 
Pushing down the EACC estimate are measurements 
of adaptation against a consistently projected devel-
opment baseline and use of a smaller multiplier on 
baseline investments than in the previous literature, 
based on a detailed analysis of climate prooﬁ ng, 
including adjustments to design standards and main-
tenance costs. 
Th e one sector where the EACC estimates are actu-
ally lower than the UNFCCC’s is human health. Th e 
reason for this divergence is in part because of the 
inclusion of the development baseline, which reduces 
the number of additional cases of malaria, and thereby 
adaptation costs, by some 50 percent by 2030 in the 
EACC study.
Th e bottom line: calculating the global cost of adap-
tation remains a complex problem, requiring projec-
tions of economic growth, structural change, climate 
change, human behavior, and government invest-
ments 40 years in the future. Th e EACC study tried to 
establish a new benchmark for research of this nature, 
as it adopted a consistent approach across countries 
25ECONOMICS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE:  SYNTHESIS REPORT
0.7
0.066
0.045
0.036
0.0045
0.0035
0.0025
0.0015
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
2000
CSIRO Static
Historical
NCAR Static
CSIRO Development
NCAR Development
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Killed by Floods (Per Million)
Affected by Droughts
Affected by Floods
and sectors and over time. But in the process, it had 
to make important assumptions and simpliﬁ cations, to 
some degree biasing the estimates. 
Lessons
Th e sector estimates of adaptation costs presented 
in the global track report point to a few important 
lessons.
A. Development is imperative ... Development dra-
matically reduces the number of people killed by 
ﬂ oods and aﬀ ected by ﬂ oods and droughts, quite 
apart from the impact of climate change (Figure 6). 
If development is held constant at 2000 levels, the 
number of people killed by ﬂ oods increases over time 
under the NCAR (wettest) scenario and decreases 
under the CSIRO (driest) scenario. Allowing for 
development between 2000 and 2050 greatly reduces 
the numbers of people killed under both scenarios. 
Th e ﬁ ndings are similar for the number of people 
aﬀ ected by ﬂ oods and droughts. 
In the health sector analysis, allowing for develop-
ment reduces the number of additional cases of 
malaria, and thereby adaptation costs, by more than 
half by 2030 and more than three-quarters by 2050. 
Th e greater the baseline level of development in each 
period, the smaller is the impact of climate change 
and the smaller are the costs of adaptation. Develop-
ment must be inclusive, however, to have these eﬀ ects. 
And development can also increase vulnerabilities: 
the more developed the country, the greater the value 
Source: World Bank 2010a.
DEVELOPMENT LOWERS THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED BY FLOODS AND AFFECTED BY FLOODS 
AND DROUGHTS, 2000–50
FIGURE 6
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of infrastructure and personal property at risk from 
climate change and therefore the greater the cost of 
climate-prooﬁ ng such assets. However, these costs 
decrease with development as a percentage of GDP.
B. …but not simply development as usual. Adaptation 
will also require a diﬀ erent kind of development—
breeding crops that are drought- and ﬂ ood-tolerant, 
climate-prooﬁ ng infrastructure to make it resilient to 
climate risks, reducing overcapacity in the ﬁ sheries 
industry, accounting for the inherent uncertainty in 
future climate projections in development planning, 
and others. 
Consider water supply. Adapting to changing con-
ditions in water availability and demand has always 
been at the core of water management. Traditionally, 
though, water managers and users have relied on his-
torical experience when planning, such as consistency 
in ﬂ ood recurrence periods. Th ese assumptions no 
longer hold under climate change. Water manage-
ment practices and procedures for designing water-
related infrastructure need to be revised to account 
for future climate conditions. Similarly, dikes and 
other coastal protection measures will need to be 
built in anticipation of rising sea levels.
C. Th ough adaptation is costly, costs can be reduced. Th e 
clearest opportunities to reduce the costs of adaptation 
are in water supply and ﬂ ood protection. Almost every 
developed country has experienced what can happen 
when countries fail to shift patterns of development 
or to manage resources in ways that take account of 
the potential impacts of climate change. Often, the 
reluctance to change reﬂ ects the political and eco-
nomic costs of changing policies and (quasi-) property 
rights that have underpinned decades or centuries of 
development. Countries that are experiencing rapid 
economic growth have an opportunity to reduce the 
costs associated with the legacy of past development 
by ensuring that future development takes account of 
changes in climate conditions. Economists and others 
regularly urge the adoption of mechanisms for man-
aging water resources that recognize the scarcity value 
of raw water. Th is advice is almost invariably ignored 
due to deeply embedded political and social interests. 
But the costs of misallocation of water resources will 
escalate even without climate change and could be 
overwhelming under conditions of climate change. A 
large share of the costs of adaptation in water supply 
and ﬂ ood protection could be avoided by adopting 
better management policies.
For good practical reasons, this study focuses on the 
costs of adaptation that are likely to fall on the public 
sector, and it assumes limited or no change in tech-
nology, except in the agriculture sector analysis. But 
the boundary between public and private (autono-
mous) adaptation is almost inﬁ nitely ﬂ exible. So long 
as governments and the public sector ensure that 
incentives for innovation, investment, and private 
decisions reﬂ ect the scarcity of resources once the 
impact of climate change is taken into account, expe-
rience demonstrates that the costs of adaptation may 
be dramatically reduced by a combination of techni-
cal change and private initiative.
D. Uncertainty remains a challenge. Th e inherent 
uncertainty in climate projections—and the uncertain-
ties about economic impacts and adaptation respons-
es—makes climate-resilient development planning a 
challenge. While the science is clear on general global 
trends of climate change, current climate science can 
provide only limited guidance to public investment in 
speciﬁ c countries or sectors, with the exception of sea 
level rise. Th is study has estimated the cost of adapta-
tion under 2 (of 26) global climate models associated 
with the A2 scenario of the IPCC Special Report 
on Emissions Scenarios. Th e costs were estimated as 
though the countries knew with certainty what the 
climate outcome would be. Th is is clearly not the case. 
Also, the study estimates the costs relative to a devel-
opment baseline, which in turn assumes a certain rate 
of growth of per capita GDP between 2010 and 2050. 
Th is is also not the case. 
Th is implies that climate adaptation must be limited 
to robust measures such as education and climate-
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related research. For durable climate-sensitive invest-
ments, a strategy is needed that maximizes the 
ﬂ exibility to incorporate new climate knowledge as 
it becomes available. Hedging against varying climate 
outcomes, for example by preparing for both drier 
and wetter conditions for agriculture, would raise the 
cost of adaptation well above the estimates here.
Th ere are three ways to deal with this uncertainty: 
wait for better information, prepare for the worst, and 
insure. Countries will select among these options, 
depending on speciﬁ c investment decisions and their 
level of risk aversion. Since climate change is gradual, 
designing for limited or no change in climate condi-
tions while waiting for better information might save 
money today but will likely result in high future costs 
for maintenance or earlier replacement of assets if cli-
mate conditions are worse than anticipated. Preparing 
for the worst might not be that expensive if the cost 
of adjusting design standards to accommodate future 
climate conditions is relatively small, as is the case for 
many infrastructure assets. Insurance is more com-
plicated, because uncertainty about climate change 
also involves regional shifts in temperature and rain-
fall. What might be large uncertainties for individual 
countries might become much smaller when the costs 
of adaptation are pooled, particularly across regions. A 
funding mechanism that permits the reallocation of 
funds across regions as better information is collected 
about the actual outcome of climate change would 
provide a basis for pooling risks across countries. 
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Th e purpose of the country case studies is to help 
the governments understand the potential economic 
impacts of climate change and to support their eﬀ orts 
to develop sound policies and investments in response 
to these potential impacts. Th is chapter summarizes 
the results of the country studies and their main les-
sons. For each country, the analyses consist of (a) a 
brief description of the nature and degree of vul-
nerability of the country to climate change; (b) the 
EACC study approach and main results from the 
modeling exercises, as well as local-level perspectives; 
and (c) a summary of country-speciﬁ c lessons and 
recommendations. 
Choice of countries. Th e seven country case studies were 
selected based on overall vulnerability to major climate 
change impacts; diﬀ ering environmental, social, and 
economic conditions; and adequate data at the national 
level. Government interest was also fundamental to 
select the countries. Although it was diﬃ  cult to identify 
the best set of candidates in advance, as is always the 
case in similar exercises, it was considered important 
to have representativeness in terms of continents, size, 
population, and income level of the country, as well as 
richness of data and local capacity to work with the 
EACC core team to apply the proposed methodology 
in the country. 
Mozambique, Ghana, and Ethiopia represent nearly 
the full range of agricultural systems in Africa. 
Mozambique is subject to ﬂ ooding and extreme 
events, including tropical cyclones. Both Mozam-
bique and Ghana are on the receiving end of water 
ﬂ owing out of major international river basins. With 
most of their economic activity and population con-
centrated along the coast and in low-lying deltas, 
Vietnam and Bangladesh are Asian countries widely 
recognized as among the world’s most vulnerable to 
climate change, particularly from extreme weather 
events and ﬂ ooding, with particular impacts on 
poorer populations. Bolivia is a poor Latin Ameri-
can country traditionally dependent on the Andean 
glaciers to supply good portions of water demand, 
and consisting of a wide range of agroecosystems—
from small-scale family agriculture on the Altiplano 
(largely composed of native indigenous populations) 
to large-scale commercial agriculture in the lowlands 
of Santa Cruz. Finally, Samoa represents a low-lying 
Paciﬁ c island at increased risk of sea level rise and 
storm surge. See Table 4 for information on which 
sectors were covered by country.
Methodology in African countries. Th e overall meth-
odology adopted in the three African countries 
closely follows the one used in the global track. Using 
a time frame of 2050, development baselines are ﬁ rst 
developed for each sector. Th e baseline represents 
the growth path the economy would follow in the 
absence of climate change. It is a reasonable trajec-
tory for growth and structural change of the economy 
Results From the Country Analyses
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over a period of 40 years that can be used as a basis 
for comparison with the climate change scenario. Th e 
baselines for each sector utilize a common set of GDP 
and population forecasts for 2010–50 and a common 
set of climate scenarios to project temperature and 
precipitation changes to 2050. Th e changes in climate 
are provided by a few diﬀ erent climate models that 
attempt to represent the most extreme variations in 
the main two variables—temperature and precipita-
tion. Th e diﬀ erent scenarios typically consist of the 
two considered in the global analyses (CSIRO and 
NCAR), plus two other country-speciﬁ c extreme cli-
mate scenarios. Th ey are used to predict impacts on 
economic sectors (agricultural output, consumption, 
water availability, and infrastructure). Th e ﬁ nal steps 
involve identifying and costing adaptation options for 
the key sectors. Th e costs of adaptation comprise the 
costs of public policy adaptation measures and exclude 
the costs of private (autonomous) adaptation. 
Th e modeling of the impacts of climate change in the 
selected sectors is carried out using a suite of models. 
Output parameters from these models are then fed 
into a common dynamic computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) model where the economic implications 
of the modeled data are assessed. Th e African country 
studies use a common core dynamic CGE model 
(Box 1), incorporating comparable approaches to cli-
mate change impacts and adaptation strategies. Th ere 
are signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences across the three countries, 
given their very diﬀ erent economic structures—for 
example, Ethiopia has no coastline, while Ghana and 
Mozambique are subject to coastal impacts of climate 
change—but the common modeling framework sup-
ports comparative analysis of sensitivity to shocks and 
adaptation strategies. 
Mozambique25
Vulnerability to climate change
Mozambique is subject to frequent droughts, ﬂ oods, 
and tropical cyclones. Th ese events threaten the coun-
try’s economic performance, which is already highly 
aﬀ ected by high rainfall variability. Drought is the most 
frequent disaster, with an average incidence of every 
3–4 years. Floods in Mozambique are characterized by 
a number of geographical factors. More than 60 per-
cent of Mozambique’s population lives in coastal areas, 
which are very susceptible to ﬂ ooding because they are 
in low-lying regions of river basins, and in areas with 
poor drainage systems. In the period 1958–2008, 20 
TABLE 4
SECTOR ANALYSES CARRIED OUT IN EACH COUNTRY CASE STUDY
Mozambique Ethiopia Ghana Bangladesh Vietnam Bolivia Samoa
Agriculture Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Water Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Roads Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hydropower Yes Yes Yes
Coastal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extreme events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CGE/MIP CGE CGE CGE CGE CGE MIP Macro
Note: The forestry and ﬁ sheries sectors were only carried out for Vietnam.
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CGE MODELS—PARTIAL AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
The impact of climate change is simulated using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. These 
models have features making them suitable for such analyses. First, they simulate the functioning of a market 
economy—including markets for labor, capital and commodities—and provide a useful perspective on how changes 
in economic conditions are mediated through prices and markets. Secondly, the structural nature of these models 
permits consideration of new phenomena, such as climate change. Thirdly, these models assure that all economywide 
constraints are respected. This is critical discipline that should be imposed on long-run projections, such as those 
necessary for climate change. For instance, suppose climate change worsens growing conditions, forcing Ethiopia 
to import food. These imports require foreign exchange earnings. CGE models track the balance of payments and 
require that a sufﬁ cient quantity of foreign exchange is available to ﬁ nance imports. Finally, CGE models contain 
detailed sector breakdowns and provide a “simulation laboratory” for quantitatively examining how various impact 
channels inﬂ uence the performance and structure of the economy. 
In CGE models, economic decision making is the outcome of decentralized optimization by producers and consumers 
within a coherent economywide framework. A variety of substi tution mechanisms occur in response to varia tions 
in relative prices, including substitution between labor types, capital and labor, imports and domestic goods, and 
between exports and domestic sales. 
The relatively long time frame considered (40 years into the future) means that dynamic processes are important 
and need to be captured in the dynamic CGE model. To the extent that climate change reduces agricultural or 
hydropower output in a given year, it also reduces income and hence savings. This reduction in savings translates 
into reduced investment, which translates into future reduced production potential. In the same vein, increased 
infrastructure maintenance costs imply less infrastructure investment, which further implies less infrastructure both 
now and in the future. Extreme events, such as ﬂ ooding, can wipe out economic infrastructure; that infrastructure is 
gone, both in the period in which the event occurs and all future periods. Generally, even small differences in rates of 
accumulation can lead to large differences in economic outcomes over long time periods. The CGE model employed 
is well-positioned to capture these effects. 
The baseline development path adopted reﬂ ects development trends, policies, and priorities in the absence of climate 
change. It provides a reasonable trajectory for growth and structural change of the economy over about 50 years 
(the period 2003–50 is modeled) that can be used as a basis for comparison. We can, for example, run the CGE 
model forward imposing the implications of future climate on dry-land agricultural productivity. Within the model, the 
decisions of consumers, producers, and investors change in response to changes in economic conditions driven by a 
different set of climate outcomes.
BOX 1
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major ﬂ ood events were recorded, aﬀ ecting more than 
9 million people (RMSI 2009). Th ese extreme events 
have been followed by outbreaks of disease, causing 
even more death and economic loss. Sea level rise 
is predicted to increase the negative eﬀ ects of storm 
surge and ﬂ ood events along the coast. Over the next 
40 years, all such consequences of climate change are 
likely to complicate the already considerable develop-
ment challenge in Mozambique.
Th e most vulnerable sectors to the impacts from 
climate change in Mozambique are agriculture, 
which employs over 70 percent of the Mozambican 
population; energy, particularly hydropower genera-
tion which is dependent on water runoﬀ ; transport 
infrastructure, notably roads; and coastal areas, which 
do not conform to a “sector” but characterize speciﬁ c 
geographical areas vulnerable to ﬂ oods and storm 
surges directly and indirectly related to sea level rise 
(Figure 7). Th ese sectors are vulnerable to current cli-
mate variability and are most likely to remain vulner-
able to future climate change. Other sectors or issues 
of importance—such as health and urban infrastruc-
ture—were not included in the EACC analyses due 
to lack of data at the required scale.
Findings from the social component suggested that 
livelihood activities most sensitive to climate change 
impacts continued to take place in areas most exposed 
to these impacts. For example, subsistence farmers 
continued to farm in areas prone to drought, render-
ing them even more vulnerable. In the case of ﬁ shing, 
artisanal ﬁ shers reported venturing further out to sea 
in search of better ﬁ sh stocks, even though this was 
increasingly dangerous due to the occurrence of more 
frequent and intense storms. 
POPULATION DENSITY AND COASTAL AREA
(land less than 30 meters above mean sea level, in red)
FIGURE 7
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EACC approach and results
Impacts. Changes in precipitation and temperature 
from four GCMs (the two global scenarios plus two 
extreme scenarios for Mozambique, MOZDRY and 
MOZWET) were used to estimate (a) the changes 
in yield each year for both irrigated and rainfed 
crops, as well as irrigation demand for six cash crops 
and eight food crops; (b) ﬂ ow into the hydropower 
generation facilities and the consequent changes in 
generation capacity; and (c) the impact on transport 
infrastructure and the increased demand and costs of 
road maintenance. Simulations of sea level rise were 
constructed independently of the climate scenarios.26 
Two approaches were undertaken. First, an integrated 
model of coastal systems was used to assess the risk 
and costs of sea level rise in Mozambique. Second, 
analyses of the interactions between cyclone risk and 
sea level rise were undertaken for Beira and Maputo, 
the two largest cities in Mozambique. 
Analysis at the sector level suggests, for example, 
net negative changes in crop productivity over all of 
Mozambique in all scenarios (Figure 8), with central 
Mozambique being hit hardest. Over the next 40 
years, climate change would lead to a 2–4 percent 
decrease in yields of the major crops. Th is, combined 
with the eﬀ ects of more frequent ﬂ ooding on rural 
roads, would result in an agricultural GDP loss of 4.5 
percent (conservative) to 9.8 percent (most pessimis-
tic), translating into a total GDP loss between 0.8 to 
1.6%. In addition, the potential energy deﬁ cit due to 
climate change relative to the base generation poten-
tial (2005–50) is approximately -110,000 GWh.
Th e results from the integrated models of coastal sys-
tems (DIVA) show that in the 2040s, if there is no 
adaptation, Mozambique could lose up to 4,850 km2 
of land existing today (or up to 0.6 percent of national 
land area) and a cumulative total of 916,000 people 
could be forced to migrate away from the coast (or 
2.3 percent of the 2040s population). In the worst 
case, the total annual damage costs are estimated to 
reach $103 million per year in the 2040s, with the 
forced migration being a large contributor to that 
cost. Th ese damages and costs are mainly concen-
trated in Zambezia, Nampula, Sofala, and Maputo 
provinces, reﬂ ecting their low-lying topography and 
relatively high population.
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Th e analysis of the interactions between cyclone risk 
and sea level rise performed for Beira and Maputo 
illustrate that relatively small levels of sea level rise can 
dramatically increase the probability of severe storm 
surge events under the assumption of no change in 
the intensity and frequency of cyclone events. Results 
are more dramatic for Beira than for Maputo City. 
Th e probability of a cyclone strike in Maputo is lower 
due to greater latitude and the positioning of Maputo 
City relative to Madagascar. 
Th e estimated impacts on agriculture, transport, 
hydropower, and coastal infrastructure are fed into 
a macroeconomic CGE model that complements 
the sector models by providing a complete picture of 
economic impacts across all sectors within a coherent 
analytical framework. Th e CGE model looks at the 
impact of climate change on aggregate economic per-
formance. As indicated in Figure 8, climate change 
has potential implications for rates of economic 
growth. Th ese growth eﬀ ects accumulate into sig-
niﬁ cant declines in national welfare by 2050. In the 
worst case scenario, the net present value of damages 
(discounted at 5 percent) reaches about $7.6 billion, 
equivalent to an annual payment of a bit more than 
$400 million.
Figure 9 breaks down the climate change shocks into 
three groups: (1) crop yields and sea level rise (the 
latter is very small), (2) transportation system, and (3) 
hydropower. Th e graph illustrates the dominant role 
played by transport system disruption, principally as 
a result of ﬂ ooding. Th e global dry scenario is in fact 
a very wet scenario for the Zambezi water basin as a 
whole, and thus causes signiﬁ cant and enduring dam-
age to roads. By contrast, the local dry scenario is a 
very dry scenario for Mozambique and causes greater 
damage to agriculture. 
Note: Bars represent the average change in crop productivity. 
Regional averages are weighted by historic crop yield rates per 
crop in the region.
AGRICULTURE: EFFECTS ON YIELD IN 2050 
COMPARED TO BASELINE
DECOMPOSITION OF IMPACT CHANNELS 
FROM A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
FIGURE 8 FIGURE 9
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Adaptation. After calculating the impacts, the CGE 
then considers potential adaptation measures in three 
sectors (hydropower, agriculture, and transportation).27 
Four adaptation strategies are then introduced in the 
model to minimize the damages: (1) transport policy 
change,28 and then the transport policy change plus 
(2) increased agricultural research and extension, or 
transport plus (3) enhanced irrigation, or transport 
plus (4) enhanced investment in human capital accu-
mulation (education). 
Th e results are shown in Figure 10. Sealing unpaved 
roads reduces the worst-case climate damages substan-
tially, restoring approximately one-ﬁ fth of lost welfare,29 
and with little additional cost; it is thus a no-regret 
action advisable even under the baseline. Remaining 
welfare losses could be regained with improved agri-
cultural productivity or human capital accumulation 
(education). Irrigation investments appear to be a poor 
alternative: 1 million hectares of new irrigation land 
would only slightly reduce CC damages. In terms of 
softer adaptation measures, investing in agricultural 
research in order to raise agricultural productivity 
(through increases in crop yield and reductions in 
post-harvest loses) by 1 percentage point each year over 
baseline productivity trends oﬀ sets remaining damages 
to agriculture (for example, a further 50 percent maize 
yield increase by 2050). Increasing rates of human 
capital accumulation by slightly more than 1 percent-
age point also oﬀ sets damages. Increased investments 
in education helps increase aggregate labor force pro-
ductivity and this translates into higher GDP. Lastly, 
investment costs required to restore welfare losses are 
subject to debate, but are reasonably less than $390 
million per year over 40 years. 
With respect to speciﬁ c coastal adaptation measures, 
the integrated coastal system analysis examined two 
protection measures: beach/shore nourishment and 
sea and river dike building and upgrading. When 
these are applied, the physical and socioeconomic 
impacts are signiﬁ cantly reduced. For instance, the 
total land area lost could be reduced by a factor of 
more than 80 to 61km2, and the number of people 
REDUCTION IN CC DAMAGES, 2003–50 
(5% discount rate, constant 2003 $)
FIGURE 10
forced to migrate could be reduced by a factor of 140 
to 7,000 people. Hence, the total annual damage cost 
is reduced by a factor of 4 to $24 million per year. 
However, the total investment required to achieve 
these adaptation options is estimated at $890 million 
per year in the 2040s for the high sea level rise sce-
nario, which appears much higher than the beneﬁ ts 
of the adaptation in terms of damages avoided. At 
the same time, more targeted investments in high 
value and more vulnerable locations can provide posi-
tive returns. Th e range of costs of more economically 
viable adaptation options in the 2040s varies from 
$190 million to $470 million per year, depending on 
the sea level rise scenario. Note that these costs are 
higher than the beneﬁ ts from adaptation that accrue 
through 2050.  But these adaptation measures such as 
dikes are long-lived and would also yield long-term 
beneﬁ ts well beyond 2050, the scope of this analysis, 
and in fact through 2100 as sea-level rise and storm 
surge risks accelerate. 
Th e analysis of the interactions of cyclone risk and sea 
level rise for Beira and Maputo provides more impetus 
for investment in the near term, particularly for Beira. 
While the full cost of the necessary infrastructure for 
Source: World Bank 2010g.
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protecting Beira city and port has not been estimated 
to date, the dramatic fall in return periods for sea 
inundation due to sea level rise strongly suggests that 
protection schemes should be reassessed.
Equity issues. Th e incidence of impacts from climate 
change between households categorized as poor and 
non-poor in the base year are approximately similar. 
Th is result is somewhat surprising but follows from 
the fact that the biggest impacts of climate change are 
on infrastructure which permeate across the economy 
and impacts the poor and the non-poor. Th e same 
holds true for adaptation measures; poor and non-
poor households both beneﬁ t from the adaptation 
measures, and the incidence of these beneﬁ ts is not 
substantially diﬀ erent. Poor and non-poor do appear 
to diﬀ er in terms of their vulnerability to shocks.
Figure 11 shows the impact of the extreme wet 
and dry scenarios, with and without road network 
adaptation investments, on the coeﬃ  cient of varia-
tion (CV)30 of the year-to-year growth rates of total 
household consumption. Th ey represent the year-to-
year changes in consumption to which households 
must adjust. A value of 0.56 in the baseline indicates 
that poor households must manage annual swings 
in the change in consumption of 56 percent. Th ese 
swings in income in the base model reﬂ ect current 
climate variabilities—droughts, ﬂ oods, and tropical 
cyclones. In all scenarios, the CVs for poor house-
holds are slightly higher than those for non-poor 
households—poor households must deal with more 
income variability than the non-poor. Th e impact of 
the climate change scenarios on the CVs is signiﬁ -
cant—rising to about 0.70 in the two global scenarios. 
However, it either remains constant or falls in the two 
Mozambique scenarios. 
Local-level perspectives on adaptation. Results from 
the social component in Mozambique were remark-
ably consistent with the economic analyses and with 
adaptation priorities previously identiﬁ ed in the 
Mozambique NAPA. Th e most common adaptation 
preferences emerging from participatory scenario 
development workshops and ﬁ eldwork results are 
presented in Table 5.
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION: COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF YEAR-TO-YEAR GROWTH RATES
FIGURE 11
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All of the planned options in the left column rep-
resent potential government interventions. Th e 
right column represents autonomous measures that 
people can undertake on their own. Th ese results 
indicate that more vulnerable groups will not have 
the resources or skills to undertake all measures they 
deem a priority. Th is is particularly true for the hard 
options that require resources. For example, during 
participatory scenario development workshops, the 
most frequently mentioned approach for reduc-
ing impacts was the construction of irrigation sys-
tems, while the most frequently listed barrier to this 
was lack of ﬁ nance. However, in the absence of an 
enabling economic and political environment, many 
of the soft options are also challenging to undertake. 
For example, many participants noted the fact that 
people would like to diversify income, but there are 
few opportunities for diversiﬁ cation. 
Education and overall knowledge about climate 
events are also needed so that vulnerable groups can 
expect disasters to be a constant feature in the future. 
Speciﬁ cally, more technical assistance for improving 
land management practices and access to real-time 
weather forecasts—eﬀ ective early warning— will be 
crucial to enhancing local adaptive capacity. Box 2 
describes the social component in Mozambique.
Lessons and recommendations
Several important lessons emerge from the Mozam-
bique work. 
Adaptation entails increasing the climate resil- 
ience of current development plans, with particu-
lar attention to transport systems and agriculture 
and coastal development.
TABLE 5
KEY ADAPTATION OPTIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Planned Adaptation Autonomous Adaptation
Hard ■ Flood control dikes and levies
■ Coastal ﬂ ood control gates
■ Dams and irrigation channels
■ Improved roadways
■ Improved communication infrastructure
■ Improved hospitals and schools
■ More robust buildings
■ Farm-scale water storage facilities
■ Deep wells to provide drinking water for 
people and animals
■ Grain storage facilities
■ Improved food processing equipment
Soft ■ Improved early warning of climatic hazards, 
and of dam releases
■ Better planning and management of forest, 
ﬁ sh, and other natural resources
■ Resettlement of populations to lower risk 
zones
■ More credit and ﬁ nancial services for small busi-
nesses and rural development
■ Better education and information for rural areas
■ Improved health care, social services, and social 
support for all people
■ Better utilization of short-season, 
drought-resistant crops to prepare for drought, 
ﬂ oods, and cyclones
■ Diversiﬁ cation of ﬂ ood and drought risk by 
maintaining ﬁ elds in both highland and lowland 
areas
■ Better household and community management 
and use of natural resources, including wild fruits
■ Practice of soil conservation agriculture
■ Migration to lower risk areas
■ Diversiﬁ cation of livelihoods away from agriculture
■ Better planning of how much grain to save for 
personal consumption, and how much to sell for 
income generation
Note: The options in plain text respond directly to climate hazards, while those in italics represent measures to increase the adaptive 
capacity of the population, or to make them more resilient to shocks to their livelihoods in general. 
Source: World Bank 2010g.
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METHODOLOGY AND FIELD WORK OF 
SOCIAL COMPONENT IN MOZAMBIQUE
In Mozambique, the vulnerability assessment 
included a literature review; the identiﬁ cation 
of six sociogeographic “hotspots;”and ﬁ eldwork 
in 17 districts across 8 provinces, including 
45 focus group discussions, 18 institutional 
stakeholder interviews, and a survey of 137 
households. Fieldwork included the use of 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) exercises 
(village history; focus group discussions of 
men, women and different age groups; wealth 
ranking; and community risk mapping), as 
well as key informant interviews with local 
government ofﬁ cials, NGOs, and traditional 
leaders. Household interviews also were 
undertaken, with 10 per site from different 
income tiers, with questionnaire modules 
covering household composition, income 
sources, agricultural practices, household 
shocks and coping strategies, past climate 
adaptation practices, and perceptions about 
climate change. 
In parallel, three participatory scenario 
development (PSD) workshops were held 
in Mozambique: one in Xai-Xai, one in 
Beira, and one national-level workshop in 
Maputo. PSD workshops began with technical 
presentations to characterize current climate 
and socioeconomic projections for the 
coming decades. Thereafter, participants 
characterized visions of a “preferred future” 
for 2050. They considered how climate 
change could impact this future vision, and 
then identiﬁ ed autonomous and planned 
adaptation options necessary to achieve the 
desired vision. Finally, participants identiﬁ ed 
prerequisites, synergies, and tradeoffs among 
their adaptation and development visions and 
prioritized action for the short, medium, and 
long term. The PSD component of the social 
component had a capacity-building emphasis, 
including participation of national teams in 
regional training on workshop design and 
implementation.
BOX 2 Changes in design standards, such as seal- 
ing unpaved roads, can substantially reduce the 
impacts of climate change even without addi-
tional resources.
Th e imperative of increasing agricultural produc- 
tivity and the substantial uncertainties of climate 
change argue strongly for enhanced investments 
in agricultural research. 
It is unlikely to be cost eﬀ ective to protect the vast  
majority of coastal regions of Mozambique from 
sea level rise; however, high value and vulnerable 
locations, such as cities and ports, merit speciﬁ c 
consideration, especially those at risk for severe 
storm surge events. 
“Soft” adaptation measures are potentially power- 
ful. Because the majority of the capital stock in 
2050 remains to be installed, land use planning 
that channels investment into lower risk locations 
can substantially reduce risk at low cost.
Viewed more broadly, ﬂ exible and more resil- 
ient societies will be better prepared to confront 
the challenges posed by climate change. Hence, 
investments in human capital contribute both to 
the adaptation agenda and to the development 
agenda.
Ethiopia31
Vulnerability to climate change    
With around 75 million inhabitants, Ethiopia is 
the second most populated country in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). Th e country is divided into ﬁ ve agro-
ecological zones (Figure 12). Around 45 percent of 
the territory consists of a high plateau—comprising 
zones 2 to 4—with mountain ranges divided by the 
East African Rift Valley. Almost 90 percent of the 
population resides in these highland regions (1,500 
meters above sea level). Within the highlands, zones 
2 and 3 generally have suﬃ  cient moisture for the 
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cultivation of key crops, whereas zone 4 is prone to 
droughts. Th e arid lowlands in the east of the coun-
try—zone 5—are mostly populated by pastoralists. 
Ethiopia is heavily dependent on rainfed agriculture. Its 
geographical location and topography, in combination 
with low adaptive capacity, entail a high vulnerability to 
the impacts of climate change. Historically, the country 
has been prone to extreme weather variability—rainfall 
is highly erratic, most rain falls with high intensity, and 
there is a high degree of variability in both time and 
space. Since the early 1980s, the country has suﬀ ered 
seven major droughts, ﬁ ve of which have led to fam-
ines, in addition to dozens of local droughts. Major 
ﬂ oods also occurred in diﬀ erent parts of the country in 
1988, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 2006.
EACC approach and results
To capture uncertainties on future climate, this study 
utilizes the two “extreme” GCMs used in the global 
track of the EACC (labeled Wet1 and Dry1), as well 
as two additional models that are better suited to rep-
resent climate model uncertainty in the speciﬁ c case 
of Ethiopia (labeled here Wet2 and Dry2). For the 
baseline (no-climate change scenarios), the analysis 
uses historical monthly climate data and projects 
the historical pattern into the future. For the cli-
mate change scenarios, stochastic representations of 
weather variability in each global circulation model 
(captured through a single draw) are superimposed 
on the baseline to capture the variability of the future. 
Th e scenarios include projections of extreme weather 
events such as droughts and ﬂ oods. 
Climate projections obtained from these four GCMs 
suggest an increase in rainfall variability with a rising 
frequency of both severe ﬂ ooding and droughts due 
to global warming. Th e Dry2 scenario shows reduc-
tions in average annual rainfall over 2045–55 of (a) 
10–25 percent in the central highlands, (b) 0–10 per-
cent in the south, and (c) more than 25 percent in the 
north. Th e Wet2 scenario shows increases in average 
annual rainfall of (a) 10–25 percent in the south and 
AGROECOLOGICAL ZONES IN ETHIOPIA
FIGURE 12
central highlands, and (b) more than 25 percent in 
most of the rest of the country. If the Wet2 scenario 
is accompanied by an increase in the variability of 
short-duration rainfall intensity, there would be an 
increased chance of severe episodic ﬂ ooding caused 
by storm runoﬀ  in highland areas. 
Th e economic analyses focus on three main channels 
of climatic vulnerability that already aﬀ ect the Ethio-
pian economy, and are likely to be of major signiﬁ -
cance under the climate of the future as well. Th ese 
channels include (1) agriculture, which accounted for 
47 percent of Ethiopian GDP in 2006 and is highly 
sensitive to seasonal variations in temperature and 
moisture; (2) roads, the backbone of the country’s 
transport system, which are often hit by large ﬂ oods, 
causing serious infrastructure damage and disrup-
tions to supply chains; and (3) dams, which provide 
hydropower and irrigation and are aﬀ ected by large 
precipitation swings. 
Speciﬁ cally, changes in precipitation and tempera-
ture from the four GCMs were used to estimate 
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(a) changes in yields for major crops and impacts on 
livestock, (b) ﬂ ow into hydropower generation facili-
ties and the consequent changes in power generation, 
(c) the impact of ﬂ ooding on roads; (d) the eﬀ ects 
of more frequent droughts on government expendi-
ture on vulnerability and food security (VFS); and 
(e) the loss of irrigation and hydropower due to con-
ﬂ icts among competing demands. Th e analyses assess 
deviations in GDP and other variables from the no-
climate-change baseline growth path for the four cli-
mate change scenarios mentioned above. 
Impacts. Economy wide impacts of climate change were 
assessed using a CGE model. Th e results of the model-
ing (Figure 13) suggest a large loss of GDP under the 
Dry2 scenario (6 percent to 10 percent) that is fairly 
evenly distributed across the entire time horizon. In con-
trast, in the case of the Wet2 scenario, the loss of GDP is 
quite substantial in the 2040–49 decade, because of the 
costs of coping with damage caused by extreme weather 
events, especially ﬂ oods, from the 2030 decade onward. 
Th e 10-year average GDP for the ﬁ nal decade is nearly 
8 percent lower than the baseline. While these are not 
forecasts of future climate impacts, they highlight the 
high degree of vulnerability of Ethiopian agriculture and 
infrastructure to future climate shocks.
Climate change brings about increased weather vari-
ability, which translates into large swings in the growth 
rate of agriculture GDP, illustrated by the increase in 
standard deviation compared to the baseline in Figure 
14. While the simple means of annual growth rates 
are similar across the scenarios, high variability leads 
to signiﬁ cant welfare losses.
Variability in agricultural income tends to aﬀ ect the 
poor more, with standard deviation values on average 
some 10 percent higher than for the non-poor under 
both wet and dry scenarios. As shown by Figure 154 
for the Wet2 scenario, climate change impacts also 
are likely to vary signiﬁ cantly across regions. Th e arid 
lowland zone 5 (R5) derives substantial beneﬁ ts from 
the increase in total rainfall, which supports livestock, 
while relative losses are concentrated in the cereals-
DEVIATIONS OF GDP FROM BASE SCENARIO
AGRICULTURAL YEAR-TO-YEAR GROWTH 
RATES: STANDARD DEVIATIONS
FIGURE 13
FIGURE 14
based highlands zone 2 (R2) and in urban areas. Th e 
latter reﬂ ects the downstream consequences of ﬂ ood-
ing and weather variability. Th e dry scenarios have 
reverse impacts, with the arid lowlands and livestock 
suﬀ ering greatly. 
In addition to analysis of the three priority sectors 
(agriculture, roads, and hydropower), the study also 
analyzed potential conﬂ icts under climate change in 
the use of water across sectors. A water planning model 
was used to evaluate the potential interactions among 
growing municipal and industrial (M&I), irrigation, 
Source: World Bank 2010e.
Source: World Bank 2010e.
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and hydropower demands under climate change. Th e 
model evaluates these inter-sectoral eﬀ ects between 
2001 and 2050, and generates time series of impacts 
on irrigated agricultural yields and hydropower gen-
eration under each of the climate scenarios.
Th e results suggest that hydropower production 
is impacted by irrigation and M&I withdrawals. 
Under the Dry2 scenario, giving priority to agricul-
tural demands results in a loss of hydropower capac-
ity equivalent to 100 percent of the 2000 installed 
capacity and 10 percent of the hydropower capacity 
planned by the government for the period 2011–15. 
If, on the other hand, priority is given to hydropower, 
up to a billion m3 of water might be taken away from 
irrigated agriculture. Th at would cause a 30–40 per-
cent yield drop in an area of some 250,000 hectares 
that would be forced to revert to rainfed conditions.
Adaptation. Th e investment program included in the 
no-climate-change baseline established in consulta-
tion with the government is likely to enhance Ethio-
pia’s resilience to climate change. However, additional 
eﬀ orts are required to attenuate climate change 
impacts. Adaptation strategies were therefore iden-
tiﬁ ed as additions to—or modiﬁ cations of—current 
government programs. 
More specifically, adaptation in agriculture 
included increasing the cropland to be equipped 
for irrigation and investing in agricultural research 
and development. In the transport sector, adapta-
tion options included increasing the share of paved 
and hardened roads, as well as “soft” measures such 
as changes in transportation operation and main-
tenance, development of new design standards that 
consider projected climate changes, transfer of 
relevant transportation technology to stakehold-
ers, and the enhancement of transportation safety 
measures. Adaptation policy considered in the 
hydropower sector included altering the scale and 
timing of planned projects, as well as constraining 
total downstream flow and irrigation flow. 
Th ese strategies were ﬁ rst assessed on a sector-by sector 
basis. When the full set of economy wide linkages 
Source: World Bank 2010e.
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is taken into account, direct plus indirect adaptation 
costs increase signiﬁ cantly, as indicated in Table 6.
To evaluate its welfare implications, the adapta-
tion strategy was analyzed in a CGE framework by 
comparing a no-climate-change baseline—reﬂ ecting 
existing development plans—with climate change 
scenarios reﬂ ecting adaptation investments. Th e main 
ﬁ ndings are that adaptation (a) reduces, but does not 
eliminate, welfare losses; (b) that such welfare gains 
can be achieved at relatively low cost; and (c) that 
adaptation lowers income variability.
As shown in Figure 16, adaptation greatly reduces the 
welfare loss due to climate change (measured here by 
the diﬀ erence from the baseline of total absorption—
GDP plus imports minus exports, discounted over 
the 40-year time horizon). 
Finally, adaptation restores the variability of agri-
culture GDP growth close to the baseline scenario 
(Figure 17).
While the beneﬁ ts of adaptation investments are sig-
niﬁ cant, they do not fully oﬀ set the negative impact 
of the climate change scenarios. Two options were 
explored to close the “welfare gap” caused by climate 
change. Th e ﬁ rst is to estimate the “residual damage 
costs” as the transfers (in $) that would be required 
to completely oﬀ set the loss of absorption from CC 
shock, after implementing adaptation investments. 
Closing the “welfare gap” through residual compen-
sation would entail mobilizing signiﬁ cant resources 
compared to direct project-level adaptation costs 
(Table 7).
Th e second approach is to include an additional 
labor-upgrading program in the adaptation strategy. 
In this scenario, 0.1 percent of rural unskilled labor 
is assumed to be transferred to the urban region, with 
additional upgrading so that all the urban labor cat-
egories, skilled and unskilled, grow uniformly faster 
than in the base run. When tested under the Wet2 
scenario, an adaptation strategy including such a 
TABLE 6
ADAPTATION COSTS (annual average, 
2010-50, $ billions)
Direct, sector 
level costs
Indirect 
costs
Total 
costs
Wet2 0.19 0.60 0.79
Wet1 0.17 0.77 0.94
Dry1 0.16 2.30 2.46
Dry2 0.26 2.55 2.81
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) OF WELFARE 
DIFFERENCES
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labor-upgrading program appears to be able to more 
than oﬀ set the negative impacts of climate change. 
While no information was available within the time 
frame of the analysis to properly cost the skill upgrad-
ing program, this ﬁ nding points to the signiﬁ cant 
potential beneﬁ ts of accelerating the diversiﬁ cation 
of the economy away from highly climate sensitive 
sectors such as agriculture. In the Wet2 scenario, for 
any value of the program cost below $0.4 billion/ year, 
a development strategy including a skill upgrading 
program like the one considered here would appear to 
be preferable to the residual compensation approach.
Source: World Bank 2010e.
Source: World Bank 2010e.
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STANDARD DEVIATION OF YEAR-TO-YEAR 
AGRICULTURE GDP GROWTH RATES, WITH 
AND WITHOUT ADAPTATION
FIGURE 17
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Local-level perspectives on adaptation. Land and 
water management are central concerns in Ethiopia, 
which is subject to extremes of drought and ﬂ oods. 
Vulnerable groups identiﬁ ed through community 
discussions included asset-poor households with very 
limited means of coping with climate  hazards, the 
expanding group of rural landless who lack income 
opportunities, the urban poor living in ﬂ ood-prone 
areas of cities, and the elderly and the sick due to 
their limited adaptive capacity. Women and children 
left behind as male adults migrate for employment 
during drought-related production failures were also 
identiﬁ ed as vulnerable during and after extreme 
events. Other vulnerable groups identiﬁ ed included 
TABLE 7
ADAPTATION COSTS AND RESIDUAL 
DAMAGE (annual average, 2010–50, $ billions)
Scenario
Adaptation 
costs
Residual 
damage Total
Wet 2 0.79 0.43 1.22
Wet1 0.94 0.81 1.75
Dry1 2.46 1.52 3.97
Dry2 2.81 3.03 5.84
communities living on already degraded lands, and 
pastoral communities who face severe conﬂ icts over 
natural resources (especially access to land for herd 
mobility) with agriculturalists and the state. 
Local participatory scenario development (PSD) 
workshops identiﬁ ed soil and forest rehabilitation, 
irrigation and water harvesting, improved agricultural 
techniques and drought-resistant varieties, education, 
and land use rights for pastoralists as adaptation 
preferences. Regional development and the need for 
structural shifts toward service and industry sectors 
to improve employment outcomes were also raised 
as issues. At the national level, similar options were 
identiﬁ ed, along with a focus on early warning sys-
tems and ﬂ ood control measures, agricultural tech-
nology, ﬁ nance and market development, renewable 
energy, and urban planning. Th e adaptation options 
identiﬁ ed at local and national levels generally aligned 
with the natural resource and agriculture focus in the 
NAPA, which also identiﬁ es needed investments in 
crop insurance, wetlands protection, carbon liveli-
hoods, agroforestry, and anti-malaria initiatives.
Lessons and recommendations 
Th e ﬁ ndings of this analysis suggest that impacts of 
climate change will be quite signiﬁ cant, particularly 
as Ethiopia approaches the middle of the century. Th e 
magnitude of the impacts remains considerable, irre-
spective of whether the climate of the future will be 
wetter or drier. Given the large uncertainty on future 
climate outcomes, the approach to enhance Ethio-
pia’s climate resilience should be couched in terms 
of a gradual, adaptive, and learning paradigm. Such 
an approach could be articulated for both the shorter 
term—including the implementation of the Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP) recently issued by 
the government—and for the long term.
Shorter term (up to 2015). By and large, the Growth 
and Transformation Plan supports a number of 
actions that—by boosting growth—will contribute to 
the enhancement of Ethiopia’s resilience to climatic 
Source: World Bank 2010e.
Source: World Bank 2010e.
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shocks. Robust growth based on infrastructure invest-
ment is likely to be the ﬁ rst line of defense against 
climate change impacts. Relatively small deviations 
from the ambitious investment targets set forth by 
the government for roads, dams, hydropower, water 
management, and irrigation would signiﬁ cantly 
increase long-term vulnerability to climate change 
and thus make adaptation costlier.
However, there are a number of additional issues that 
the government could consider to further enhance 
the contribution of GTP to Ethiopia’s climate 
resilience—and thus, ultimately, to the ability of the 
country to support sustained, long-term growth. 
Agriculture. Th e GTP purports to “continue the 
ongoing eﬀ ort of improving agriculture productivity 
in a sustainable manner so as to ensure its place as the 
engine of growth.” Th e analysis of this report indicates 
that agricultural production as an engine of growth is 
vulnerable to climate change and climate variability. 
While the more pronounced eﬀ ects on crops and live-
stock are likely to materialize in later decades, eﬀ orts 
to enhance the resilience to climate shocks of crop 
yields and livestock production should be stepped up 
as soon as possible, particularly on account of the lead 
time needed to strengthen research systems, and to 
transfer and adapt ﬁ ndings from the lab to the ﬁ eld. 
Investments in improved agricultural productivity—
such as watershed management, on-farm technology, 
access to extension services, transport, fertilizers and 
improved seed varieties, and climate and weather 
forecasting—will enhance the resilience of agricul-
ture, both to droughts and to waterlogging caused 
by ﬂ oods. National and local actions will need to 
be supported by international eﬀ orts—for example, 
through the CGIAR system—to develop climate 
resilient agricultural technologies, given the global 
public good nature of these innovations.
Road infrastructure. Th e GTP aims to expand the 
coverage and enhance the quality of infrastructure: 
“Focus will be given to the development of roads, 
railways, energy, telecommunication, irrigation, 
drinking water and sanitation and basic infrastruc-
ture developments; (…) With regard to roads, rural 
roads will be constructed on all regions and all rural 
kebeles will be connected (through) standardized all 
weather roads with main highways.”
Modeling results show that existing infrastructure 
design standards—that is, the level of prevention 
against extreme events such as local and regional 
ﬂ ooding—are inadequate to address current climate 
variability and will impact economic growth rates 
in the near to medium term. Results from climate 
change analyses show this issue is likely to become 
worse in the medium to long term. Th e government 
should consider enhancing infrastructure design 
standards as soon as possible.
Even under current climate, the direct beneﬁ ts—in 
terms of increased lifetime—of roads designed fol-
lowing higher standards outweigh the corresponding 
costs in a discounted beneﬁ t/cost analysis. Th e case 
for improved design standards is even stronger under 
climate change, irrespective of climate outcomes: the 
beneﬁ t/cost ratio of adopting higher design standards 
is 17 to 75 percent higher than in the baseline under 
the Wet2 scenario, and 16 to 55 percent in the Dry2 
scenario (Figure 18). In addition, there are important 
indirect economy wide beneﬁ ts: a more climate-
resilient road network can avoid costly disruptions 
of communications links and supply chains that 
increased ﬂ ood frequency might bring about.
Energy. Current water resources and Ethiopian topog-
raphy indicate an overall potential of more than 30,000 
megawatts in economically viable hydropower genera-
tion capacity. Th e GTP approach is to focus on “the 
development of water and wind energy options to ful-
ﬁ ll the energy demand of the country,” with targets for 
hydropower of 6,000 to 8,000 MW in additional gen-
eration capacity. Th e hydropower analysis of this report 
(conducted at the monthly scale, which is adequate for 
sector-wide planning purposes, although not for plant-
level design and operation) provides support, from a 
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BENEFIT/ COST RATIO OF UPGRADING ROAD STANDARDS
FIGURE 18
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climate change perspective, to the GTP targets. Th e 
projects likely to go online in the next 5 years have very 
low risk of being impacted by climate change.
While in the longer term (see below) hydropower 
development will become increasingly more climate 
sensitive, projects in the current pipeline are likely to 
be less vulnerable to shocks as the overlap between 
their life span, and the time when stronger climate 
change eﬀ ects will materialize, is relatively limited. 
Some climate change scenarios actually project an 
increase in Ethiopian runoﬀ , resulting in larger vol-
umes of hydropower generation, and thus making the 
case for investment in hydropower stronger.
In the nearer term, the economics of hydropower 
investments will be inﬂ uenced less by climate, and 
more, on the demand side, by the evolution of domes-
tic and external markets. A sustained expansion of 
national and foreign demand for power will be key to 
support the expansion of Ethiopia’s hydropower sec-
tor, which in turn will be vital to support the country’s 
accelerated economic growth.
In the short run, expansion of hydropower genera-
tion should be accelerated as a way to support growth 
and to facilitate the economy’s transition from being 
highly agriculture-dependent to having a broader 
productive base in industry and services. Given the 
vulnerability of the agricultural sector to current cli-
mate shocks (let alone those to be expected in the 
future), strengthening of the electricity sector, and 
in particular the promotion of regional and Africa-
wide power grids to receive Ethiopia’s excess power, 
should be a priority in the investment strategy. 
Strengthened hydropower development can both 
increase near-term economic growth and make the 
energy system more climate-resilient. Additional 
reservoir storage distributed over the country also 
will provide more reliability and protection from 
regional droughts.
Medium to long term. As Ethiopia looks into the next 
stages of development—starting with preparation of 
the next growth plan following the GTP 2011–15—it 
might want to evaluate more closely the implications 
of climate change for its overall policies and infra-
structure development programs. Early planning for 
the more severe climate impacts of mid-century is 
desirable, so as to avoid locking the country into a cli-
mate-vulnerable development trajectory, particularly 
when it comes to economic processes with a high 
Source: World Bank 2010e.
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degree of inertia, or investment decisions concerning 
infrastructures with a long life span. 
Due to the uncertainty of future climate, a risk-based 
investment planning approach should be adopted. 
Robust decision-making principles are needed to 
minimize the “regrets” of climate-sensitive decisions. 
As climate shocks become more frequent and severe, 
the “opportunity costs of capital” invested in projects 
and programs that are viable only under a limited 
set of climate outcomes becomes too large. Some 
key areas for consideration to develop a climate risk 
management approach to support long-term devel-
opment include the following.
Macroeconomic management. Historically, the Ethio-
pian economy has been vulnerable to climate ﬂ uc-
tuations. Th e analysis of this report shows that 
climate variability will increase under all scenarios. 
Since agriculture (the economy’s most climate sen-
sitive sector) is likely to remain for some time one of 
Ethiopia’s main engines of growth, climate-induced 
shocks will continue to be a threat to macroeco-
nomic stability because of the impacts on income, 
employment, ﬁ scal revenues, capital formation, the 
drain on government expenditures, and aid ﬂ ows to 
support disaster relief.
Under climate change, renewed eﬀ orts will be neces-
sary to buﬀ er the economy from more frequent and/
or severe climate shocks. Th ese include strengthen-
ing social safety nets, access to relief funds, drought 
early warning systems, crop insurance programs, 
grain banks, and strengthening infrastructure 
design.
Promote diversiﬁ cation. In the longer term, however, 
accelerated diversiﬁ cation of income and employ-
ment sources away from climate-sensitive sectors 
such as agriculture is likely to become increasingly 
important under a more erratic climate. It be should 
explored in closer detail, particularly because it 
holds promise to be a cost-eﬀ ective way to eliminate 
residual welfare damage caused by climate change. 
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Th e government may want to look into ways to 
accelerate the absorption of the rural labor force into 
non-agriculture activities, including through skills-
upgrading programs and encouragement of growth 
poles around medium-size municipalities.
Evaluate the climate resilience of large infrastructure 
projects. As we move toward mid-century, the range 
of possible climate futures broadens to encompass 
markedly diﬀ erent “wet” and “dry” scenarios. Th is 
has implications for the optimal timing of dams and 
other investments in water infrastructure, which is 
likely to be quite sensitive to climate outcomes. Large 
projects of this type should be subject—on account of 
the large capital outlays involved—to careful climate-
robustness tests. 
To adequately inform the design of subsequent 
generations of water infrastructure projects, invest-
ments in enhancing national hydro-meteorological 
services, data collection, and analysis are crucial to 
assist identifying which climate change path Ethio-
pia is actually on, and to provide inputs to the adap-
tive management process for resource management. 
Better data on hydro-meteorological processes, and 
stronger capacity to analyze and model the data, is 
key to making more informed decisions on issues 
such as the number of hydropower plants, the design 
of individual plants, and the operation of the grid.
Proactively address conﬂ icts in water uses. Under “dry” 
future climate scenarios, competition among water 
users —municipal and industrial consumption, hydro-
power generation, and irrigation—might become 
more acute, particularly in certain river basins. Th e 
availability of water to downstream riparian countries 
might also be aﬀ ected. 
Given the signiﬁ cant pay-oﬀ  of addressing internal 
and transboundary conﬂ icts on water use before they 
arise, the government might want to consider invest-
ments in river basin planning systems and institu-
tional arrangements that can facilitate information 
sharing, dialogue, and dispute resolution.
Ghana32
Vulnerability to climate change
Ghana’s economy is particularly vulnerable to climate 
change and variability because it is heavily depen-
dent on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, 
forestry, and hydropower. Th e agricultural sector, in 
particular, is highly vulnerable because it is largely 
rainfed with a low-level of irrigation development. 
Th e country’s 565km coastline is inhabited by about 
a quarter of the population and is the location of sig-
niﬁ cant physical infrastructure.
Th e inheritance system, local governance and custom-
ary law, and multiple forms of land tenure systems 
disproportionately harm both women and migrants’ 
adaptive capacity. Rural-rural migrants, for example, 
forgo income by not planting long-gestation cash 
crops for lack of a secure title in receiving areas. Sea-
sonal ﬂ oods, which are indicated by projected climate 
change scenarios, could cause signiﬁ cant impacts 
in highly populated urban and peri-urban areas in 
Greater Accra, particularly given poor housing and 
the possibility of disease outbreaks in the “zongo” 
slums dominated by in-migrants. 
In line with the approach taken in the global track 
study, climate projections from the NCAR and 
CSIRO models were used to generate the “Global 
Wet” and “Global Dry” scenarios for the Ghana 
case study. In addition, the climate projections from 
the two GCM/SRES combinations with the lowest 
and highest CMI for Ghana were used to generate 
a “Ghana Dry” and a “Ghana Wet” scenario (Table 
8). Note that in the case of Ghana, the globally “wet-
test” GCM actually projects a drier future climate for 
Ghana than the globally “driest” GCM under emis-
sion scenario A2.
Th e projections indicate fairly wide ﬂ uctuations in 
annual temperatures in all four Ghana agroecological 
regions (northern savannah, southern savannah, for-
est, and coastal) for all the four scenarios. However, 
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the trend over the period 2010–50 indicates warming 
in all regions, with temperatures increasing the most 
in the northern savannah region—with increases of 
up to 2.2–2.4°C, leading to average temperatures as 
high as 41°C—while also presenting the widest range 
of temperature variability (5.7°C range). All agroeco-
logical regions show signiﬁ cant precipitation variabil-
ity compared to the baseline scenario. Th e coeﬃ  cient 
of variation of annual precipitation in Ghana varies 
between -9 percent (global wet scenario) to -14 per-
cent (Ghana dry scenario). 
As shown in Figure 19, there may be wide variations 
in stream ﬂ ows and runoﬀ  changes. Th e southwestern 
part of Ghana is expected to experience increases in 
runoﬀ  under both Ghana speciﬁ c scenarios, with the 
opposite occurring with the Black Volta basin. Th e 
ﬂ uctuations in stream ﬂ ows and runoﬀ s, particularly 
in the Volta River, increase the risk of ﬂ oods and/or 
droughts in urban and rural areas. Given that Ghana 
has very little control over the upper streams of rivers 
across its borders in Burkina Faso and Togo, there is 
a need for regional cooperation in the management 
of water resources among the neighboring countries 
sharing the Volta basin.
TABLE 8
GCM SCENARIOS FOR THE GHANA CASE 
STUDY
Scenario GCM SRES
CMI 
Deviation
Global Wet ncar_ccsm3_0 A2 -17%
Global Dry csiro_mk3_0 A2 9%
Ghana Wet ncar_pcm1 A1b 49%
Ghana Dry ipsl_cm4 B1 -66%
SURFACE FLOW AVERAGE DIFFERENCE FROM THE NO-CLIMATE-CHANGE SCENARIO, 2010–50 
(million m3/month)
FIGURE 19
Ghana Dry Scenario (ipsl_cm4-B1)  Ghana Wet Scenario (ncar_pcm1 A1b)
EACC approach and results
Impacts. All four GCM scenarios suggest signiﬁ cant 
adverse economywide eﬀ ects, which become stronger 
toward 2050. Although there is considerable variation 
in real GDP growth over the simulation period, the 
overall trend relative to the baseline is clearly down-
ward. Toward 2050, annual real GDP is projected 
to be 1.9 to 7.2 percent lower than in the baseline 
scenario without anthropogenic climate change. Real 
household consumption also declines relative to the 
base scenario in all the four climate change scenarios 
analyzed in this study.
Source: World Bank 2010f.
Source: World Bank 2010f.
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In comparison to the baseline growth path without 
climate change, the output of the agricultural sector is 
estimated to decline by between 10.1 percent (Global 
Wet) and 3.0 percent (Ghana Wet) by 2050 (Figure 
20). Th e projections for cocoa show considerable 
variation across the climate scenarios, regions, and 
decades. Under the Ghana Wet climate, cocoa pro-
duction is projected to experience signiﬁ cant adverse 
eﬀ ects, while under the Global Dry and Global Wet 
climates the impacts turn out to be predominantly 
positive from a nationwide perspective. Th e variance 
of annual cocoa yields rises across all climate change 
scenarios.
Ghana’s coastal zone is of immense signiﬁ cance to 
the economy. Th ere are ﬁ ve large cities located in the 
coastal zone and about a quarter of the population 
lives in this area. It is estimated that over 240,000 
people living in the coastal zone are at risk of seal 
level rise (Ghana Statistical Services, 2008). Like 
most coastal cities around the world, Ghana’s coastal 
areas are vulnerable to extreme events above the cur-
rent defense standards of structural protection, and 
are especially vulnerable to coastal ﬂ ooding. Addi-
tional threats include coastal erosion and reduction in 
freshwater resources in deltas and estuaries. 
Th e total cost of damage from ﬂ ooding, land loss, and 
forced migration is estimated to reach $3.7 million/
yr by the 2020s, rising to $6.5 million/yr by the 2040s 
using the high sea level rise scenarios. Damage costs 
are estimated at $4.7 million/yr for the 2040s using 
the low sea level rise scenario. 
Ghana’s water and energy sectors have already shown 
signs of vulnerability to climate change, particularly 
the eﬀ ect of highly variable precipitation patterns on 
hydropower production. Th e 1980–83 drought not 
only aﬀ ected export earnings through crop losses, but 
also caused large-scale human suﬀ ering and called 
into question the nation’s continued dependence on 
hydroelectric power. By 2050, the annual average 
output of the water and energy sector is expected to 
decline to within a range of $2.19 billion to $2.26 
DEVIATION OF REAL TOTAL AND AGRICUL-
TURAL GDP FROM BASE, TERMINAL YEAR (%)
FIGURE 20
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billion from a 2050 baseline output of $2.33 billion. 
Th is represents a decline of between 3 and 6%.
Adaptation. Adaptation actions were considered in 
four key sectors in Ghana—roads, agriculture, hydro-
power, and coastal. In each case it is important to look 
at the resource envelope available to fund adaptation, 
which can begin with the existing government budget 
(or projected budget), and increase to a higher level if 
one assumes that funding will be available from dif-
ferent sources.
Road Transport. Adaptation of road infrastructure is 
considered in order to make the road network more 
climate-resilient at no additional cost compared to 
the baseline. Th at is, the baseline road infrastruc-
ture budget is just reallocated through changes in 
road design standards. Th is is more costly initially 
and reduces the amount available for the expansion 
Source: World Bank 2010f.
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of the road network, but at the same time there is 
less climate change damage to the road network later 
on. Th e economywide simulation analysis assumes 
that the same road infrastructure adaptation strat-
egy is adopted in all adaptation scenarios under 
consideration.
Agriculture. Th e whole adaptation resource envelope 
considered is spent on gradual expansion of irrigated 
land area from 2012 onwards. Th e assumed upfront 
investment cost of irrigation is $18,000 per ha, taking 
account of Ghana-speciﬁ c cost estimates for recent 
and planned irrigation projects, plus the need for 
complementary investment in water harvesting etc, 
as this strategy requires the irrigable land area to 
expand. For example, under the Ghana Dry scenario, 
the share of irrigated land rises gradually from less 
than 0.4 to 23 percent of the current total cultivated 
area. Th e resulting average annual factor productivity 
increase for crop agriculture as a whole is an additional 
0.54 percent above baseline productivity growth. Th is 
scenario can also be interpreted as representing other 
productivity-rising agricultural adaptation measures 
with a comparable yield impact per dollar spent.
Energy. In this sector, part of the available resource 
envelope is spent on additional investments in hydro-
power relative to the baseline, minimizing negative 
climate change impacts on power generation. Th e 
remaining part of the resource envelope is spent on 
agricultural productivity improvements. Th e pres-
ent value of the additional power investment up to 
2050 is estimated to be $859 million, which reduces 
the amount available for agricultural investment. For 
example under the Ghana Dry scenario, 32 percent 
of the resource envelope goes to power and the rest 
to agriculture.
Coastal Zone. Coastal adaptation analysis and options 
have been used as an example for now, while a more 
detailed analysis is being completed using the DIVA 
Model and SRTM 90-m resolution data. Th e larg-
est cost component is the construction of sea dikes, 
estimated to be about $87 million per year under a 
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high sea level rise scenario, and $30–34 million a year 
under a low sea level rise scenario. Annual mainte-
nance costs of the sea dikes under the high sea level 
rise scenario will be about $9 million in the 2010s, 
rising to $35 million by the 2040s. Total annual adap-
tation costs for the coastal zone are estimated to be 
$19–$156 million. Th ese results are based on a partial 
equilibrium model (assuming no interaction between 
the coastal sector and the rest of the economy) and 
are not part of the CGE adaptation analysis. Th ey 
also do not include other adaptations measures, such 
as protection for the ﬁ shery industry. Compared to 
1990, sea levels were assumed to gradually increase 
from 4 cm in 2010 to 15.6 cm by 2050 using the low 
sea level rise scenario (and from 7.1 cm to 37.8 cm 
using the high sea level rise scenario). 
Macroeconomic/integrated analysis. In the dynamic 
CGE analysis, it is assumed that the maximum 
resource envelope available for adaptation measures 
over the simulation period (2010–50) is equal to the 
present value of the aggregate welfare loss due to cli-
mate change in the absence of adaptation measures 
(Table 9). From an economywide perspective, these 
ﬁ gures represent the lump-sum income transfers 
Ghana would have to mobilize from external sources 
in order to be fully compensated for the economic 
impacts of climate change.33 Similar to the other case 
studies for Africa, the CGE analysis also includes an 
adaptation scenario in which the resource envelope 
available for adaptation measures is spent on addi-
tional broad-based education and training that raises 
labor productivity across all skill groups. 
Results from simulations. Table 9 shows that in the 
absence of adaptation, aggregate real welfare losses up 
to 2050 will range (in present value terms) from $2.7 
billion (Ghana Dry) to $13.1 billion (Global Dry). In 
annualized values, these estimates range from $157 
million (Ghana Dry) to $765 million. On a per capita 
basis, they amount to $6.50 and $31.46 for Ghana Dry 
and Global Dry, respectively. Th e equivalent annual 
value of the real welfare impacts with no adaptation 
range from $157.9 million (Ghana Dry) to $764.5 
million (Global Dry). Th ese results translate to an 
annual equivalent per capita impact that range from 
$6.5 (Ghana Dray) to $31.46 (Global Dry).
Table 10 reports deviations of the present value of 
welfare from the baseline for the three alternative 
adaptation strategies (these strategies are built in 
combination with the road adaptation strategy). In 
order to generate a meaningful comparison across 
alternative adaptation investment paths, the total 
resource envelope for adaptation investments is the 
same across the diﬀ erent strategies (but diﬀ erent 
across the four climate scenarios).
Changes in road design standards alone provide sig-
niﬁ cant reductions in welfare losses with the notable 
TABLE 9
REAL WELFARE IMPACTS WITH NO ADAPTATION INVESTMENTS
Climate Scenario
Present value of lost
welfare ($ Billion)
Equivalent annual value 
($ Million)
Annual equivalent 
per capita
Global Dry 13.118 764.5 31.46
Global Wet 10.095 588.3 24.21
Ghana Dry 2.709 157.9 6.50
Ghana Wet 4.050 236.0 9.71
Notes: (i) Discount rate = 5%. Welfare is measured by real absorption, the constant-price value of domestic and imported ﬁ nal goods and 
services available for household consumption, government consumption, and capital stock investment.
Second column: constant annual ﬂ ow with same present value. Third column: second column / 2010 population (UN medium projection: 
23.4 Million).
Source: World Bank 2010f.
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exception of Ghana Dry. In this scenario, the reallo-
cation of funds from road network expansion to road 
hardening slows down road network growth without 
generating net beneﬁ ts, because climate shocks to the 
road system turn out to be very mild. Th us, this result 
suggests, that in the case of Ghana (and contrary to 
the case of Mozambique), road design change is not 
an unequivocal no-regret adaptation measure.
Th e simulated adaptation investments in agriculture 
in combination with road design slightly overcom-
pensate for the climate change damages in a macro-
economic sense under Ghana Wet. Th is means that in 
this case the total cost of returning aggregate welfare 
to the baseline is actually lower than the assumed 
adaptation investment expenditure of $4.05 billion. 
In the other three scenarios, the agriculture-focused 
strategy restores aggregate real absorption close to 
the baseline level, but the negative signs in Table 
9 indicate some residual damage. In these cases it 
would appear advisable to channel the investments 
selectively to crops and regions with high expected 
returns and use the remaining part of the resource 
envelope for lump-sum compensation payments.
Th e comparison of the combined hydropower/agri-
culture adaptation strategy with the pure agriculture 
adaptation strategy suggests that only under the 
Global Wet climate scenario is it preferable to divert 
a fraction of the adaptation envelope from agriculture 
to hydropower investments. Th is is the climate sce-
nario with the strongest adverse impacts of climate 
change on hydropower generation. 
Finally, the results for investment in education serve 
to represent an adaptation strategy that does not 
directly address climate change impacts in particular 
sectors, but is aimed at spurring growth performance 
in general in order to reduce vulnerability to nega-
tive climate change shocks. Th e illustrative results 
reported here suggest that a broad-based education 
strategy is cost-eﬀ ective under the wet scenarios but 
not under the dry scenarios. As with the strategy 
based on agricultural investments this argues for a 
more targeted education-based adaptation strategy, 
targeting sectors where labor productivity gains are 
likely to be large. 
Local-level perspectives on adaptation. While the 
economic analyses prioritized improved road infra-
structure, energy, and regional integration (including 
transboundary water management), these issues were 
not raised in the social investigation. However, iden-
tiﬁ ed adaptation options in the areas of agriculture 
and coastal zone development did largely echo those 
raised by participatory scenario development (PSD) 
stakeholders and respondents in ﬁ eldwork. In addi-
tion, adaptation preferences expressed in the PSD 
workshops largely coincided with priority action areas 
in the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) 
TABLE 10
DEVIATIONS OF REAL WELFARE FROM BASELINE UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES (present value, in $ billions)
No Adaptation scenario Road Design
Adaptation Investment in
Agriculture Hydro /Agric. Education
Global Dry -13.118 -10.308 -0.121 -0.941 -2.090
Global Wet -10.095 -5.854 -2.973 2.116 0.584
Ghana Dry -2.709 -3.009 -1.193 -1.782 -1.308
Ghana Wet -4.050 -0.766 1.936 1.358 1.795
Note: Key assumption: Resource envelope is externally ﬁ nanced and does not reduce Ghana’s baseline investment path.
Source: World Bank 2010f.
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as well as related climate strategy priorities in-country. 
Discussions also focused on the need for improved 
governance, social protection, land tenure, and training 
and education in order to accelerate development and 
build resilience to climate change. 
Interestingly, local participants in the zonal workshops 
were more concerned with declining living standards 
due to degraded natural resources and with the lack 
of public services as drivers of vulnerability than with 
exposure to climate-related events. Speciﬁ c priorities 
included a focus on improving agricultural production 
techniques and land management practices; manag-
ing migration; closing the gap in gender equity; and 
strengthening governance and institutional structures. 
National workshop participants also focused on adapta-
tion measures that would oﬀ er cobeneﬁ ts with sustain-
able development, yet preferred adaptation measures 
that were often more expensive and left little room for 
integration of inputs of local communities. 
Lessons and recommendations
In view of the expected change in temperature and 
precipitation, strategic planning in Ghana should 
take regional climate change variability into consid-
eration. At the national level, the National Develop-
ment Planning Commission’s draft Medium-Term 
National Development Policy Framework for 2010 
to 2013 lays out the priorities of the government 
installed since February 2009. Th is framework was 
used to establish the baseline scenario of develop-
ment upon which this study is based. As the gov-
ernment moves to implementation of this new plan, 
recommendations from adaptation options presented 
in this study should be considered.
For each of the ten regions in Ghana, the possible 
sets of climate change impacts described need to 
be addressed through the Regional Coordinating 
Councils, and at District-level through District 
Development Plans. Speciﬁ c needs in each sec-
tor are discussed below. As in the other countries 
of the EACC study, policy recommendations for 
adaptation to climate change go hand-in-hand with 
“good” development policies:
Agriculture: Invest in R&D related to impacts of cli-
mate change on crops and livestock products and pest 
control, as well as early-maturing varieties; improve 
water storage capacity to utilize excess water in wet 
years; and improve agricultural extension services 
and marketing networks. Other required measures 
include construction of small to mid-size irrigation 
facilities, improvement of the land tenure system, 
and improved entrepreneurial skills to generate oﬀ -
farm income.
Roads: Proper timing of road construction (for 
example, during dry season); routine and timely road 
maintenance; upgrade road design speciﬁ cations, 
including choice of materials; and consider drain-
age and water retention, road sizes, and protection 
of road shoulders.
Energy: Diversify current thermal and large hydro 
sources to include renewable sources such as the 
planned mid-size hydro Bui Dam and mini hydro.
Coastal Zone: Improve shoreline protection in areas 
with economically important urban and port infra-
structure; upgrade peri-urban slums and control 
development of new ones; protect, manage, and sus-
tainably use coastal wetlands; and review Ghana’s 
coastal development plans to take into consideration 
climate change adaptations, including coastline and 
port protection, ﬂ ood protection, and coastal commu-
nities and ﬁ shery industry protection. 
Social: Improve social safety nets, community-
based resource management systems, and disaster 
preparedness. It is also necessary to accelerate the 
decentralization process to devolve decision making 
to the local level to promote local-level adaptation 
and preparedness.
West Africa Regional Integration: Ghana needs 
to enhance dialogue with neighboring countries 
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regarding the management of shared water resources, 
and explore possible regional water resource manage-
ment coordination in order to eﬀ ectively deal with 
the challenges of climate change such as droughts, 
ﬂ oods, and possible regional migration.
Bangladesh34
Vulnerability to climate change
Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries in 
the world to climate risks. Two-thirds of the nation 
is less than 5 meters above sea level and is susceptible 
to river and rainwater ﬂ ooding, particularly during 
the monsoon. Due to its location at the tail end of 
the delta formed by the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and 
Meghna (GBM) rivers, the timing, location, and 
extent of ﬂ ooding depends on the precipitation in the 
entire GBM basin, not just on the 7 percent of the 
basin that lies within the country. Nearly 80 percent 
of the country’s annual precipitation occurs during 
the summer monsoon season, when these rivers have 
a combined peak ﬂ ow of 180,000 m3/sec, the second 
highest in the world. Once every three to ﬁ ve years, 
up to two-thirds of Bangladesh is inundated by ﬂ oods 
that cause substantial damage to infrastructure, hous-
ing, agriculture, and livelihoods. Low-lying coastal 
areas are also at risk from tidal ﬂ oods and severe 
cyclones. On average once every three years, a severe 
cyclone makes landfall on the Bangladesh coastline, 
either before or after the monsoon. Th e largest dam-
ages from a cyclone result from the induced-storm 
surges, sometimes in excess of 10 meters. Bangladesh 
is on the receiving end of about 40 percent of the 
impact of total storm surges in the world. Crops and 
the livelihoods of the rural poor in low-lying coastal 
areas are also devastated by saline water intrusion into 
aquifers and groundwater and land submergence. In 
addition, seasonal droughts occasionally hit the 
northwestern region. 
Climate-related disasters continue to result in large 
economic losses, reducing economic growth and 
slowing progress in reducing poverty. Th e direct 
annual costs from natural disasters to the national 
economy—in terms of damages to infrastructure and 
livelihoods and losses from forgone production—
have been estimated at 0.5 percent to 1 percent of 
GDP. Th ese statistics do not include the signiﬁ cant 
loss of life that has also occurred during these events. 
Th ese damages and losses are geographically concen-
trated in areas that also have higher concentrations of 
the poor, who are the most vulnerable and have the 
lowest capacity to address the impacts, hence are also 
aﬀ ected disproportionately.  Th ey live in thatch or tin 
houses that are more susceptible to direct damages 
from cyclones, storm surges, and ﬂ oods. Additionally, 
most rural households depend on weather-sensitive 
sectors—agriculture, ﬁ sheries, and other natural 
resources—for their livelihood.  Destruction of their 
assets and livelihoods leaves the poor with a limited 
capacity to recover. 
Th e importance of adapting to these climate risks 
to maintain economic growth and reduce poverty is 
thus very clear (Figure 21). Since the sixties, Bangla-
desh has invested $10 billion on disaster reduction 
measures, both structural and non-structural, and 
enhanced its disaster preparedness system (Box 3). 
Th ese measures have signiﬁ cantly reduced damages 
and losses from extreme events over time, especially in 
terms of deaths and injuries. In addition, public sec-
tor agricultural support services have enabled rural 
households to reduce exposure to these risks and to 
maintain their livelihoods. For instance, they have 
adapted to “normal ﬂ oods” by switching from low-
yielding deepwater rice to high-yielding rice crops, 
resulting in increased agricultural production. How-
ever, it is the low-frequency, high-magnitude ﬂ oods that 
have adverse impacts on livelihoods and production, 
particularly of the poorest and most vulnerable. Th e 
cost of strengthening and expanding these measures to 
further reduce the risks from existing climate-related 
hazards is less than the avoided damages.
A warmer and wetter future climate that goes beyond 
historical variations will exacerbate the existing cli-
mate risks and increase vulnerability by increasing the 
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extend and depth of inundation from ﬂ ooding and 
storm surges and by reducing the arable land due to 
sea level rise and salinity intrusion. Th e median pre-
dictions from these models are for warming of 1.55°C 
and an increase in precipitation of 4 percent by 2050. 
Th e median temperature predictions exceed the 90th 
percentile of historical variability across GCMs dur-
ing the summer months by the 2030s. Unlike temper-
ature changes, the predicted changes in precipitation 
(and discharges) through 2050 are not distinct from 
the historically observed variability for all months 
and seasons, reﬂ ecting the large historical variability 
in precipitation levels and the even larger uncertainty 
in future precipitation predictions. Current trends for 
water levels in coastal areas suggest a rise in sea levels 
of over 27 cm by 2050. Further, the increased sever-
ity of cyclones in the Bay of Bengal is expected to 
increase risks of inundation in coastal areas by 2050. 
EACC approach and results
Th e Bangladesh case study builds on a parallel study 
on the impacts of climate change and food security 
(Yu et al. 2010) and focuses on two speciﬁ c climate 
hazards: storm surges induced by tropical cyclones and 
inland ﬂ ooding. Th e study (a) estimates the additional 
damages that would result in key economic sectors and 
in the overall economy if no additional adaption mea-
sures are put in place to address current and expected 
hazards, and (b) estimates the costs of additional 
investments that would be needed to protect against 
these hazards. Th e study also analyzes the diﬀ erential 
impact of climate change on vulnerable populations 
and how they cope with such impacts.
Tropical cyclone-induced storm surges. Th e poten-
tial damages and the adaptation cost necessary to 
MAPS OF POVERTY, FLOODING AND TIDAL SURGES
FIGURE 21
Poverty Map Map of Flooding and Tidal Surges
Source: BBS, World Bank, WFP 2009.
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 PAST EXPERIENCE ADAPTING TO EXTREME CLIMATE EVENTS IN BANGLADESH
Given its vulnerability to extreme climate events, a number of adaptation measures are already in place in Bangladesh, 
including both hard infrastructure as well as soft policy measures combined with communal practice. Hard infrastructure 
has included coastal embankments, foreshore afforestation, cyclone shelters, early warning systems, and relief opera-
tions; soft measures have included design standards for roads and agricultural research and extension, such as the 
introduction of high-yielding varieties of aman and boro rice crops. Both types of adaptation measures have made the 
country more resilient in facing hazards, as evidenced by the decline in the number of fatalities and the share of GDP lost 
as a result of these events.  
Coastal embankments. In the 1960s and 1970s, 123 polders (including 49 facing the sea) were constructed to protect 
low-lying coastal areas. Polders have been an effective measure for protection against storm surges and cyclones, 
but breaching of embankments has been a recurring phenomenon due to overtopping, erosion, inadequate O&M, 
and other problems. 
Foreshore aff orestation to protect sea-facing dikes. Foreshore afforestation is a cost-effective way to reduce the 
impacts of cyclonic storm surges on embankments by dissipating wave energy and reducing hydraulic load on the 
embankments during storm surges. The limited damages from Cyclone Sidr (2007) and Aila (2009) have been 
partially attributed to foreshore afforestation. Government ofﬁ cials have recommended that the existing forest belt 
include at least a 500-meter wide mangrove forest. Currently 60 km of forest belts exist on the 49 sea-facing pol-
ders, span a total combined length of 957 km, leaving over 90 percent of the polder length unprotected. 
Cyclone shelters. Cyclone shelters are currently essential to protect human lives and livestock during cyclones hitting 
the coast. During the Cyclone Sidr in 2007, 15 percent of the affected population took refuge in cyclone shelters, sav-
ing thousands of lives. Focus group interviews with area residents revealed that shelters have been limited in their 
use and effectiveness, mainly due to existing design, distance from the homestead, difﬁ cult access, the unwilling-
ness to leave livestock behind, lack of user-friendly facilities for women and people with disabilities, overcrowding, 
and lack of sanitation facilities. Although the need for cyclone shelters is expected to decline with more effective 
protection through embankments combined with autonomous adaption with rising incomes, cyclone shelters will 
nevertheless be needed in areas where dikes are not cost effective (such as in small less inhabited islands).
Early warning systems. Early warning and evacuation systems have played an important role in saving lives during 
cyclones. The Bangladesh Meteorological Department tracks cyclones and issues a forewarning that indicates areas 
that are likely to be affected by the cyclone storm. These warnings are broadcast through newspapers, television, 
and radio stations throughout the affected area. The existing evacuation operations managed by the local govern-
ments can be improved by increasing the spatial resolution of the warning and indicating the severity of expected 
inundation. Repeated warnings in areas that are not ultimately affected reduce the conﬁ dence of the inhabitants in 
the early warning system. 
Decentralization of relief operations. Relief operations were historically centralized in Dhaka, away from the actual 
impacts and affected population, resulting in a long chain of command and delayed effective relief. Recent efforts to 
decentralize operations have proven quite successful. They include the establishment of a forward operation center 
with a government appointed commander-in-chief to oversee operations, the use of high frequency and ultra high 
frequency transceiver radios, and cell phones as an emergency communication system. Pre-positioning of emer-
gency relief materials and life-saving drugs and medical supplies is playing an increasingly important role in quickly 
initiating relief and rehabilitation activities.
BOX 3
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avoid these damages are estimated separately for 
two scenarios—a baseline scenario without climate 
change and another with climate change. Th e base-
line scenario is developed from all 19 major historical 
cyclones making landfall in Bangladesh between 1960 
and 2009, and represents the risk in the absence of 
climate change currently, as well as in 2050. Climate 
change is expected to increase the severity of cyclones 
by 2050. Th e storm surge conditions in 2050 under 
the climate change scenario are simulated based on 
three anticipated eﬀ ects: ( a) sea level rise of 27cm, (b) 
an increase in the observed wind speed by 10 percent, 
and (c) landfall during high tide. 
Cyclone-induced storm surges due to climate change 
are expected to inundate an additional 15 percent 
of the coastal area and also increase the inundation 
depth in these areas (Figures 22 and 23). Households 
have adapted to the existing risks by moving further 
inland into areas with lower current risks; as a result, 
current population density is lower in areas with a 
higher risk of inundation (Figure 21). However, not 
all households are able or can aﬀ ord to migrate away 
from higher risk areas. Poverty rates are also highest 
in the higher risk areas (Figure 23).
Th e population and assets at risk and the damages 
from cyclone-induced storm surges in 2050 under the 
two scenarios are computed assuming an economy 
with “normal” development patterns that is the same 
for both the baseline and climate change scenarios. 
Th e population is projected to increase 1.15 percent 
annually (reaching replacement fertility by 2021) 
with increases concentrated in urban areas. GDP is 
projected to continue to grow at the current annual 
rates of growth of 6 to 8 percent, but is expected to 
be less dependent on agriculture by 2050. Damages 
from storm surges are based on spatially disaggre-
gated projections of the population and assets poten-
tially at risk.  If additional public adaptation measures 
INUNDATION RISK FROM STORM SURGES IN COASTAL AREAS WITH AND WITHOUT CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN RELATION TO CURRENT POPULATION DENSITY
FIGURE 22
Source: World Bank 2010c.
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are not put in place, the damages from a single typi-
cal severe cyclone with a return period of 10 years is 
expected to rise nearly ﬁ vefold to over $9 billion by 
2050, accounting for 0.6 percent of GDP, with the 
burden likely falling disproportionately on the poor-
est households. 
Inland ﬂ ooding. Rural households have adapted their 
farming systems to the “normal ﬂ oods” that typi-
cally inundate about a quarter of the country every 
year by switching to high-yielding rice crops instead 
of low-yielding deepwater rice. As a result, agricul-
tural production has actually risen over the past few 
decades. Severe ﬂ ood events, however, continue to 
cause signiﬁ cant losses, both to agriculture and to the 
transportation and communication networks and to 
the livelihoods of the poor once every three to ﬁ ve 
years. Th e 1998 ﬂ ood inundated over two-thirds of 
Bangladesh and resulted in damages and losses of 
over $2 billion (4.8 percent of GDP), approximately 
equally split between infrastructure, agriculture, and 
industry/commerce. 
Increased monsoon precipitation, higher transbound-
ary water ﬂ ows, and rising sea levels resulting from 
climate change are expected to increase the depth and 
extent of inundation. Th e impacts of climate change 
are measured by comparing the inundation levels pre-
dicted by simulations using the MIROC 3.2 GCM 
predictions under the A2 emission scenario for 2050 
with the inundation levels in the 1998 ﬂ oods. Cli-
mate change places an additional 4 percent of land 
area at risk of inundation. Further, inundation depth 
increases in most areas currently at risk, with increases 
greater than 15 cm in about 544 km2, or 0.4 percent of 
the country (Figure 24).35 Th ese are underestimates of 
the actual increased risk from climate change as they 
do not account for the frequent river course changes. 
Th e total inundation risks in 2050 are actually sub-
stantial, considering the increased risks are measured 
relative to the 1998 ﬂ ood.  Despite the higher risks, 
the rural population exposed to ﬂ ooding is expected 
to decline from current levels due to the rural-to-
urban migration projected to occur by 2050. Th ese 
risks are in addition to the substantial baseline risks 
INUNDATION RISK FROM STORM SURGES IN COASTAL AREAS WITH AND WITHOUT CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN RELATION TO CURRENT POVERTY RATES
FIGURE 23
Source: World Bank 2010c.
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CHANGE IN INUNDATION DEPTH (CM) FROM MONSOON FLOODING (WITH AND WITHOUT CC) 
FIGURE 24
that currently exist from inland ﬂ ooding. Damage 
estimates from the agriculture component indicates 
that climate change increases the existing damages by 
about one-third, suggesting that actions to manage 
current severe ﬂ oods are a good no-regrets strategy 
for adapting to future climate change. 
Agriculture. Th e climate change and food security 
study examines the impacts of predicted changes in 
climate on crop yields, agricultural production, GDP, 
and household welfare. Crop yields are separately 
modeled for 16 diﬀ erent agroecological regions, with 
rice split by seasonal varieties using climate predic-
tions from 16 GCMs for three emission scenarios. 
In addition, the impacts of severe ﬂ ooding on agri-
cultural production are assessed using ﬁ ve GCMs 
and two emission scenarios. Th e models predict that 
higher yields of the main rice crops aman and aus—
resulting from higher concentrations of CO2, rising 
temperature, and heavier precipitation—will be more 
than oﬀ set by declines in the yield of the boro crop, 
crop damages from severe ﬂ ooding, and losses of cul-
tivable land due to rising sea levels. Considering all 
climate impacts (CO2 fertilization, temperature and 
precipitation changes, ﬂ ooding, and sea level rise), 
cumulative rice production is expected to decline by 
80 million tons (about 3.9 percent each year) over 
2005–50, driven primarily by reduced boro crop pro-
duction (Figure 25). Agricultural GDP is projected 
to be 3.1 percent lower each year ($36 billion in lost 
value-added) and total GDP $129 billion lower due 
to climate change over the 45-year period 2005–50.
Adaptation 
Th e costs of adaptation under the two climate sce-
narios are estimated through a gap analysis taking 
into account the adaptation investments already in 
place. Th e costs under the baseline scenario corre-
spond to the adaptation deﬁ cit, while the cost diﬀ er-
ence between the two scenarios represents the cost of 
adaptation due to climate change. 
Source: World Bank 2010c.
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PROJECTED NATIONAL RICE PRODUCTION WITH AND WITHOUT CLIMATE CHANGE
FIGURE 25
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Tropical cyclone-induced storm surges. Since the 
1960s, Bangladesh has made signiﬁ cant investments 
in embankments, cyclone shelters, coastal aﬀ oresta-
tion and in disaster preparedness to address the risks 
from cyclones and storm surges. However, these 
investments are not suﬃ  cient to address the exist-
ing risks and much less the future risk from climate 
change. Adaptation measures evaluated were (a) 
embankments, (b) aﬀ orestation, (c) cyclone shelters, 
and (d) early warning systems. Protecting Bangladesh 
against existing storm surge risks requires $3,090 mil-
lion in initial investments and $62 million in annual 
maintenance costs. Addressing the additional risks 
due to climate change will require additional invest-
ments of $2,426 million and annual maintenance 
costs of $50 million by 2050 (Table 11). Despite dif-
ferences in methodology, climate scenarios, economic 
assumptions, and scope of coverage, these costs are of 
the same order of magnitude as the adaptation costs 
estimated for Bangladesh from the global track of the 
study of around $13 billion over the 40-year period. 
Inland ﬂ ooding. Th e analysis focuses on adaptation 
measures to avoid further damage from additional 
inundation on existing infrastructure—road network 
and railways, river embankments, and embankments 
to protect highly productive agricultural lands, drain-
age systems, and erosion control measures for high-
value assets such as towns. Th e total cost of adaptation 
due to climate change to address inland ﬂ ooding risk 
is $2.7 billion in initial investment and $54 million in 
annual recurrent costs (Table 12). Full protection in 
2050 will also require addressing the existing baseline 
risks of ﬂ ooding, which are likely to be at least of the 
same of order of magnitude or larger.
Agriculture. While the public sector cost of adapt-
ing in the agriculture was not estimated, the rela-
tive merits of a number of short-term adaptation 
measures—namely the extension of currently avail-
able options into new areas—are examined from the 
farmer’s perspective. Part of the longer term adapta-
tion strategy will be to control the damages from 
inland ﬂ oods. Th is has been partially costed in the 
inland ﬂ oods component of the study. In addition, 
longer term adaptation has to also include develop-
ment of alternatives, particularly to the boro crop in 
the southern region. 
Source: Yu et. al 2010.
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Local-level perspectives on adaptation 
Past adaptation practices by households vary accord-
ing to hazard type and asset base holdings. Th e most 
common form of adaptation is temporary migration 
for day labor work by adult men (undertaken by 37 
percent of surveyed households). Storage of food and 
drinking water before extreme events is also common, 
and 25 percent of surveyed households also reported 
building livestock platforms to guard animals during 
such events. Adaptive capacity among all ﬁ eld sites 
was low; in particular, poor urban dwellers face few 
options for livelihood diversiﬁ cation and also have 
low social capital. 
Participants in local and national participatory sce-
nario development workshops identiﬁ ed preferred 
adaptation options in environmental management 
(mangrove preservation, aﬀ orestation, coastal green-
belts, and waste management); water resource man-
agement (drainage, rainwater harvesting, drinking 
water provisions, and ﬂ ood control); infrastructure 
(roads and cyclone shelters); livelihood diversiﬁ ca-
tion and social protection for ﬁ shers during cyclone 
TABLE 12
TOTAL ADAPTION COST FOR INLAND FLOODING BY 2050 ($ Million)
Adaptation Option Investment Cost Annual Recurrent Cost
Transport – Road height enhancement  2,122 42
Transport – Road cross-drainage     5 -
Transport – Railway height enhancement    27  1
Embankment – height enhancement    96  2
Coastal Polders – cross drainage   421  8
Erosion Control Program  1
Total Costs  2,671 54
TABLE 11
COST OF ADAPTING TO TROPICAL CYCLONES AND STORM SURGES BY 2050
($ millions)
Adaptation Option
Baseline Scenario
(existing risks) (1)
 (additional risk 
due to CC) (2)
CC Scenario 
(total risk = (1) + (2))
IC AMC IC AMC IC AMC
Polders 2,462 49    893  18    3,355 67
Afforestation      75      75
Cyclone shelters    628 13 1,219  24 1,847 37
Resistant housing    200    200
Early warning system      39    8     39    8
Total 3,090 62 2,426 50 5,516 112
Note: CC = climate change; IC = investment cost; AMC = annual maintenance cost
Source: World Bank 2010c.
Source: World Bank 2010c.
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season; education; agriculture (development of salt 
tolerant and high-yield varieties, crop insurance); 
ﬁ sheries (storm resistant boats, conﬂ ict resolu-
tion between shrimp and rice farmers); governance 
(especially access to social services for the urban 
poor); and gender-responsive disaster management 
(separate rooms for women in cyclone shelters, 
mini-shelters closer to villages, use of female voices 
in early warning announcements, and mobile medi-
cal teams in Char areas).  
Lessons and recommendations
Given the pervasive impacts of climate-related risks 
over time, Bangladesh is also one of the most climate 
resilient countries and can provide many lessons on 
developing climate resilient strategies for other devel-
oping countries. Yet, damages from recent cyclones 
and ﬂ oods indicate that substantial risks remain. 
Deﬁ ciencies in costal protective measures weaken 
resilience to existing cyclone-induced storm surges, 
and climate change is expected to nearly double these 
risks. Further, the aggregate additional costs of the 
proposed adaptation measures needed to mitigate 
climate change risk from extreme events are generally 
smaller than the expected damages. As a result, a no-
regrets strategy would be to begin by addressing the 
adaptation deﬁ cit and strengthening early warning 
systems. Additional embankments and shelters can 
be constructed in the medium term as the geographic 
incidence of risk becomes more certain. 
Th e impacts of existing climate variability are concen-
trated in areas that also have higher concentrations 
of poor and socially vulnerable populations. Climate 
change does not shift these distributions, but just exac-
erbates them. Th e rural poor in the southern region in 
particular are expected to face the largest declines in per 
capita consumption, as well as declining productivity 
in the aus and aman rice crops, severe yield losses in 
the boro crop, and land losses due to increased salinity 
brought forth by sea level rise. Th ough the government 
has made substantial investments to increase the resil-
ience of the poor (e.g. new high-yielding crop varieties, 
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protective infrastructure, disaster management), the 
scale of the current eﬀ orts remains limited and will 
need to be scaled up commensurate with the probable 
impacts from climate change. 
By 2050, the number of people living in cities will 
triple while the rural population will fall by 30 per-
cent. Th e long-term challenge is to move people and 
economic activity into less climate-sensitive areas. A 
strategic balance between protecting existing popula-
tions and encouraging the mobility of future popula-
tions must be sought. Current policies will determine 
where this urban population settles and how prepared 
it is to adapt to a changed climate. Good policy will 
encourage future populations to move away from 
areas of high natural risk. Th is requires avoiding 
perverse incentives to remain in high-risk areas and 
adopting positive incentives to promote settlement 
and urban growth in low-risk areas. 
Lastly, although Bangladesh accounts for only 7 per-
cent of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) 
basin, due to its geographical location at the tail end 
of the basin, ﬂ ooding in Bangladesh depends on 
the rainfall in the entire GBM basin. Institutional 
arrangements on the sharing and management of 
water resources with its neighbours will be just as 
important in managing ﬂ oods.
Bolivia36
Vulnerability to climate change
Th e Bolivian population has always been exposed 
to hydro-meteorological extremes and climate vari-
ability, particularly because of the inﬂ uence of the El 
Niño oscillation (ENSO), which—regardless of cli-
mate change—occurs periodically in diﬀ erent areas 
across the country. Th e impact of El Niño 2006–07 
in Bolivia cost approximately $443.3 million in dam-
ages. Direct damage to property accounted for about 
half of the total; the remaining 45 percent included 
losses in cash ﬂ ow, declines in production, reduced 
income, and disruption of services. Floods, landslides, 
and droughts, all of which have serious implications 
for food security and water supply, are common cli-
mate-related events. 
Figure 26 shows the inﬂ uence of accumulating 
extreme events on agricultural GDP. Th e negative 
impact of strong El Niño events (red) is clear in the 
years 1982–83, 1991–92, and 2005–06. Also visible is 
the slight improvement in agriculture management in 
2003–04. Th e less severe eﬀ ects from La Niña (blue) 
also are evident in the years 1985–86, 1988–89 and 
1994–95.
Most of the climate models for future projections do 
not agree with regard to rainfall estimates in terms of 
the sign of the change, intensity, and geographical dis-
tribution within Bolivia (Figure 27), showing a range 
of plausible wet and dry scenarios.37 Th e economic 
and population welfare impacts under a changing 
climate are thus somewhat uncertain. Higher tem-
peratures and fewer frosts might stimulate agricul-
tural production in the Altiplano and the valleys. Th e 
key uncertainties concern the total amount, timing, 
and intensity of precipitation. If the dry scenarios 
are correct, then the beneﬁ ts of higher temperatures 
will be more than oﬀ set by more frequent and severe 
periods of low rainfall, especially in the southwest, 
together with an uncertain eﬀ ect in the north, mak-
ing the case for improved water storage and irrigation 
infrastructure. 
On the other hand, if the wet scenarios are correct, 
then agricultural yields should increase throughout 
much of the country, but this would also require 
upgrades in infrastructure (water storage and ﬂ ood 
control) together with improved agricultural prac-
tices and land management. 
Bolivia’s economic mainstays—mining and hydro-
carbon extraction—suggest the nation is relatively 
insensitive to climate change. However, it is the 
large majority of its rural and urban population who 
are quite vulnerable to changes in climate. Bolivia’s 
rural population relies mostly on rainfed agriculture, 
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small-scale livestock farming, and seasonal labor in 
agriculture. Approximately 30 percent of Bolivia’s 
rural residents reside in the valleys and high plateau 
areas, where water availability is already problematic. 
In addition, a high proportion live in extreme con-
ditions without the necessary resources to adapt to 
climate change. 
Climate change will not only aﬀ ect rural areas within 
Bolivia. Several major cities located in the upper 
watersheds in the Altiplano and Valley regions—such 
as La Paz-El Alto, Sucre, Potosí, and Cochabamba—
are signiﬁ cantly vulnerable to climate variability and 
water scarcity. Th ese cities are highly vulnerable to 
decreasing rainfall trends, to unexpected changes in 
seasonality, and to prolonged droughts. Water short-
ages have already incited social conﬂ icts in Cocha-
bamba, Sucre, and Tarija.
Investment in better water management will enhance 
the resilience of Bolivia’s population, both to system-
atic changes associated with annual levels of rainfall, 
as well as greater year-to-year volatility in rainfall 
patterns. Improved water management practices are 
conducive to smart development even in the absence 
of climate change, making this a robust no-regrets 
investment given the prevailing uncertainty about 
future climate change in the area. 
EACC approach and results
Based on continuous dialogue with the government, 
the EACC study in Bolivia focused on two vulnerable 
sectors: agriculture and water resources. In addition, 
a social component complemented the sector-based 
economic analysis and shed light on the implications 
of diﬀ erent adaptation options on poor and vulner-
able groups. Th e study considered two extreme cli-
mate scenarios in terms of water availability in order 
to simulate the worst case scenarios, assuming that 
changes in the Bolivian climate are likely to occur 
somewhere between these two. Th e wet scenario 
forecasts an average temperature increase of 1.5˚C 
and an annual mean precipitation increase of +22 
percent, whereas the dry scenario shows a tempera-
ture increase of 2.4˚C and a decrease in precipitation 
of -19 percent averaged across the Bolivian terri-
tory. Models indicate that the frequency of extreme 
weather events might increase, including the onset 
of El Niño and La Niña events. Th e accumulation of 
such extreme events within shorter time frames can 
easily threaten the development-as-usual patterns in 
Bolivia, given the serious public sector ﬁ nancial limi-
tations to reconstruct and recover to previous levels 
of welfare. 
As one of its main objectives, the EACC study evalu-
ated the robustness of planned adaptation measures 
under diﬀ erent climate scenarios in terms of ﬁ nan-
cial values and socioeconomic terms. Results dem-
onstrated that most current planned investment in 
agriculture and water resources continue to be robust 
to climate change, at least under extreme conditions. 
Th us, current adaptation measures in Bolivia are rep-
resentative of primarily no-regret development strat-
egies under climate variability. 
Th e EACC in Bolivia consisted of three diﬀ erent 
economic assessments regarding the costs, beneﬁ ts, 
and sequencing of alternative adaptation measures at 
diﬀ erent levels. Th e ﬁ rst exercise assessed the robust-
ness of planned investments in the water sector by 
evaluating costs and beneﬁ ts of government-selected 
adaptation measures reﬂ ecting the types of needed 
adaptation actions previously identiﬁ ed by the Bolivia 
National Mechanism of Adaptation. Th e second exer-
cise evaluated the cost of stylized adaptation options 
for the water sector—mainly infrastructure needs for 
increased irrigation. 
Th e third assessment comprised the development of a 
planning investment tool to evaluate the sequencing 
and prioritization of adaptation options under cli-
mate and development constraints. Th e analysis was 
able to identify the most vulnerable population, and 
how to restore watershed-level beneﬁ ts to their base-
line levels through accelerated investment. Th is type 
of planning model permitted a detailed comparison 
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of investment alternatives and the potential eﬀ ect 
of climate change on each alternative. Th e approach 
facilitates investigation of the sequencing and priori-
tization of actions in a certain time frame, as well as 
the robustness of alternative investment and policy 
strategies to possible climate outcomes. Th e water-
shed planning model developed for this investigation 
is a practical, useful planning tool that can be used 
by Bolivian authorities, reﬁ ned, and updated as addi-
tional climate and watershed data become available.
Impacts
Water. Water resources are abundant in Bolivia. Aver-
age rainfall is about 1,200 mm38, and despite high 
evaporation rates, average water allocation is high at 
approximately 45 m3 per capita per year.39 However, 
natural water supply presents both a marked geo-
graphical and seasonal variability: 45 percent of the 
rainfall falls within 3 months (December–February), 
with values from 100 to 600 mm in the cold Altiplano 
and less cold central and southern valley regions, up to 
2,000 mm in the warm lowlands, and maximum values 
of 5,000 mm in certain transition areas from the valley 
to the lowlands. 
Rural Areas  . According to most future climate 
projections, access to water resources in rural 
areas will be impacted by two major water-related 
climate risks: gradual changes in the magnitude 
and distribution of precipitation and temperature, 
and changes in the frequency and magnitude of 
extreme events. In addition, local evidences of 
rapidly melting glaciers may exacerbate water 
shortages in the arid and semi-arid valleys and in 
the highlands, which already lack water storage 
capacity. Glaciers act as a buﬀ er for water avail-
ability during dry periods, and in Bolivia they are 
shrinking at an alarming rate. 
Water Supply and Sanitation in Urban Areas.   In 
many cases—such as in Cochabamba, Sucre, or 
Tarija—the competition for water resources is 
high, and social conﬂ icts are frequent between 
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the urban utility and diﬀ erent user communi-
ties. Th e case of La Paz-El Alto, is particularly 
worrying due to disappearance of the glacial con-
tribution to the superﬁ cial runoﬀ , which, though 
not properly quantiﬁ ed, will provoke a reduction 
in the amount of natural water supply and pose 
an extra threat on this metropolitan area, where 
demand has already matched supply.40 
Agriculture. Th e crops analyzed were quinoa, potato, 
maize, and soy, which are cultivated from the Altiplano 
to regions of lower elevation. Generally, Bolivia’s agri-
culture would beneﬁ t signiﬁ cantly from a warmer and 
wetter climate, so long as the varieties and crops that 
are grown can be adjusted to changes in rainfall pat-
terns during critical phenological time periods and/or 
any shortening in the growing season. Yields for maize 
and soybeans would increase by 40–45 percent, while 
that for potatoes and quinoa by 60–90 percent. On the 
other hand, the dry scenarios would lead to a substan-
tial reduction in agricultural yields in the Altiplano, the 
valleys, and the El Chaco regions. Th e eﬀ ects of less 
rainfall and higher evaporation could only be oﬀ set 
by (a) a substantial investment in water storage and 
irrigation infrastructure, and (b) the adoption of more 
drought-resistant varieties and crops in the lower lands. 
Potential losses from a drier climate are on the order of 
25 percent for maize and 10–15 percent for soybeans, 
potatoes, and quinoa. Th is suggests that rapid and 
timely implementation of irrigation (at least at the ini-
tial phases of crop development), would be even more 
attractive under a scenario of warmer climate. 
Adaptation
Water. Investment in better water management will 
enhance the resilience of Bolivian agriculture both to 
systematic changes in annual levels of rainfall and to 
greater year-to-year volatility in the rainfall patterns. 
Such investments are “no-regret” measures and would 
be desirable under most development strategies for 
a stable climate, so that climate change is likely to 
reinforce the beneﬁ ts of such investments. 
While water resources are abundant for the whole 
country, improving the storage eﬃ  ciency of wet peri-
ods to meet irrigation demands in deﬁ cit areas such as 
the south of the Altiplano and El Chaco is essential. 
Improvements in irrigation need to be accompanied 
by better water management, particularly integrated 
watershed management where the resource compe-
tition between rural and urban populations is likely 
to increase. In addition, there is a need to reinforce, 
improve, protect, and diversify water sources in order 
to strengthen the production capacity of the urban 
utilities, especially in cities of the arid regions like La 
Paz, Cochabamba, or Sucre.
Under the wet scenarios, there will be an increase 
in ﬂ ooding, especially in the valleys and the eastern 
lowlands. Reforestation, as well as the development 
of ﬂ ood warning and disaster prevention systems, can 
help reduce the economic and social costs of ﬂ ood-
ing in lowland areas. More expensive forms of ﬂ ood 
prevention such as dikes are rarely justiﬁ ed. 
Agriculture. According to the estimated impact of 
climate change, similar adaptation options for the 
four studied crops were identiﬁ ed as crucial, irriga-
tion being clearly the most important. In addition, 
for quinoa, the application of deﬁ cit irrigation and 
changes in the sowing dates and crop varieties are 
viable options; for potatoes, better management of 
the diﬀ erent varieties, changes in sowing dates, and 
application of irrigation in critical phenological 
periods; for soybeans, investments in ﬂ ood control 
measures as well as the introduction of input saving 
varieties; and for maize, speciﬁ c additional adaptation 
measures include ﬂ ood control in wet periods, as well 
as improved soil management practices. Most adap-
tation strategies will require signiﬁ cant institutional 
support in order to avoid negative social and ecologi-
cal impacts due to intensiﬁ cation of crop production. 
Adaptation measures indicated by local popula-
tions include the need for better information 
and capacity building initiatives geared toward 
working with new and adapted seed varieties, as 
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well as better infrastructure for conservation and 
storage of crops during warm periods. Extension 
services, crop insurance, and improved access and 
availability to hydro-meteorological data will also 
be vital to improve agriculture adaptation policies 
and meet the needs of livelihoods based on rain-
fed agriculture. Some measures that remain to be 
explored include the potential role of investments 
in rural roads in providing the infrastructure 
required to facilitate shifts in the location of agri-
cultural production linked to changes in compara-
tive advantage. Robust adaptation options should 
be accompanied by large cobeneﬁ ts and interlink-
ages. For example, investments in rural roads can 
be an important adaptation strategy because they 
increase access to markets for agricultural inputs 
and outputs. Th e implementation of policies that 
increase access to markets—bridging two vulner-
able sectors, infrastructure and agriculture—could 
be implemented for small-scale farmers, and com-
plemented by additional macroeconomic measures 
for large-scale farmers. 
Finally, the agriculture study suggests that planned 
adaptation actions—including increased irrigation 
resources and ﬂ ood control measures, as well as the 
implementation of knowledge support for improved 
analysis of climate science—are highly costly and 
hard to implement in Bolivia, based on qualitative 
assessments of cost, beneﬁ ts, and viability of these 
adaptation actions.
Economic analysis of adaptation investment 
options
 Th e cost-beneﬁ t analysis illustrates the use of an eco-
nomic tool for the evaluation of robustness of invest-
ment projects under a changing climate. Th e analysis 
evaluated projects selected primarily based on the 
availability of data. Water projects included water 
supply and water management, and the agricultural 
projects consisted primarily of irrigation projects. 
Th e analysis excluded the assessments of larger infra-
structure projects in urban areas, as these projects are 
usually excluded from national budgets and mostly 
ﬁ nanced by international cooperation. 
Th e analysis was made in terms of ﬁ nancial (market) 
values and in socioeconomic terms (shadow prices), 
and integrated climate change variables (tempera-
ture and precipitation) under a dry (worst case) and 
a no-climate-change scenario. Th e objective was not 
to evaluate the projects themselves, but rather their 
economic feasibility and robustness as appropriate 
adaptation measures to climate variability in Bolivia 
(Table 13). 
Th e results suggest that the Altiplano will be favored 
by increased temperatures, while the oriental and 
Chaco zones will be negatively aﬀ ected by increased 
temperatures and reduced precipitation. Th ese results 
are in accordance with the spatial distribution of the 
projects where, depending on the area, the Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) is reduced due to these regional 
impacts. Th e agriculture projects show a slight increase 
of the IRR under the climate change scenario in the 
highland zones (except the B.R.Paraisito project). Th is 
suggests that current planned investment in agriculture 
and water resources continue to be robust to climate 
change, at least under dry extreme conditions.41 Th us, 
adaptation measures in Bolivia represent primarily 
good development strategies under climate variability. 
Two other economic exercises explored the possible 
eﬀ ects of climate change on a long-term irrigation 
program (National Watershed Program – PNC by its 
Spanish acronym) at the watershed level.
Th e ﬁ rst exercise considered the cost of providing 
the required level of additional water storage infra-
structure to meet PNC’s planned irrigation expansion 
to 2011 and estimated up to 2050. Th e analysis was 
based on balances of water deﬁ cit and water surplus 
months, and therefore the necessity and potential to 
reallocate additional water through storage, under a 
wet and a dry extreme climate scenario. Th e estimated 
cost of the additional water storage required to match 
monthly water deﬁ cits due to climate change under 
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the wet climate scenario would be on the order of 
an additional $12 million over the projected baseline 
(estimated at around $480 million for 2050 under no 
climate change), and an additional $60 million under 
the dry climate scenario up to 2050. 
Th e second exercise42 explored the eﬀ ect of climate 
change on PNC’s planned investment program for the 
Mizque watershed. Th is is a watershed that has been 
identiﬁ ed as being particularly susceptible to climate 
eﬀ ects. Th e study evaluated the eﬀ ect of a changing 
climate on decisions to make durable investments. As 
irrigation must compete with potable water and water 
for agriculture practices, two policies were explored 
under extreme climate conditions and budget con-
straints: (1) decentralization of budgets to the sub-
basin level versus centralized Mizque watershed-level 
watershed planning; and (2) maximizing the number 
of families receiving irrigation versus maximizing the 
economic beneﬁ ts from irrigation. 
Results showed that incorporating the eﬀ ects of cli-
mate change appears to slightly modify the original 
national watershed development plan, suggesting 
that most of the potential irrigation investments in 
the Mizque watershed are robust to climate impacts. 
Th is is the case because major vulnerability problems 
are upstream and related to urban water supply, sani-
tation, and threats of ﬂ oods and droughts. Th is analy-
sis suggests that farther downstream in the Mizque 
River watershed, annual rainfall would remain suﬃ  -
cient for nearly all the irrigation projects identiﬁ ed in 
the PMIC-Mizque study, assuming suﬃ  cient storage 
was built as part of the program. Under a “dry sce-
nario,” the eﬀ ect would be to reduce potential social 
beneﬁ ts by 1–3 percent as water becomes scarce 
TABLE 13
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ADAPTATION MEASURES IN THE AGRICULTURE AND WATER 
SECTORS
Project
Investment
Costs (000) Beneﬁ ciaries NPV1 (000) IRR (%) NPV* (000) IRR (%)
Baseline Dry scenario
WATER
Distribution in Sapecho 3,440 2,199 persons 3,428 24 3,331 24
 Potable water S.P. Cogotay   408  140 persons     8 13     3 13
Well drills Chapicollo   317  50 families   187 17   151 17
Flood Control Caranavi 4,052  528 houses 2,658 22 2,658 22
AGRICULTURE
Irrigation dam S.P.Aiquile  11,476 147 ha    2,583  16 4,195 18
Dam restoration Tacagua 313,623 907 ha (184,275)  3 (171,580) 3
Wall elevation Tacagua dam  120,457 907 ha    9,705 14 21,563 16
Irrigation B.Retiro S Paraisito    3,686 178 ha   17,260 71 14,874 63
Catchment Atajados/Aiquile    1,951  32 ha     115 14    347 16
Notes: parenthesis values indicate a negative NPV, suggesting that dam resto-
ration is not economically feasible in this location. * NPV = Net present value.
Source: World Bank 2010d.
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and there are diminishing economic returns from 
sequenced investment projects. Th e eﬀ ect of the wet 
scenario is to increase beneﬁ ts by 1–3 percent. Th ese 
results vary with varying assumptions regarding the 
budget available each year and the degree of budget-
ary decentralization policies. 
In general, the eﬀ ect of budgetary decentralized 
management43 at the subwatershed level overwhelms 
the eﬀ ect of a dry or a wet climate change scenario, 
regardless of whether the objective is to maximize 
social beneﬁ ts or to maximize the number of families 
directly beneﬁ tting from the projects. According to 
the model exercise, decentralizing budgets at the sub-
watershed level actually reduces social beneﬁ ts and/or 
the number of families directly beneﬁ tting from the 
projects by between 2 percent and over 30 percent. 
Local-level perspectives on adaptation. Communities 
in the valleys and highlands considered drought to be 
the principal threat to their livelihoods and prioritized 
adaptation measures related to water management—
including improving water storage capacity and irriga-
tion infrastructure—followed by improved agricultural 
and livestock practices. In contrast, communities from 
the Chaco and Plains regions asserted that improved 
agricultural practices were most important and consid-
ered water management measures to be of secondary 
signiﬁ cance. Th ese local perceptions coincided with the 
adaptation measures identiﬁ ed in the sector analyses.
Yet results from participatory scenario development 
workshops and ﬁ eldwork demonstrate that communi-
ties view adaptation strategies not as isolated “hard” 
measures nor as single projects, but rather as a set of 
complementary measures comprised of both hard 
and soft adaptation actions. Th us, while infrastructure 
investments would be necessary, they emphasized that 
these would be insuﬃ  cient if complementary eﬀ orts are 
not made to promote capacity, institutional develop-
ment, and in many cases, fundamental transformation 
to underlying logic and livelihood strategies. Notably 
too, local authorities tended to favor investment in 
discrete, hard measures, while community members 
tended to favor more comprehensive strategies that 
consisted of a mix of hard and soft options.
Lessons and recommendations
Th ere is little practical diﬀ erence between Bolivia’s 
development agenda and the adaptation agenda. Th us, 
there is a need to accelerate the development agenda, 
as in most cases, good development policies are the 
most robust adaptation policies. While the country 
has always experienced a high degree of climate vari-
ability, climate change is expected to intensify the 
phenomenon. Since the Bolivian economy is heav-
ily dependent on minerals and gas, it is not expected 
to be highly impacted by climate change. However, 
the majority of the rural and indigenous populations 
are dependent on agriculture, which in turn is highly 
impacted by changes in climate. Climate change 
therefore will tend to intensify the already severe dis-
tributional problems of the country, thus calling for 
an even stronger people-centered development.
Th e two possible climate trends—warmer and wet-
ter, and warmer and drier—will imply quite diﬀ erent 
outcomes. Even in the more optimistic scenario of 
wetter conditions, agricultural productivity can only 
increase if the capacity to store and use the needed 
additional water is available for farmers and poor 
peasants. Given the great uncertainties about future 
precipitation patterns, strategies that will work well 
under both wet and dry conditions are called for. 
Such a strategy should include a combination of 
improved water resources management and building 
water storage and irrigation infrastructure. Th ese are 
no-regret strategies that should be pursued irrespec-
tive of climate change.
Vietnam44
Vulnerability to climate change
Vietnam is a long narrow country consisting of 
an extensive coastline, two major river deltas, and 
mountainous areas on its eastern and northeastern 
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LOCAL FACTORS INFLUENCE LOCAL ADAPTATION PREFERENCES IN BOLIVIA
The social component in Bolivia identiﬁ ed the very wide variety of envisaged livelihood strategies in fourteen com-
munities and highlighted the importance of past experience and support from local institutions in determining local 
adaptation preferences. More speciﬁ cally, adaptation strategies tended to reﬂ ect the order of priority assigned to 
the same type of adaptation measure in the past. In effect, this shows how preferred adaptation strategies depend 
on the recent history of a particular community. For example, communities that have beneﬁ ted from investments 
in water management schemes that have resulted in safer drinking water do not consider water management for 
improved drinking water as necessary for their future, as they do not view the current system as inadequate. 
The presence or lack of institutions is a second determinant for identifying, prioritizing, and sequencing adaptation 
strategies in Bolivia. Where local authorities and privatized institutions have a history of supporting development, 
community members will count on their continued support and prioritize measures that require external support. 
Where institutions do not have a strong presence, prioritized adaptation options will not be based on major external 
support.
BOX 4
borders. As such, Vietnam is heavily exposed to the 
risks of weather variability and climate change. Its 
vulnerability to weather risks has given the country 
experience in designing and implementing measures 
to mitigate the eﬀ ects of droughts, ﬂ ooding, storms 
and similar events on agriculture and other sectors 
of the economy. Assessing the potential impacts of 
climate change and determining how best to adapt 
represents a new challenge, for which past experience 
may be a guide but which is accompanied by large 
uncertainties.
In June 2009, the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MoNRE) published Vietnam’s oﬃ  cial 
scenario for climate change. Th e MoNRE scenario 
falls in the middle of a range of alternative climate 
scenarios for Vietnam when these are arranged by 
their climate moisture indexes. In addition to the 
MoNRE scenario, the EACC study has made use of 
two other climate scenarios—Dry (IPSL-CM4) and 
Wet (GISS-ER)—which represent the extremes of 
the distribution by climate moisture indexes. 
Rainfall projections across seasons are of particular 
interest. Th e dry seasons are projected to get drier, 
with the March–May rainfall reductions being higher 
in the southern part of the country; the wet seasons 
are projected to get wetter, with the June–August 
rainfall increases being higher in the northern part of 
the country. Hence, it is expected that rainfall will be 
concentrated even more than now in the rainy sea-
son months, leading to an increase in the frequency, 
intensity, and duration of ﬂ oods, and to an exacerba-
tion of drought problems in the dry season. Sea level 
is projected to rise approximately 30 cm by 2050 and 
up to 75 cm by 2100 under the medium scenario. 
An analysis of vulnerability to climate change at the 
regional level was carried out as part of the social 
analysis. Exposure to climate change is assessed by 
considering the numbers of households potentially 
threatened by the eﬀ ects of storms, ﬂ ooding, salinity 
intrusion, sea level rise and storm surges, landslides 
and ﬂ ash ﬂ oods, and drought. Each region is assigned 
to categories ranked from 0 (low exposure) to 4 
(severe exposure). Similarly, sensitivity to the impacts 
of climate is assessed on criteria that reﬂ ect vulner-
ability to the consequences of climate change based 
on speciﬁ c socioeconomic characteristics—poverty, 
economic diversiﬁ cation, education, and health and 
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sanitation—and for speciﬁ c social groups, such as 
ethnic minorities, women and children, migrant pop-
ulations, and urban populations. Again, each region is 
assigned to categories ranked from 0 (low sensitivity) 
to 4 (extreme sensitivity). Unweighted averages of the 
classiﬁ cations were computed to give indices of expo-
sure and sensitivity. Th ese are shown in Table 14.
Th e analysis indicates that exposure to the eﬀ ects 
of climate change is highest in the Central Coastal 
regions (NCC & SCC) and in the Mekong River 
Delta. On the other hand, sensitivity to the eﬀ ects 
of climate change is highest in the North West and 
Central Highland regions. Th e correlation between 
exposure and sensitivity is negative, so that regions 
with high exposure tend to have low sensitivity and 
vice versa. Th e only region with indexes that are 
above the average on both measures is the Mekong 
River Delta.
EACC approach and results
Methodology. Th e sector studies concentrated pri-
marily on Vietnam’s rural economy because that is 
TABLE 14
REGIONAL VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Region
North 
West
North 
East
Red 
River 
Delta
North 
Central 
Coastal
South 
Central 
Coastal
Central 
Highland
South 
East
Mekong 
River 
Delta
Exposure
 Storms 1 3 4 4 4 2 2 3
 Flooding 1 1 4 4 4 2 2 4
 Salinity 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 4
 SLR 0 0 2 2 2 0 3 4
 Landslides 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 1
 Drought 2 2 1 4 4 4 2 2
 Average 1.2 1.5 2.2 3.2 3.2 1.7 1.8 3.0
Sensitivity
 Poverty 4 3 2 4 2 4 1 2
 Economic 
diversiﬁ cation
4 4 2 4 3 4 2 2
 Education 4 3 1 2 2 2 1 3
 Health & sanitation 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 3
 Ethnic minorities 4 3 0 1 1 4 1 2
 Women & children 4 3 1 2 3 3 1 2
 Migrants 0 0 2 2 1 4 4 1
 Urban households 0 0 2 1 1 0 4 3
 Average 3.0 2.1 1.5 2.1 1.8 2.8 1.9 2.3
Source: World Bank 2010i.
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where the eﬀ ects of climate change are likely to be 
most immediate and serious. Detailed studies were 
carried out for agriculture (crop production), aqua-
culture, forestry, and coastal ports. Each of the sec-
tor studies follows a broadly similar approach that 
involved the following steps:
Step 1: Establish a baseline scenario consisting of 
projections of land use, production, value-added, 
population growth, urbanization, and other variables 
without climate change. Th is provides a reference 
scenario against which the impacts of climate change 
without and with adaptation are measured.
Step 2: Consider the relevant climate variables for 
the sector and identify changes projected to 2050 or 
beyond for each of the climate scenarios. Th is made 
use of detailed information on precipitation by season 
and/or region. 
Step 3: Identify the impact of changes in climate on 
resource productivity and land use. Th is included the 
eﬀ ect of changes in seasonal temperatures on rice 
yields or of seasonal precipitation on coﬀ ee yields, as 
well as the eﬀ ect of ﬂ ooding or saline intrusion on the 
amount of land that can be used for rice production 
in the Mekong River Delta.
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Step 4: Using GIS and other techniques, combine 
the information collected in steps 2 & 3 to estimate 
the overall impact of climate change on land use and 
production of crops, freshwater ﬁ sh, timber, and so 
on by comparing estimates of yields and production 
under no climate change and with climate change 
but no adaptation.
Step 4A: For agriculture, incorporate the results from 
Step 4 into a macroeconomic model to assess the 
consequences of changes in agricultural output on 
agricultural prices, trade, GDP, and economic activity 
in other sectors and household consumption.
Step 5: Identify opportunities for (a) autonomous 
adaptation undertaken by farmers and other producers 
in response to changes in climate and other conditions, 
and (b) planned adaptation, which is likely to be initi-
ated and at least partly funded by the government. 
Step 6: Estimate the production of crops, timber, and 
so on under the new climate conditions after the 
adaptation measures have been implemented. Th is 
provides the basis for identifying (a) the eﬀ ect of cli-
mate change with adaptation (the diﬀ erence between 
the baseline scenario and the scenario of climate 
change with adaptation), and (b) the impact of adap-
tation itself (the diﬀ erence between the scenarios of 
climate change without and with adaptation).
Step 6A: As for Step 4A, incorporate the results from 
Step 6 into the macroeconomic model to assess the 
beneﬁ ts of adaptation in terms of aggregate and sec-
toral economic activity and household consumption. 
Many of the adaptation options are “no regrets” 
options that increase yields or production even 
without climate change. Th is is not invariably the 
case, because there is no need to upgrade ports if sea 
level and storm surges do not change. However, for 
agriculture and other sectors it is diﬃ  cult to identify 
measures that are only justiﬁ ed under a speciﬁ c set 
of climate conditions. For these sectors, adaptation 
is often a matter of doing things that would in any 
event have been economic under a wide range of cli-
mate conditions. 
Agriculture. Th e impact of the alternative climate sce-
narios on crop production has been examined using 
projections of runoﬀ , which aﬀ ects the availability 
of irrigation water, plus agronomic models that take 
account of temperature and rainfall patterns, water 
availability for rainfed and irrigated crops, and other 
factors to estimate the impact of climate change on 
crop yields. 
Changes in yields without adaptation vary widely 
across crops, agroecological zones, and climate scenar-
ios. As for other EACC studies, the results reported do 
not take account of CO2 fertilization, partly because 
of the uncertainties about the extent of the eﬀ ect and 
partly to assess how far adaptation can mitigate the 
worst-case outcome. For rice, the Dry scenario would 
lead to reductions in yields ranging from 12 percent 
in the Mekong River Delta to 24 percent in the Red 
River Delta. Th e primary inﬂ uences on rice yields are 
the increase in average temperatures and reductions 
in runoﬀ  in many months of the year (Figure 28). 
Th ere would be more extensive inundation of crop 
land in the rainy season and increased saline intrusion 
in the dry season as a consequence of the combina-
tion of sea level rise and higher river ﬂ ooding. For 
the Mekong River Delta, it is estimated that about 
590,000 ha of rice area could be lost due to inunda-
tion and saline intrusion, which accounts for about 13 
percent of today’s rice production in the region. 
Table 15 shows the potential impact of climate 
change without adaptation under alternative climate 
scenarios on production of six major crops or crop 
categories relative to the baseline for 2050 if there 
were no climate change. Paddy rice production may 
fall by 5.8 (MoNRE) to 9.1 (Dry) million metric tons 
(mmt) per year. 
Note that these ﬁ gures are not forecasts of what 
will actually happen. Farming involves a continuous 
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process of adaptation to weather, technology, eco-
nomic and other inﬂ uences, so adaptation will cer-
tainly occur to a greater or lesser extent in practice. 
Rather, these projections provide a starting point—
based on the best available information and subject 
to substantial uncertainty—for (a) understanding 
the potential importance of climate change for crop 
production, holding other factors constant; and (b) 
assessing the type and scale of adaptation that may be 
required, which will require a combination of autono-
mous adaptation (by farmers) and planned adaptation 
(as a consequence of government policy).
Further, this assessment of the potential impact of 
climate change on crop production needs to be inter-
preted in a larger context. Changes in diets and con-
sumer preferences with falling demand for rice, market 
liberalization, trade (which will expose Vietnam to 
lower-cost competition), and conversion opportun-
ities to aquaculture and more salt-tolerant varieties 
will all have important eﬀ ects on the demand for and 
the supply of agricultural products over the coming 
decades. Th e impacts of climate change have to be 
assessed against a background of wider economic and 
social development. 
TABLE 15
CHANGE IN CROP PRODUCTION IN 2050 DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE WITH NO ADAPTATION
(million metric tons)
Climate scenario Paddy rice Maize Cassava Sugar cane Coff ee Vegetables
Impact Yields Sea level Total Yields Yields Yields Yields Yields
Dry -6.7 -2.4 -9.1 -1.1 -1.9 -3.7 -0.4 -1.7 
Wet -5.8 -2.5 -8.4 -1.0 -2.6 -2.9 -0.4 -3.1 
MoNRE -3.4 -2.4 -5.8 -0.3 -0.6 -1.4 -0.1 -0.9 
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Macroeconomic impacts. As in other country studies, 
a CGE model has been used to examine the mac-
roeconomic impacts of climate change. In Vietnam 
the GCE model was only used to examine the eﬀ ects 
of climate change and adaptation for the agricultural 
sector, so it does not attempt to take account of all of 
the macroeconomic impacts of climate change. Th e 
CGE model establishes a baseline composition of 
economic activity up to 2050 given data and assump-
tions about inter-industry linkages for 158 sectors, 
including regional crop production for the six crops 
examined above, consumption for 10 rural/urban 
household groups, population, investment, and pro-
ductivity growth. Th is is used to simulate the eﬀ ect of 
exogenous “shocks;” that is, deviations from the base-
line scenario such as a reduction in crop production 
due to climate change. Th e model is run assuming that 
the aggregate level of investment and savings remains 
constant in real terms, so that aggregate consump-
tion moves with national income (GDP). Th e model 
takes account of the eﬀ ects of exogenous shocks on 
industry and services, international trade, commodity 
prices, and the distribution of consumption. A broad 
picture of its results may be obtained by examining 
changes in total GDP, aggregate consumption, and 
other variables under the alternative climate scenarios 
in 2050 relative to a baseline with no climate change.
As shown in columns 1–3 of Table 16, total GDP 
and aggregate consumption in 2050 with no adap-
tation will be 2.4 and 2.3 percent lower than the 
baseline under the Dry/Wet scenarios, respectively, 
but only 0.7 percent lower under the MoNRE sce-
nario. Th e reason for the reduction in GDP is the 
decline in agricultural value-added of 13.9/13.5 
percent under the Dry/Wet scenarios, which is 
marginally oﬀ set by small increases in value-added 
in industry and services. Th ere are signiﬁ cant dif-
ferences between the impact of climate change on 
diﬀ erent regions, as illustrated by the estimates for 
changes in regional GDP for the North-Central 
Coast and South-East regions. Th e gain in the 
South-East is a consequence of the concentration 
of industry and services in the region.
Th e impact on household incomes is skewed, with 
greater losses for those in the bottom rural quintile 
(the poorest 20 percent of rural households arranged 
by expenditure per person) than for the top quintile. 
Poor rural and urban households are most vulnerable 
because they rely more heavily on the agricultural 
sector for their incomes and they spend a higher 
proportion of their income on food, which becomes 
relatively more expensive. 
Adaptation in agriculture. Th e study examined a range 
of adaptation options that combine autonomous 
adaptations undertaken by farmers with planned 
adaptation underpinned by government spending 
in areas that will enhance the capacity of farmers to 
adapt. Th e autonomous adaptations include changes 
in sowing dates, switching to drought-tolerant crops, 
adoption of salinity-tolerant varieties of rice, adop-
tion of new varieties for other crops, and switching 
to rice-ﬁ sh rotations. Th e planned adaptations focus 
on (a) increased spending on research, development 
and extension, with the goal of raising average crop 
yields by 13.5 percent relative to the baseline; and (b) 
extending the area of irrigated land by about 688,000 
ha, roughly half for rice and the remainder mainly 
for maize and coﬀ ee. Th e total cost of these measures 
is estimated at about $160 million per year at 2005 
prices without discounting over the period 2010–50. 
Deviations in GDP and other macroeconomic 
variables from the baseline with adaptation for the 
alternative climate scenarios are shown in columns 
4–6 of Table 16, while columns 7–9 give the net ben-
eﬁ ts of adaptation after allowing for the costs that 
are incurred. Th e adaptation measures substantially 
reduce the impact of climate change under all sce-
narios. Th e expenditures on adaptation for agriculture 
are clearly justiﬁ ed as the ratio of their beneﬁ ts to the 
costs that are incurred is much greater than 1. Th e 
combination of the MoNRE scenario with adapta-
tion leads to an increase in aggregate consumption, 
indicating that some, perhaps many, of the adaptation 
measures are “no regrets” options that would be justi-
ﬁ ed even without climate change. 
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TABLE 16
 MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT/WITH ADAPTATION IN 2050 
(Percentage deviations from baseline with no climate change)
No adaptation With adaptation Adaptation beneﬁ ts
Dry Wet MoNRE Dry Wet MoNRE Dry Wet MoNRE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDP -2.4% -2.3% -0.7% -1.1% -0.7% 0.7% 1.3% 1.6% 1.3%
Aggregate consumption -2.5% -2.5% -0.7% -1.4% -0.8% 0.6% 1.1% 1.7% 1.3%
Agricultural value-added -13.9% -13.5% -5.8% -3.8% -3.4% 5.4% 10.0% 10.1% 11.2%
Regional GDP
North Central Coast -6.6% -6.1% -2.6% 0.5% -0.3% 4.8% 7.1% 5.8% 7.4%
South East 1.1% 0.8% 1.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.2% -1.1% 0.3% -0.9%
Rural household consumption
Bottom quintile -6.5% -6.3% -2.6% -1.9% -1.4% 2.4% 4.7% 4.9% 5.0%
Top quintile -1.6% -1.7% -0.4% -1.5% -1.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.4%
An important aspect of adaptation is that it oﬀ sets 
most of the disproportionate impact of climate 
change on poorer households. Th e bottom quintile 
of rural households beneﬁ t most from adaptation, 
and the gap between the changes in household 
consumption for the bottom and top quintiles is 
almost eliminated. Adaptation partly or wholly oﬀ -
sets both the reduction in agricultural incomes and 
the increase in food prices that accompany climate 
change without adaptation. 
Investments in flood and coastal protection were 
not incorporated in the macroeconomic analysis. 
Separate studies have indicated that the costs of 
building/upgrading sea dikes and flood defenses 
to protect urban infrastructure and the most valu-
able agricultural land would be about 1 percent of 
total investment—about $540 million per year at 
2005 prices.
Aquaculture. Aquaculture, especially in the Mekong 
River Delta, is an important source of employment 
and rural income. It is estimated that some 2.8 million 
people are employed in the sector, while export revenue 
is expected to be about $2.8 billion in 2010. Higher 
temperatures, increased frequency of storms, sea level 
rise, and other eﬀ ects of climate change are likely to 
aﬀ ect ﬁ sh physiology and ecology as well as the opera-
tion of aquaculture. Some ﬁ sh species, such as catﬁ sh, 
may grow more rapidly with higher temperatures, but 
be more vulnerable to disease. Th e main impacts of 
climate change on aquaculture seem likely to be a con-
sequence of increased ﬂ ooding and salinity.
Parts of the aquaculture sector, particularly catﬁ sh 
farming, face uncertain economic prospects, particu-
larly as a result of rising prices for feedstuﬀ s and the 
costs of maintaining water quality. Without adapta-
tion, it is likely that climate change will signiﬁ cantly 
reduce the margins that can be earned from the busi-
ness, so that only the most eﬃ  cient farmers who adopt 
best farming practices will survive. Successful adapta-
tion will require a combination of better feed conver-
sion and improvements in marketing, together with 
investments in upgrading dikes to reduce ﬂ ooding 
and salinity intrusion that will beneﬁ t other sectors 
as well as aquaculture. Semi-intensive and intensive 
shrimp producers may incur additional costs of water 
Source: World Bank 2010i.
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pumping to maintain water and salinity levels. Since 
the industry is both capital-intensive and growing 
rapidly, adaptation is likely to be autonomous with 
the costs borne by operators. Th e total cost of adapta-
tion is estimated at an average of $130 million per 
year from 2010–50, which is equivalent to 2.4 percent 
of total costs. 
Forestry. Th e impact of climate change on forests 
is likely to be complex and long term. For natu-
ral forests, the analysis suggests that there will be a 
substantial reduction in the area of land that is suit-
able for humid semi-deciduous forest, which would 
replaced by other forest types. Mangrove forests will 
be aﬀ ected by sea level rise unless they are able to 
migrate inland. Th e area of land under plantation for-
ests with short rotations has increased rapidly over 
the past 20 years. A forestry growth model suggests 
that climate change will increase the variability of 
plantation yields across the country without having a 
major impact on the average yield. Th us, an important 
aspect of adaptation will be to ensure the best match 
between soil, climate, and management practices to 
obtain the highest yields from plantations.
A range of adaptation options was considered. Th e 
key measures identiﬁ ed were (a) changes in land use 
planning to facilitate the migration of mangroves, 
(b) adoption of plantation species and methods of 
silviculture that are more resilient to droughts, (c) 
improvements in pest management, including genetic 
selection and integrated pest control strategies, and 
(d) use of herbicides or biological controls to limit 
the eﬀ ect of exotic weed species on tree growth. Th e 
money costs of adaptation are likely to be modest, but 
the institutional issues may be more diﬃ  cult to deal 
with. 
Coastal ports. Along its 3,200km coastline, Vietnam 
has a total of 116 ports. In addition, new terminals are 
being constructed and planned all along the coastline, 
particularly in the south around Ho Chi Minh City 
and in the north around Hai Phong. Given the nature 
of its location, this infrastructure is at risk from sea-
level rise and storm surges. Impacts include acceler-
ated depreciation of structures and ﬂ ooding of port 
facilities such as warehouses.
Adaptation options examined in the study include (a) 
raising quay walls, (b) improving surface drainage to 
reduce ﬂ ooding, and (c) increasing expenditure on the 
maintenance and replacement of port infrastructure. 
Th e cost of adaptation for all ports would be less than 
$500 million, or about $12 million per year without 
discounting at 2005 prices. 
Social analysis. To this point, government policies 
have focused on sector-wide assessments for the 
whole country and on “hard” adaptation measures—
sea dikes, reinforced infrastructure, and durable 
buildings. Little attention has been paid to “soft” 
adaptation measures, like increasing institutional 
capacity or the role of collective action and social 
capital in building resilience. Most adaptation 
options identiﬁ ed at the ﬁ eld sites and during par-
ticipatory scenario development workshops were 
aimed at improving response capacity and disaster 
risk reduction—forecasting, weather monitoring—
and managing climate risk. Notably, adaptation 
options that reduce poverty and increase household 
resilience or that integrate climate change into 
development planning were not emphasized. 
Overall, many of the adaptation options observed 
at the field sites and/or proposed in workshops 
were highly cost-effective and do not require large 
expenditures. Moreover, they were largely in line 
with the adaptation options considered for the cli-
mate scenarios in the sector analyses. These adap-
tation measures included shifting planting dates, 
adopting drought-tolerant crops, and switching 
to salinity-tolerant varieties of rice. The diversity 
of preferred adaptation responses reflected the 
impressive variety of Vietnam’s vulnerability zones 
and confirm the need for a mix of both autono-
mous and planned adaptation, a mix of hard and 
soft options, and adaptation to be carried out at 
the national, subnational, and community levels.
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Lessons and recommendations
Climate change will have a signiﬁ cant impact on 
some regions and sectors of Vietnam’s rural economy. 
Still, in macroeconomic terms the impacts of climate 
change on agriculture and related sectors, even with 
no adaptation, appear to be relatively modest. In prac-
tice, there will be substantial autonomous adaptation 
even without active government intervention, since 
farmers will change the crops and crop varieties they 
grow and their methods of farming.
Th e major concern is the extent to which climate 
change will hit poor households, partly because of the 
decline in agricultural incomes and partly because of 
an increase in food prices relative to the general cost 
of living. Th e lowest 20 percent of households—either 
urban or rural—arranged by household expenditure 
per person will experience larger reductions in real 
standards of living due to climate change than the 
top 20 percent of households. 
Th us, the primary focus of policies to adapt to climate 
change should be to protect the poor, the vulnerable, 
and those least able to respond to changing climatic 
stresses. Th e goal should be to provide farmers and 
others with the tools and resources that will enable 
them to respond to climate change itself and to the 
new risks that will accompany climate change. Th e 
key elements will be: 
Increased expenditures on research, development,  
and extension for crop production, aquaculture, 
and forestry to develop new crop varieties that are 
more tolerant to drought, salinity, and higher tem-
peratures early in the growing season. Both the 
public and the private sectors should be involved 
in eﬀ orts to increase yields and productivity.
Investment in expanding irrigation infrastruc- 
ture, especially in the central regions where the 
opportunities for irrigation expansion are great-
est. In the short term, this should build upon 
achieving fuller utilization of existing irrigation 
infrastructure and improvements in operations 
and maintenance. 
Increased spending on the maintenance and  
extension of coastal and ﬂ ood defenses to mini-
mize the impacts of sea inundations, salinity 
intrusion, and river ﬂ ooding, especially in the 
Mekong River and Red River deltas.
Much of these expenditures would be justiﬁ ed even 
without climate change, so adaptation to climate change 
is primarily a matter of building upon no-regrets mea-
sures. Under the intermediate MoNRE climate sce-
nario, the program of agricultural adaptation outlined in 
this study will increase agricultural incomes relative to 
the baseline, especially in the Central Highlands region, 
illustrating the general beneﬁ ts of the strategy.
If this program of adaptation were to be imple-
mented, the adverse impacts of climate change on 
poorer households would largely be avoided. Th ere 
would still be a net loss of agricultural value-added 
and aggregate consumption in the Wet and Dry cli-
mate scenarios, but the magnitude of the losses would 
be signiﬁ cantly smaller and the skewed impact on the 
distribution of income would be corrected. 
Year-to-year weather variability is much greater than 
the long-term trends associated with climate change. 
Policies and systems that can cope eﬀ ectively with 
weather variability will be more successful in adapt-
ing to future climate change than those that cannot. 
Strengthening the capacity of the rural sector to cope 
with current weather variability and build resilience 
into such systems will yield beneﬁ ts both now and in 
the future. It is also important to collect, analyze, and 
report data on how the climate is changing in dif-
ferent regions of the country, so that those who have 
to take account of climate change in planning new 
infrastructure or implementing investment programs 
should have access to the best possible information. 
Climate change, including sea level rise, will aﬀ ect the 
country’s infrastructure and require expenditures on 
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adaptation. Th e case study of coastal ports indicated 
the lesson that the costs of adaptation are likely to be 
modest. Th e total cost of protecting existing ports that 
are exposed to ﬂ ooding—as a result of higher sea level 
combined with greater storm surges—is estimated 
at no more than $500 million in total over 40 years, 
equivalent to $12.5 million per year (at 2005 prices 
without discounting), or about 1 percent of planned 
investment in ports over the period 2010–30. 
An equally important lesson from the case study is 
that it is essential to plan ahead for climate change. 
Ports that are built over the next 10–20 years should 
be designed to cope with sea levels and storms to 
which they may be exposed 50 or more years from 
now. It may be cheaper to build margins of resilience 
and safety into new infrastructure than to upgrade 
assets during the course of their life. Th e same lesson 
emerges from the countrywide analyses for infra-
structure and coastal protection undertaken as part of 
the EACC Global study. Th e total cost of adaptation 
for these sectors amounts to about 2 percent of total 
investment for the Global Wet (NCAR) scenario and 
about 1.3 percent of total investment for the Global 
Dry (CSIRO) scenario on the assumption that adap-
tation measures are combined with new investments 
anticipating climate change up to 2100.
Samoa45
Vulnerability to climate change
Samoa is a country at extreme risk from a variety of 
natural disasters, including tropical cyclones and tsu-
namis caused by earthquakes. In addition, it is subject 
to inter-annual climate ﬂ uctuations associated with 
El Niño (ENSO), which aﬀ ect precipitation as well 
as air and sea temperatures. Periods of drought in the 
islands have been linked to the ENSO. Th ere is no 
simple association between increases in mean surface 
temperature and the frequency of tropical cyclones, 
partly because of the strong inﬂ uence of ENSO cycles 
on tropical storms in the Paciﬁ c and partly because 
climate models have diﬃ  culty in simulating tropical 
storm activity (IWTC 2006). Still, many climate sci-
entists believe that climate change will lead to some 
increase in the intensity of tropical cyclones—an 
increase of 3–5 percent in peak wind speed per 1°C 
rise in sea surface temperature—accompanied by 
greater variability of rainfall with more frequent epi-
sodes of very heavy rainfall and drought. 
Approximately 70 percent of the population of 
Samoa lives in low-lying areas, which would be 
vulnerable to inundation as a consequence of the 
combined eﬀ ects of sea level rise, more severe storm 
surges, and ﬂ ooding caused by heavier rainfall. As an 
illustration of the risks, two major cyclones (Ofa and 
Val) hit or passed near to one of the two main islands 
in 1990–91, damaging a majority of buildings and 
causing a total economic loss including asset damage 
and the capitalized value of lost GDP of about $550 
million at 2005 prices, equivalent to about 3.75 times 
GDP in 1990. While these events were considered to 
be unprecedented within the previous 100 years, an 
increase in the probability of such large losses from 
1-in-100 years to 1-in-50 years or even 1-in-25 years 
would clearly be very signiﬁ cant.
EACC approach and results
Th e EACC study focuses on the impact of, and 
adaptation to, a shift in the probability distribution 
of tropical storms aﬀ ecting the islands. Th e severity 
of such storms is measured by their peak wind speed 
over a period of 10 minutes. Wind speed is associated 
directly with the amount of wind damage caused by 
a storm. Further, it serves as a proxy for the intensity 
of precipitation and the height of storm surges, which 
are associated with ﬂ ood damage in coastal and non-
coastal zones. Since storms that hit the islands and 
cause signiﬁ cant damage are infrequent events, the 
analysis examines how climate change will aﬀ ect the 
expected annual value of storm damage expressed as 
a percentage of GDP under the alternative climate 
scenarios. Th e extent of such damage depends upon 
a combination of (a) the resilience to storm dam-
age that is designed into buildings and other assets, 
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and (b) other measures to reduce the vulnerability of 
communities to ﬂ ooding and wind damage. 
Th e study divided Samoa into four economic regions 
(Figure 29). North Upolu has a population of about 
110,000, while the populations of the other regions 
fall between 17,000 and 28,000. Table 17 shows base-
line values and changes in precipitation over diﬀ er-
ent periods—the whole year, the rainy season from 
November to April, and the main cyclone season from 
December to February—and mean temperatures by 
region derived from the Global Wet (NCAR) and 
Global Dry (CSIRO) scenarios. Th e rise in mean 
temperature is consistent across regions and falls in 
the range of 0.8 to 1°C for the two climate scenarios. 
However, total precipitation declines marginally in 
three out of four regions under the NCAR scenario, 
but increases signiﬁ cantly in the CSIRO scenario. 
For all regions and both scenarios, precipitation tends 
to increase during the months of November, March, 
and April, leading to the likelihood that the length 
of the main cyclone season will increase. Because 
the impact of climate change on the intensity of the 
worst cyclones is uncertain, the analysis examined the 
eﬀ ect of an increase in the peak wind speed for a 1 in 
100 year storm in a range from 4 percent (low) to 8 
percent (high) for 2050, and from 10 percent (low) to 
25 percent (high) for 2100. In addition, the extent of 
potential damage caused by ﬂ ooding at other times 
was linked to changes in the amount of precipitation 
during the rainy season, using the NCAR climate 
scenario as the low scenario and the CSIRO climate 
scenario as the high scenario. 
Th e data available for Samoa cannot sustain a con-
ventional CGE model, so a simple macro model of 
climate and economic growth has been used to exam-
ine the eﬀ ects of climate change on the economy. To 
maintain the baseline level of economic growth, this 
assumes that changes in the expected value of damage 
REGIONS OF SAMOA USED IN THE CLIMATE-ECONOMY MODEL
FIGURE 29
Source: World Bank 2010h.
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TABLE 17
DEVIATIONS IN PRECIPITATION AND TEMPERATURE IN 2050 BY CLIMATE SCENARIO
Scenario Region Baseline values for NoCC Deviations in 2050 relative to NoCC
Total 
precipit.
Precipit. 
Dec-Feb
Precipit. 
Nov-Apr
Mean 
temperat.
Total 
precipit.
Precipit. 
Dec-Feb
Precipit. 
Nov-Apr
Mean 
temperat.
mm mm mm °C mm Mm mm °C
NCAR Savai’I N 2,958 1,062 1,921 26.87 -17 -39 5 0.99 
NCAR Savai’i S. 3,002 1,107 1,971 26.86 -19 -41 3 0.99 
NCAR Upolu N. 3,048 1,154 2,024 26.83 -21 -42 0 0.99 
NCAR Upolu S. 2,929 1,090 1,942 26.67 106 -8 118 0.97 
CSIRO Savai’i N 2,958 1,062 1,921 26.87 277 43 197 0.81 
CSIRO Savai’i S. 3,002 1,107 1,971 26.86 343 65 215 0.83 
CSIRO Upolu N. 3,048 1,154 2,024 26.83 344 68 218 0.83 
CSIRO Upolu S. 2,929 1,090 1,942 26.67 335 66 213 0.83 
Note: NoCC=no climate change.
caused by storms fall on total consumption, so that 
the economic impact of climate change is measured 
by the changes in the present value (discounted at 5 
percent) of consumption over the period 2010–50 
relative to the no climate change (NoCC) baseline.
Impacts. Th e gross economic losses under two sce-
narios of low and high impact when there is climate 
change without adaptation are shown in Columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 18. Th e impact of climate change 
under the high-impact scenario amounts to $212 
million at 2005 prices in present value terms. On an 
annualized basis, this is equivalent to $12.1 million at 
2005 prices per year, or 1.3 percent of total GDP in 
the baseline scenario.
Th ere is one sphere in which the impacts of climate 
change may be smaller than is often assumed. Agri-
culture provides the main source of employment for 
about one-third of the labor force, but it represents 
a small and declining share of GDP—about 6 per-
cent for agriculture in 2008. Variations in the ENSO 
cycle have had a statistically signiﬁ cant impact on 
taro production and agricultural imports. Even so, 
non-climate factors—for example, the taro blight in 
the 1990s—are more important sources of risk for 
agricultural incomes than climate change. Managing 
non-climate risks better will also reduce the potential 
impact of future climate variability on agricultural 
incomes.  
Adaptation. Th e key form of adaptation is the imple-
mentation of design standards to ensure that buildings 
and other assets can cope with higher winds and more 
intense precipitation without damage. Th e eﬀ ective-
ness of this approach can be illustrated by analysis of 
the damage caused by Cyclone Heta in 2004. Th is was 
approximately a 1-in-11 year event with a peak wind 
speed of 110 kph, but it caused very limited economic 
damage. Had design standards in force in 2004 been 
similar to those in 1990–91, when Cyclones Ofa and 
Val hit the country, the economic loss would have been 
much higher at 35–40 percent of GDP. Th e reduction 
in potential damage was a consequence of changes in 
design standards and other measures that increased 
the eﬀ ective threshold for storm damage from 1-in-5 
year events (a peak wind speed of 90 kph) to 1-in-10 
year events (a peak wind speed of 108 kph). Th e esti-
mates of net economic losses with adaptation in Table 
18 assume that the current standard of a 1-in-10 year 
Source: World Bank 2010h.
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TABLE 18
LOSSES DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT AND WITH ADAPTATION
Gross losses without 
adaptation
Net losses with 
adaptation
Net beneﬁ ts of 
adaptation
NCAR CSIRO NCAR CSIRO NCAR CSIRO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Present value @ 5%, $ million 103.9 212.4 4.5 5.4 99.4 207.0 
Annualized equivalent, $ million per year 5.9 12.1 0.3 0.3 5.6 11.8
Loss/beneﬁ t as % of baseline GDP 0.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3
storm is applied in estimating the costs of adaptation 
and the residual damage after adaptation.
However, analysis carried out for the EACC global 
study indicates that the beneﬁ ts of strengthening 
buildings and infrastructure to withstand the wind 
and precipitation associated with a 1-in-50 year storm 
(peak wind speed ~ 148 kph) would exceed the costs 
involved by a large margin even under an assumption 
of no climate change. Th e present value of adopting 
the stricter design standard as a consequence of a lower 
expected value of storm damage would exceed $275 
million after allowing for the additional costs of con-
struction. Th is would be a “no regrets” form of adap-
tation, because it would greatly reduce the economic 
impact of climate change under any climate scenario. 
With a 1-in-50 year standard, the present value of 
gross losses from climate change would fall from $212 
million to $37 million for the high climate scenario. 
Further spending on adaptation to protect against 
1-in-50 year storms up to 2100 under the high sce-
nario (peak wind speed ~ 184 kph) would also pass a 
cost-beneﬁ t test. Th e estimates of net economic losses 
with adaptation in Table 18 assume that a standard of a 
1-in-50 year storm is applied in estimating the costs of 
adaptation and the residual damage after adaptation.
For agriculture the key element of an adaptation 
strategy is to increase expenditures on research, 
development, and advisory services so as to mitigate 
the higher risks that are likely to be associated with 
Source: World Bank 2010h.
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climate change. Again, this is building upon policies 
that would form part of a sound development strategy. 
Samoan agriculture was hit hard by the taro blight in 
the mid-1990s, which devastated taro production and 
eliminated export revenues from taro for nearly 15 
years. Vulnerability to disease, pests, and storm dam-
age means that diversiﬁ cation of both crop varieties 
and crops is an important element in any policy to 
limit the impact of these risks on agricultural house-
holds. Since climate change is likely to reinforce 
these risks, the appropriate level of expenditure will 
be higher to reﬂ ect the greater value placed on risk 
reduction.
Other adaptation measures, largely drawn from 
NAPA, were considered in each of the regions. It is 
assumed that adaptation measures are only imple-
mented in a particular region when or if the resulting 
reduction in the expected value of economic losses 
due to climate change exceeds the annualized cost of 
the adaptation measures. Th is is a simple cost-beneﬁ t 
test designed to optimize the timing of expenditures 
on adaptation.
Coastal zone infrastructure  . Th ese include the con-
struction of sea dikes to protect infrastructure 
along vulnerable parts of the coast or the reloca-
tion of key assets such as roads or schools out of 
potential ﬂ ood zones. Measures to encourage vil-
lages to relocate away from ﬂ ood zones entirely, 
such as extending the national power grid and 
building new roads, were also included. Th is 
approach is being applied in parts of the south 
coast of Upolu in response to the 2009 tsunami. 
Th e largest costs are associated with the reloca-
tion of utility infrastructure (power, roads, water 
reticulation, water treatment and telecommunica-
tions) for a village—estimated at $32 million—
but the initial investment is expected to be partly 
oﬀ set by greater income from tourism, planta-
tions, and other activities.
Water supply.   Ensuring better access to good qual-
ity water for communities was the main priority 
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in the NAPA. Th is is an example of the overlap 
between development priorities and adaptation 
to climate change. Th ere is little doubt that mea-
sures such as decreasing leaks in the reticulated 
water supply, improvements in catchment man-
agement, and better water treatment at the source 
are justiﬁ ed even without climate change.
Tourism.   Adaptation in tourism focuses on the 
provision of niche tourist facilities, including 
inland (rain-forest) resorts that are away from 
the coast. 
Food security.   Th is includes improvements in the 
operation of existing plantations, the promotion 
of village based micro-enterprises, research into 
crop changes, and sustainable ﬁ shing. 
Urban development  . Th is is particularly important 
in Upolu North, where a better approach to plan-
ning land use and urban development is needed. 
In view of the vulnerability of urban infrastruc-
ture to storm damage, adaptation must focus on 
enhancing the resilience of the key commercial 
and economic zones to extreme weather shocks.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 18 show the net economic 
losses due to climate change with adaptation, allow-
ing for the cost of implementing the adaptation 
measures. Th e net beneﬁ ts of adaptation are shown 
in columns 5 and 6. Th ey amount to $99 million at 
2005 prices for the low scenario and $207 million for 
the high scenario. 
Adaptation measures involving the adoption of more 
stringent design standards are clearly justiﬁ ed, even in 
the low scenario for which the gross losses due to cli-
mate change are relatively small. However, under the 
low scenario the other adaptation measures outlined 
above do not reduce climate losses by a suﬃ  cient mar-
gin to cover their costs, though they may be warranted 
for other reasons. Under the high scenario, these adap-
tation measures should be implemented in the period 
2025–29 in both Savai’i North & Savai’i South and in 
the period 2030–35 in Upolu North, but not before 
2050 in Upolu South. Again, several of the adaptation 
measures —for example, moving coastal infrastructure 
in Upolu South and improving water supply—would 
be justiﬁ ed for non-climate reasons.
Table 19 shows the composition of adaptation costs 
by category and decade. Most of the cost of adapta-
tion for housing will fall upon households. Th is may 
be regarded as a form of autonomous adaptation, so 
the table shows the total cost of adaptation including 
and excluding housing. Th e main costs are incurred 
for housing, municipal infrastructure—which covers 
public buildings and storm water drainage—and agri-
culture and ﬁ sheries. When expressed as a percentage 
of the cost of providing the relevant services in the 
baseline scenario, the average increases vary from 1 
percent of baseline costs for electricity and telecom to 
6 percent for housing. As might be expected, the bur-
den of adaptation rises over time as the probability 
distribution of severe storms shifts. Over the whole 
period from 2010 to 2050, the increase is 3.5 percent 
for infrastructure excluding housing, and 4.1 percent 
including housing. 
Local-level perspectives on adaptation. Th e EACC 
study did not carry out a social assessment of cli-
mate change in Samoa. Nonetheless, the country has 
started to address the potential impacts of a greater 
frequency and intensity of cyclones through a com-
bination of stronger institutions, better governance, 
and robust planning. Th is will underpin a variety of 
soft adaptation actions, such as re-orienting coastal 
infrastructure management and developing commu-
nity disaster plans. 
Samoa’s cultural context is an important factor when 
selecting adaptation measures. Th e traditional model 
of community decision making is by consensus under 
the leadership of the matai (chief ). Th e authority of 
a village matai and customary land ownership rights 
are respected, so negotiations between the govern-
ment and village matai can often take a long time. 
Th ere is a commitment to supporting village-based 
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TABLE 19
AVERAGE ADAPTATION COSTS BY DECADE, HIGH SCENARIO, 2005 $ MILLION/YEAR, 
NO DISCOUNTING
2010–19 2020–29 2030–39 2040–49
Agriculture & ﬁ sheries 0.99 1.47 2.03 2.66
Coastal protection 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Education & health 0.13 0.18 0.30 0.44
Electricity & telecom 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.20
Housing 0.55 1.07 1.93 3.16
Municipal 0.86 1.39 2.22 2.98
Other transport 0.08 0.13 0.22 0.36
Roads 0.52 0.68 0.82 0.93
Water & sewer 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10
Total 3.26 5.11 7.78 10.86
Total excl housing 2.71 4.04 5.85 7.70
consultations that include women and youth. Raising 
awareness of climate change and other development 
concerns through village-based consultation is an 
eﬀ ective and sustainable way of supporting the tradi-
tional decision-making model. Nevertheless, women 
and migrants in the poorer communities remain 
among the most vulnerable groups in the community. 
Stakeholders at workshops held during the prepara-
tion of the NAPA identiﬁ ed the following areas as 
critical to a strategy for adapting to climate change: 
the protection of community water supplies, early 
warning systems, support for agriculture and for-
estry sectors, implementation of coastal infrastruc-
ture management plans, and integrated catchment 
management.
Lessons and Recommendations
Samoa is a small island nation with most of its popu-
lation and infrastructure located along the coast, so it 
is highly vulnerable to extreme weather events. How-
ever, Samoa is also among the more climate-resilient 
Paciﬁ c Island countries, and there is much to learn 
from the way it is approaching climate change and 
related development issues. Over the last decade it 
has focused on increasing the capacity of its institu-
tions, which are necessary for the implementation 
of soft approaches to adaptation, including land-use 
controls and coastal infrastructure management.
One key lesson is that extreme weather variability  
in the coastal zone will involve signiﬁ cant costs 
for either investments in coastal protection or the 
relocation of assets. In the longer term, the relo-
cation of assets—or, even whole villages—may be 
the best option as it can shift economic activity 
such as tourism, crops, and other businesses away 
from the coast.
Th e uncertainty about climate outcomes and lack  
of baseline data has led to a focus on the col-
lection of information in Samoa. More eﬀ ort is 
needed to support the collection and analysis of 
this information and use of the information to 
inform decision making. 
Good development policies are a foundation  
for climate change adaptation. Th e participatory 
Source: World Bank 2010h.
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consultations undertaken across the country in 
developing plans for managing coastal infrastruc-
ture are continuing with a focus on other develop-
ment and adaptation issues.
Th e analysis suggests that the country should  
consider, as a good development policy even in 
the absence of climate change, the adoption of 
design standards that would enable buildings and 
infrastructure assets to cope with 1-in-50 year 
storms under historical climate conditions with-
out signiﬁ cant damage. Th is would imply that 
buildings and infrastructure should be designed 
to withstand storms with a peak wind speed of 
up to 148 kph. Such a policy is a “no regrets” form 
of adaptation whose beneﬁ ts exceed its costs even 
without climate change, but will yield even larger 
beneﬁ ts if climate change leads to more intense 
storms in future.
Going beyond “no regrets” adaptation, the key  
measure identiﬁ ed in the study is the adoption of 
design standards that will enable buildings and 
other assets to cope with storms with higher peak 
wind speeds and associated precipitation look-
ing forward to 2100 under alternative climate 
scenarios. Retaining the 1-in-50 year criterion 
would mean buildings and infrastructure should 
be designed to withstand storms with a peak wind 
speed up to 184 kph under the worst climate sce-
nario. Under this strategy, the expected losses 
from climate change would be greatly reduced.
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Extracting robust general conclusions across diverse 
countries with respect to an uncertain and broad 
phenomenon like climate change is a perilous task. 
Too much generality leads to banal and potentially 
uninformative conclusions. Excessive speciﬁ city is 
unhelpful as a basis for useful generalizations. We have 
attempted to strike an appropriate balance. Th e recom-
mendations follow from the lessons of the country and 
global exercises. 
The costs of adapting to climate change
Past and prospective future emissions mean that some 
amount of climate change is inevitable over the next cen-
tury, even though the extent and nature of the changes 
are uncertain. Adapting to a climate that is about 2°C 
warmer will be costly, but our country studies show that 
the impacts of climate change without adaptation will 
be much more costly. Th e study puts the cost of adapting 
to climate change at an average of $70 billion to $100 
billion a year at 2005 prices between 2010 and 2050. Th e 
cost amounts to 0.2 percent of projected GDP for all 
developing countries in the current decade and falls to 
about 0.12 percent of projected GDP for 2040–49. Th is 
cost is large when compared to current levels of devel-
opment aid, as $100 billion is 80 percent of the total 
disbursement of ODA in 2008. 
Th e averages across all developing countries hide a 
very uneven distribution of the burden of adaptation 
across regions as well as decades. Our estimates of 
the overall cost of adaptation are 0.6–0.7 percent of 
GDP for the Sub-Saharan Africa region in 2010–19, 
falling to about 0.5 percent of GDP in 2040––49. 
In contrast, the equivalent ﬁ gures for the East Asia 
and Paciﬁ c region are 0.13–0.19 percent in 2010–19 
and about 0.07 percent in 2040–49. Apart from Sub-
Saharan Africa, the regions facing high relative costs 
of adaptation are the Latin America and Caribbean 
region and (under the dry climate scenario) the South 
Asia region.
Th e absolute costs of adaptation increase over time 
and will certainly continue to increase after 2050. Our 
projections suggest that real GDP will increase more 
rapidly than the costs of adaptation during the next 
four decades, even on quite conservative assumptions 
about growth in GDP per person. However, it would 
be unsafe to assume that this trend will continue into 
the second half of the current century. 
Lessons
LESSON 1: 
The cost of developing countries to adapt to climate 
change between 2010 and 2050 is estimated at $70 
billion to $100 billion a year at 2005 prices. This 
amounts to about “only” 0.2 percent of the projected 
GDP of all developing countries in the current decade, 
and at the same time to as much as 80 percent of total 
disbursement of ODA in 2008.
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In a few of the country studies—Bangladesh, Samoa 
and Vietnam—it was possible to make limited com-
parisons between adaptation costs estimated in the 
global analysis and in the country study. Where like 
could be compared with like, the separate estimates 
were in reasonable agreement. However, the analysis 
suggested that the costs of strengthening infrastruc-
ture to provide resilience against the wind damage, 
precipitation and ﬂ ooding caused by infrequent 
but severe tropical storms could increase the overall 
cost of adaptation by 10-20% under the worst sce-
nario relative to the global estimates for countries 
that are most exposed to such storms. Th is cannot 
be directly linked to any particular climate scenario, 
since the worst storm scenario depends upon (a) how 
ocean temperatures respond to climate change, and 
(b) changes in the tail of the distribution of extreme 
weather events. Th is adjustment does not alter the 
overall range of adaptation costs, since the countries 
aﬀ ected account while the range is based on estimates 
with a strong upward bias. 
On the other hand, the analysis in the Ethiopia 
country study suggests that cross-sectoral eﬀ ects of 
adaptation measures (not considered under the global 
track) could increase the overall costs of adaptation. 
It is hard to generalize from the one country case to 
estimate the extent of bias, but it is important that 
future research explore this bias which reﬂ ects the 
opportunity cost or forgone beneﬁ ts from allocating 
resources to adaptation measures instead of allocating 
them to other development initiatives.
Economic development and adaption to 
climate change
Th e link between economic development and adapta-
tion to climate change is fundamental.
Economic development is the most basic and cost- 
eﬀ ective method of adaptation, provided that it is 
properly managed. Richer countries are more resil-
ient to weather variability. Economic development 
brings changes in economic activities that reduce 
vulnerability to climate, both in aggregate and for 
the poor when their interests are built into devel-
opment strategies. 
Economic development generates both the  
resources and opportunities to adapt to climate 
change at a relatively low cost by ensuring that 
the design and location of new infrastructure, 
buildings, and other assets take account of the 
eﬀ ects of climate change on their performance.
Our country studies show that a failure to adapt  
to climate change may lead to very large weather-
related losses, both in terms of the destruction 
of infrastructure and foregone opportunities for 
future growth. In Ethiopia, for example, robust 
growth based on infrastructure investment is the 
ﬁ rst line of defense against climate change impacts. 
At the same time the design of new infrastructure 
must take account of future weather stresses and 
existing infrastructure must be upgraded and/or 
replaced where it cannot cope with such stresses.
Bangladesh, Ghana, Mozambique and Vietnam rely 
upon large rivers that are aﬀ ected by the investment 
and operational decisions made by upstream riparian 
countries.  Such decisions determine the availability 
of water resources for irrigation, hydro-power and 
other uses as well as vulnerability to ﬂ ooding. For 
example, Vietnam’s capacity to respond to climate 
change will, in part, depend upon upstream develop-
ments in the Mekong River basin, but this will also 
aﬀ ect investments in and the management of irriga-
tion and aquaculture even without climate change. 
More extensive and eﬀ ective cooperation between 
the countries that share international river basins 
will be crucial both for economic development and 
for adaptation to climate change.
Th e existing management of water resources and irri-
gation systems was highlighted as a key issue for both 
development and adaptation in the country studies 
for Bolivia, Samoa and Vietnam. In these studies, 
access to and the availability of water for public water 
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supply and irrigation systems were identiﬁ ed as key 
concerns in the social vulnerability studies and for 
the economic impact of climate change. Th ese studies 
identiﬁ ed a combination of more investment in and 
better management of existing water infrastructure as 
yielding immediate development beneﬁ ts as well as 
enabling communities to adapt more easily to a range 
of future climate scenarios.
Another example of the overlap between development 
and adaptation concerns autonomous adaptation in 
agriculture in countries such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Vietnam. Th e dissemination and 
adoption of improved agricultural practices including 
drought-resistant crop varieties, fertiliser use and bet-
ter water management will be critical for maintaining 
agricultural production and incomes under diﬀ erent 
climate scenarios. But, equally, enhancing the capacity 
of small farmers to take advantage of more produc-
tive agricultural technologies is crucial for economic 
development under any scenario. Th is would include 
crop insurance and other mechanisms for redistribut-
ing the risks of weather and other agricultural risks 
with or without climate change. 
LESSON 2: 
Economic development is a central element of adapta-
tion to climate change, but it should not be business 
as usual. 
Countries that reach the middle of the 21st century 
with large shares of their populations engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, with substantial illiteracy, and 
with lethargic and/or inept institutions will be par-
ticularly vulnerable to the eﬀ ects of climate change. 
Rapid development leads to a more ﬂ exible and 
resilient society, so that building human and social 
capital—including education, social protection, and 
health and skills training—are crucial to adaptation. 
In all case-study countries, the burden of existing climate 
variability is especially heavy in areas that have high con-
centrations of poor and socially vulnerable populations. 
Climate change exacerbates this pattern. For example, 
the rural poor in the southern region of Bangladesh are 
expected to face the largest declines in per capita con-
sumption, as well as declining productivity of subsistence 
crops and land losses due to increased salinity brought 
forth by sea level rise. Th e Vietnam study suggested that 
the impact of climate change falls disproportionately on 
households in the lowest quintiles of the rural and urban 
income distributions. Adaptation through agricultural 
improvement and expansion of irrigation largely oﬀ set 
this impact and may reduce inequality relative to the 
outcome with no climate change.
Rapid urban growth will be a key aspect of economic 
development in countries such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, 
Ghana and Mozambique. Some of the country stud-
ies examined investment in human capital as part of 
strategies to adapt to climate change. Under most cli-
mate scenarios, expenditure on equipping rural pop-
ulations and urban migrants with better education 
and market-driven skills is a cost-eﬀ ective response 
to climate change. At the same time, these country 
studies highlighted the risk that the growth of cit-
ies will expose more people to the consequences of 
poor urban management, such as ﬂ ooding and lack of 
sanitation, that are likely to be exacerbated by climate 
change unless appropriate social and physical infra-
structure is put in place.
LESSON 3: 
Invest in human capital, develop competent and 
ﬂ exible institutions, focus on weather resilience 
and adaptive capacity, and tackle the root causes of 
poverty. Eliminating poverty is central to both devel-
opment and adaptation, since poverty exacerbates 
vulnerability to weather variability as well as climate 
change.  
Climate uncertainty: the need for robust 
strategies 
Th e fundamental problem of making public policy in 
the face of climate change is one of uncertainty with 
regard to both climate outcomes and longer term 
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projections of social and economic development. 
Even though the uncertainties regarding the socio-
economic projections are more frequently discussed 
in the context of broader development planning, they 
should not be entirely shadowed by climate uncer-
tainties. In Bangladesh, for example, the number of 
people living in cities by 2050 is expected to triple, 
while the rural population falls by 30 percent. Current 
policies will determine where this urban population 
settles and how prepared it is to adapt to a changed 
climate. Adaptation decisions to be made now can 
prove to be signiﬁ cantly wrong, and thus costly, if 
such socioeconomic projections end up being wrong.
In terms of climate outcomes, such uncertainty is 
particularly large for patterns of precipitation. Some 
of the country studies have highlighted crucial dif-
ferences between alternative wet and dry scenarios 
and their eﬀ ects on agricultural production, water 
resources, and transport infrastructure. Th is uncer-
tainty about the underlying trends in climate variables 
is exacerbated by the expectation that the variability 
of weather indicators around climate averages will 
increase, making it even more diﬃ  cult to reach reli-
able conclusions on what is weather variability and 
what are climate trends. 
Th e general economic equilibrium analyses in Ethio-
pia, for example, suggested that the cost of adapta-
tion varies by a factor of 3, depending on the climate 
scenario considered. Th us the cost of selecting the 
“wrong” strategy may be considerable. Under these 
circumstances, the value of reducing uncertainty 
about future climate outcomes is extremely high, since 
it would help better deﬁ ne what kinds of adaptation 
(viewed as a form of insurance) are most appropri-
ate. It also follows that making investment decisions 
based on any one climate scenario is no more justi-
ﬁ ed than basing it on another. Attempting to hedge 
against most or all climate outcomes obviously may 
raise the cost of adaptation very substantially. 
It also follows from this analysis that countries 
should want to delay adaptation decisions as much as 
possible and focus on low-regret actions, while await-
ing greater certainty about climate and socioeco-
nomic scenarios. Low-regret actions are those actions 
that are robust under most climate scenarios. Th ey 
are typically policies or investments that can be identi-
ﬁ ed as priorities for development even without climate 
change. Our country studies included a number of 
these strategies. For example, investments to expand 
the road system and increase the share of paved roads 
in Africa yield high returns by lowering transport 
costs and expanding markets. At the same time they 
lessen the impact of ﬂ oods and enhance the ability of 
farmers to respond to changes in agricultural com-
parative advantage. Similarly, better management of 
water resources; improved access to extension ser-
vices, fertilizers, and improved seed varieties; and 
better climate and weather forecasting will enhance 
the resilience of agriculture, both to droughts, and to 
waterlogging caused by ﬂ oods.
Apart from promoting these low-regret measures, 
which include many “soft” adaptation alternatives, it is 
also important to subject long-lived, expensive infra-
structure such as dams and other water infrastructure 
to careful climate-robustness tests. In Mozambique, 
the recommendation coming out of our study is clearly 
toward delaying investments in large coastal protection 
schemes, and focusing more on the people aﬀ ected 
than on the land lost. Th e expensive option of con-
structing dikes would be justiﬁ ed only for vital coastal 
infrastructure, such as the port of Beira. In Bangladesh, 
a no-regrets strategy would be to begin by addressing 
the adaptation deﬁ cit and strengthening the early 
warning systems. Additional embankments and shel-
ters can be constructed in the medium term as the 
geographic incidence of risk becomes more certain. 
Bolivia and Ethiopia are two countries with large dif-
ferences between the eﬀ ects of the extreme Wet and 
Dry climate scenarios, especially in highland areas 
such as the Altiplano and the Rift Valley plateau. Th ese 
are areas that are already prone to both intermittent 
droughts and intense rainfall causing severe ﬂ ooding. 
Major investments to manage water resources might 
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be warranted under some climate scenarios but not 
under others. Hence, the studies identify a variety of 
more limited measures which are designed to increase 
the resilience of agriculture and economic activity 
to existing weather risks and which can be justiﬁ ed 
under a wide range of possible climate outcomes. In 
the longer term, larger investments for adaptation 
may be warranted if the uncertainty about the eﬀ ects 
of climate change has been greatly reduced.
LESSON 4: 
Do not rush into making long-lived investments in 
adaptation unless they are robust to a wide range of 
climate outcomes or until the range of uncertainty 
about future weather variability and climate has nar-
rowed. Start with low-regret options.
Current climate vulnerabilities
Climate change will always hide beneath weather vari-
ability. Systems that can eﬀ ectively cope with existing 
weather risks will be more successful in adapting to future 
climate change than those that cannot. Th e short-term 
priority is to better prepare for the weather risks that 
countries are already facing.
One clear example concerns the impact of storms, 
especially in coastal areas. Despite the uncertainty over 
future rainfall, there is relative certainty that a warmer 
climate will lead to rising sea levels and an increased 
intensity of storms. With the inevitable increase in 
urban populations, the costs of failing to protect 
coastal cities against major storms will increase rap-
idly. At the same time, the deﬁ ciencies of storm water 
drainage in coastal or inland cities has already led to 
avoidable—and sometimes large—losses caused by 
urban ﬂ ooding that have disproportionate eﬀ ects on 
the health and welfare of the poor. 
Many of the country studies illustrate the contri-
bution that better methods of managing existing 
weather risks can make in lowering the costs of 
adapting to climate change. In each of the Africa 
case studies damage to roads and transport caused 
by intermittent ﬂ ooding is a major factor determin-
ing the losses associated with alternative climate 
scenarios. Th is damage can be reduced, sometimes 
by a large amount, simply by reallocating the bud-
gets for road construction and maintenance to build 
fewer but stronger roads. With a few exceptions this 
is a no regrets strategy that will pay oﬀ  under a wide 
range of climate scenarios.
A similar conclusion emerges from the Samoa case 
study, in which strengthening buildings and infra-
structure so that they can withstand 1 in 50 or 100 
year storms under today’s climate would reduce the 
potential losses due to climate change by more than 
80% without any further adaptation. While resilience 
to extreme weather events was not examined in detail 
in all of the country studies, the analyses for Bangla-
desh, Mozambique and Vietnam all indicate that the 
adoption of construction standards and investment 
strategies which are more resilient to current weather 
risks can greatly reduce both storm damage in the 
near future and the costs of adaptation to climate 
change in the longer term. 
LESSON 5: 
Adaptation to climate change should start with the 
adoption of measures that tackle the weather risks 
that countries already face, such as more investment 
in water storage in drought-prone basins or protec-
tion against storms and ﬂ ooding in coastal zones 
and/or urban areas. Climate change will exacerbate 
these risks.
Th e prospect of greater weather variability has an 
additional, rather more diﬃ  cult, implication. Eco-
nomic development has been accompanied by a 
tendency for more rapid urban growth in coastal 
areas than in inland cities. Th is may reﬂ ect relative 
diﬀ erences in transport costs as well as government 
policies or individual preferences. Th ere will be 
many opportunities to reduce weather risks and the 
associated costs via intelligent urban and land-use 
planning. Whether in rural or urban areas, the rule 
of thumb is simple: wherever possible, ensure that 
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future growth and infrastructure takes place in loca-
tions that are less exposed to weather risks.
In addition to the need to subject large investments 
in protecting coastal infrastructure to great scrutiny 
to ensure robustness to diﬀ erent climate scenarios, 
appropriate incentives must be put in place that 
discourage the accumulation of physical capital in 
the shadow of dikes considered to be “safe.” As the 
tragedy of New Orleans dramatically illustrated, a 
suﬃ  ciently extreme event will breach a dike. Th e 
combination of an increasing severity of extreme 
events, the high costs of providing physical protec-
tion, and the accumulation of capital behind such 
barriers can mean that the expected value of losses, 
including human suﬀ ering, may not be reduced, 
either at all or by as much as expected by invest-
ments in protection.
Similar concerns apply to eﬀ orts to maintain the 
welfare of populations engaged in agriculture and 
other resource-intensive activities that are sensitive 
to climate variability and change. Short-term mea-
sures to prevent suﬀ ering must be complemented 
by long-term measures such as education, job train-
ing, and resettlement designed to reduce reliance 
on resources and assets whose value may be eroded 
by climate change. Adaptation should not attempt 
to resist the impact of climate change, but rather it 
should oﬀ er a path by which accommodation to its 
eﬀ ects can be made less disruptive and does not fall 
disproportionately on the poor and the vulnerable.
Th e country study for Samoa highlighted the dif-
ﬁ culty of managing coastal development in a coun-
try with high exposure to natural hazards. Coastal 
locations are attractive and easy to develop but 
buildings and infrastructure have been badly dam-
aged by storm surges or tsunamis. On the other 
hand, relocating existing infrastructure is expen-
sive and may be hard to justify. Either such invest-
ments should be minimised or they should built/
upgraded so that they are capable of withstanding 
more severe weather and other risks. 
Similarly, the country studies for Bolivia and Ethio-
pia highlight the importance of managing agricul-
tural expansion in drought-prone areas, especially in 
places where droughts may become more frequent or 
severe as a consequence of climate change. Th is may 
be economic with suﬃ  cient investment in developing 
drought-resistant crop varieties and water infrastruc-
ture, but too often such expansion has been a response 
to pressure on land resources. Once such expansion 
has occurred it becomes more diﬃ  cult and expensive 
to adapt to adverse climate outcomes.
A ﬁ nal example of the same mistake is permitting the 
development of housing and urban infrastructure in 
ﬂ ood plains, which is a signiﬁ cant problem in Ban-
gladesh, Ghana and Mozambique.
LESSON 6: 
Beware of creating incentives that encourage devel-
opment in locations exposed to severe weather risks. 
Where possible, build future cities out of harm’s way, 
particularly ﬂ ood plains or coastal zones that are 
exposed to sea level rise and storm surges.
Hard vs. soft approaches to adaptation
Th e distinction between “hard” (capital-intensive) 
and “soft” (institutions and policies) adaptation is 
easily exaggerated. Th e reality is that both approaches 
are necessary. Th ere is no point in building the best 
type of road in the wrong place, while the best insti-
tutions will provide no protection against a storm 
that destroys buildings or power lines. Th us, the 
challenge is to get the balance between hard and soft 
adaptation right. In some ﬁ eld sites in Vietnam, re-
establishment or migration of mangroves was ranked 
above spending money on sea walls, given the lower 
costs of mangrove planting and the potential for this 
activity to be more pro-poor.
Nonetheless, pouring concrete is often a very expen-
sive and relatively ineﬀ ective method of adaptation. 
Th e importance of keeping infrastructure and urban 
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development out of harm’s way is a key illustration of 
the costs of creating perverse incentives that encour-
age behavior and investments that worsen rather than 
reduce the prospective impacts of climate change. 
Equally, however, experience shows that the diﬃ  -
culties in devising and implementing soft measures 
are often underestimated because they may involve 
changes in expectations or (quasi-) established prop-
erty rights that are strongly resisted. 
Th e analysis of the global costs of adaptation relies 
heavily on the costs of hard measures. It is much 
simpler to estimate the costs of new or replace-
ment investment to provide protection against the 
eﬀ ects of climate change than it is to estimate the 
costs of creating new institutions and implement-
ing better policies. In many cases the monetary costs 
of soft adaptation are zero or negative in the longer 
run, because the changes bring greater beneﬁ ts than 
merely adaptation to climate change. Unfortunately, 
the political and social costs may be perceived as 
being very high, while the wider beneﬁ ts are hard to 
assess and, sometimes, to achieve.
Th is is part of the larger theme that economic develop-
ment is the best form of adaptation. Implementing good 
policies and developing eﬀ ective institutions should 
be pursued simply because they yield large economic 
and social beneﬁ ts. Once this is done, the incremental 
cost of planning for adaptation to climate change is 
minimal, because it should form a regular element of 
the responsibilities of institutions and the design of 
policies. All EACC estimates rely upon the assump-
tion that investments in adaptation take place within 
a framework of appropriate development policies and 
eﬃ  cient management of the economic sectors. 
Th e social analyses in all countries pointed to the 
need and importance of improvements in safety nets, 
community-based resource management systems, and 
disaster preparedness. It is also necessary to acceler-
ate the decentralization process and devolve decision 
making to the local level to promote local-level adapta-
tion and preparedness. Some of the economic models 
incorporated soft adaptation measures in agriculture, 
such as improvements in extension services and mar-
keting networks. Others should be exploited, such as 
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research and development of early maturing plant 
varieties and other innovations related to impacts of 
climate change on crops, livestock products, and pest 
control, as well as improvements in land tenure sys-
tems and improved entrepreneurial skills to generate 
oﬀ -farm income. In the transport sector, some signif-
icant soft approaches include proper timing of road 
construction, routine and timely road maintenance, 
and upgraded road design speciﬁ cations (including 
the choice of materials).
In Ghana, a number of soft measures were given prior-
ity over hard measures, including (a) upgrading peri-
urban slums and controlling the development of new 
ones; (b) the protection, management, and sustainable 
use of coastal wetlands; and (c) a review of Ghana’s 
coastal development plans to take into consideration 
climate change adaptation, including strengthened 
protection of coastlines and ports; additional ﬂ ood 
protection measures; and greater attention to the pro-
tection of coastal communities and ﬁ shery industry.
Several of the country studies—e.g. Bolivia, Mozam-
bique and Vietnam—emphasise the links between 
autonomous and planned adaptation in agriculture, 
forestry and aquaculture in responding to the eﬀ ects 
of climate change. Usually the planned adaptation 
involves some combination of expenditures on agricul-
tural research and extension and investment in irriga-
tion development. At the same time, it is important 
to ensure that market structures and incentives sup-
port the adoption of improved methods of production. 
Th is was particularly evident for catﬁ sh cultivation in 
Vietnam for which autonomous adaptation is likely to 
be dominant, provided that producer margins are not 
squeezed by processors and export companies. 
LESSON 7: 
Hard and soft approaches to adaptation are two sides 
of the same coin. Good policies, planning, and institu-
tions are essential to ensure that more capital-inten-
sive measures are used in the right circumstances and 
yield the expected beneﬁ ts. 
Conclusion
Th e related messages of uncertainty, ﬂ exibility, and 
time are central to this report. Some speciﬁ c conclu-
sions may be drawn about the implications of climate 
change and appropriate adaptation measures. But 
even more remains uncertain, so that the essence of 
adaptation is learning how to cope with greater lev-
els of uncertainty. Shifting resources toward more 
productive uses and away from less productive ones 
in the context of uncertainty is already a principal 
aim of development. Climate change increases the 
importance of achieving this aim, but it makes the 
task more complex. Time is also crucial. On some 
issues it is possible—and necessary—to implement 
adaptation measures within the next 5–10 years, but 
the whole process will extend over many decades. It is 
trivial to note that investments designed for a future 
that never materializes should be avoided. It is much 
less trivial to identify what those investments are. It 
may be wise to undertake some forms of adaptation 
now, especially those that provide resilience to a wide 
range of climate outcomes. But, equally, it may be 
better to postpone expensive investments in adapta-
tion until there is less uncertainty about whether they 
will be justiﬁ ed. 
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